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ABSTRACT John Fells 
The Concept of Tradition and its Deployment by the 
Historian of Political Thought 
I begin this thesis by reviewing the use of the concept 
of tradition in the disciplines of theology and literary 
criticism. In Chapter Ir· I discuss a number of concepts 
for ~hich 'tradition' is often used as a synonym. Then, 
by considering traditions in the arts and SGiences, I 
attempt to produce a model of 'tradition' for which there 
is no synonym. In that model, innovation is identified as 
being indispensable, rather than antithetical, to a tradition's 
vitality. 
In Chapter III I consider some influential notions of 
what constitutes a tradition in the history of political 
thought. In objecting to the idea that traditions are 
prescriptive, or paradigmatic, I suggest that political 
ideologies are traditions of discourse, and, therefore, that 
it is a mistake to contend that any given ideology can be 
identified by a simple definition. Location of that identity 
requires, in my view, an historical narrative of innovation 
in a tradition of discourse. Such a narrative, I argue in 
Chap~r IV, _should not be merely an account of the philosophies, 
alleged to have influenced political agents, with, perhaps, 
an account of those agents' policies. It should include a 
discussion of the vocabulary of ideological debate. In 
particular, I suggest that the actions of the ideologically 
committed are symbolic affirmations of their ideological 
identity, and, therefore, that the intelligibility of 
accounts of party authority and orthodoxy is enhanced by 
an appreciation of the vocabulary of ideological committment. 
Finally, I propose an objection to Skinner's view that 
professed principles can be treated as 'causal' conditions 
of an agent's actions. My conclusion is that the histo~an 
of political ideas should narrate the history of a tradition 
by recounting the political experiences of an association 
of political agents in the light of the changing vocabulary 
in which that experience has been articulated. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Michael Oakeshott, in his discussion of a 'tradition 
of behaviour', in Rationalism in Politics, writes that such 
a tradition is "a 1 tricky thing to get to know". All 
the components of the tradition change, but never all at 
once, or at the same rate. Thereby continuity is preserved. 
In Oakeshott's words: 
"Nothing that ever belonged to it is 
completely lost: we are always swerving 
back to recover and make something topical 
out of even its remotest moments: and 
nothing for long remains unmodified".2 
If, however, we are to try to find an application for 
these reflections, when we discuss tradition as a concept 
to be deployed by the historian of political thought, we 
might well begin by deciding whether or not the parts of 
the tradition whose differential rates of modification ensure 
continuity, are elements of vocabulary, "broader concepts", 
or both, or neither. Is it possible_ to identify the medium 
3 
of what Oakeshott calls the "flow of sympathy", or must 
we admit that, in fact, traditions are, as Oakeshott says 
they appear·to be, "essentially.unintelligible"?4 
Further clarification of Oakeshott's ideas about tradition 
appear in his introduction to Hobbes's Leviathan. Here 
Oakeshott explains that traditions of writing "tolerate 
and unite an internal variety", 5 and that a tradition "has 
the ability to change without losing its identity". 6 
Traditions of writing, then, are li~e traditions of behaviour. 
Writing is, after all, an activity. But the crucial question, 
'continuity of what', remains unanswered. 
2 
At one point in his introduction, Oakeshott distinguishes 
traditions of writing from one another, using as a criterion 
their "Master conceptions" - for example, "Reason" and 
"Nature". 7 Elsewhere in that essay, in a section headed 
"The Tradition of Hobbes", Oakeshott sets out to outline 
the relationships between Hobbes's themes of Right, Will 
and Artifice. ·These concepts Oakeshott identifies as "ruling 
ideas" which·have "dominated the political philosophy of 
the last three hundred years". 9 By these concepts Hobbes 
is 10 "allied to the future". 
Here, then, we have both a criterion of identification 
for traditions of writing and a putative explanation of 
the continuity which is the source of that identity. The 
analysis of "tradition" is not quite complete however. 
Oakeshott also writes that this Hobbesian tradition is a 
tradition of opposition to another tradition, equally old, 
from which it must be distinguished. How is the distinction 
to be achieved? Hobbes's work, according to Oakeshott, 
represents a "break away" from the "Rational-Natural Tradition", 
which begins from Law and Obligation rather than Right. 11 
This opposed tradition "cannot tolerate" Hobbes's doctrine. 12 
The distinction between traditions at first seems clear. Yet, 
in the same place, Oakeshott also warns that there has been 
a failure to detect the tradition to which Hobbes's civil 
philosophy belongs. Membership of such a tradition must 
then, I suggest, be more than a matter of the repetition 
of certain ideas, and the exclusion of others. After all, 
traditions, according to Oakeshott, "unite an internal variety". 
Clearly, the notion of "tradition" itself requires further 
examination. 
3 
It is helpful, at this point, to look at some definitions. 
The definitions of "tradition" in the Oxford English Dictionary 
deal with the notions of delivery, handing over and transmission, 
and then with what is transmitted. Two definitions of "tradition" 
in this latter sense are of interest here. The first (5a) 
states that a tradition is: 
"That which is handed down; a statement, 
belief or practice transmitted (especially 
orally) from generation to generation". 
The second ( 5b), preceded by the qualification "more vaguely", 
refers to: 
"A long established and generally accepted 
custom or method of procedure, having 
almost the force of law; an immemorial 
usage; the body (or any one) of the experiences 
and usages of any branch or school of art or 
literature handed down py predecessors and 
generally followed." 13 
I shall discuss what I understand by "traditionalism" at 
greater length. later. I suggest, provisionally, that the 
tradition towhose authority the traditionalist submits is 
that defined in the first, rather than the last, part of 
(5b). This last vaguer sense: "the body of experiences 
and usages ... "does not convey the notion of something 
liable to exert authority or communal reverence. If this 
vague sense is the one relevant to the history of political 
thought, then we return to the question of how, to paraphrase 
15 Oakeshott, intimations can be pursued. What is to count 
as following "experiences and usages"? Any vagueness in 
the answer to that question wouid be made more obscure by 
the fact that the definition is only committed to the statement 
that these usages are "generally" followed. It also states 
that such usages·are also those belonging to a "branch or 
school of art or literature". . f . t A t. . 16 Now, 1 1n rue us 1n1an 
4 
manner, we next go in search of the relevant definition of 
"school", it is clear that a tradition of political thought 
need not always be a school of thought. The Oxford English 
Dictionary informs us that, amongst other things, a school 
is: 
"The body of persons that a:re or have been 
taught by a particular master (in philosophy, 
science, art, etc); hence in wider sense a 
body or succession of persons who in some 
department of speculation or practice are 
disciples of the same master, or who are united 
by a general similarity of principles and 
methods".l7 
That the set of relationships which make up a school 
are not necessarily those typical of a tradition of political 
writing can be readily illustrated by the case of Liberalism~ 
Liberalism has been called a tradition of discourse, 18 and 
regardless of the claims of Liberals, such as Herbert Spencer 
and L.T. Hobhouse, it is easy to show that the criterion 
for calling a writer a Liberal is not the presence in his 
work of any Liberal principl~, or method, or of reference 
to a common master. Comparison of the worksof T.H. Green, 
J.S. Mill, and Herbert Spencer, qll acknowledged liberals, 
is all that is required to remind us that Liberalism is 
not a school of thought. Spencer's account of a putative 
Liberal principle serves the cause of polemic, not that 
of good historigraphy. The historian who. takes Spencer's 
claims about Liberalism seriously, as a g.uide for his own 
work,. commits an error which I shall attempt to analyse 
in depth in a later Chapter, (Ch. III). 
How then are we to understand the above vague second 
sense of "tradition"? It is not clear what is '!followed" 
or what constitutes such "following". It seems that the 
notions of authority, and of the "transmission"of statements, 
5 
beliefs, or practices which made up the first part of that 
definition of "tradition" should be re-examined. Certainly 
other views of tradition emphasise just these aspects. J.G.A. 
Pocock, for example, in his essays collected in Politics, 
Language and Time, attaches importance to authority. 19 He 
notes Oakeshott's point that traditions are difficult to 
conceptualize, but adds that such conceptualisations must 
take place if traditions are to be communicated. 20 It -is 
at this point that he introduces his notions of authority. 
However, before going on to di~cuss Pocock's main argument, it 
is worth pausing to note that Pocock, in making the above 
comments, was writing about traditions of behaviour and about 
conservative and radical strategies for change within a 
tradition. Still it is not quite so clear that all the individ-
uals whose works are included in any tradition of political 
thought envisaged themselves as contributors to that, or any 
other, tradition. What could Locke have known of the Liberal 
tradition? Would he have attached any meaning at all to the 
name "Liberal"? 21 These questions about the nature of the 
history of political thought as history rather than hindsight 
will be raised again shortly. The point I want to make here 
is as follows. Whereas we can perhaps agree with Pocock that, 
at all except the simplest levels of human existence and 
behaviour, traditions must be conceptualized by participants 
in them; in what have been called traditions of political 
writing, we must distinguish between active participants in a 
tradition, and the sources from which the tradition draws. 
Let·us now return to Pocock's main argument. In the 
essay, ·'On the Non-revolutionary Nature of Paradigms', 
following the one to which I have already referred, Pocock 
6 
agrees that the thinking which he has discussed is that of 
the inhabitants of pre-modern societies. I have, so far, 
taken my examples from Liberalism - a tradition of thought 
in a more or less non-traditionalist society. But even in 
modern society, Pocock claims, political talk is governed 
by "paradigms". These "paradigms" are so-called authoritarian 
linguistic structures in which even the radical must 
participate if he is to engage in politics (of course, the 
radical has his own tradition). Here, again then, we have 
a putative answer to our question about the constituents and 
continuity of a tradition of political thought. What is 
required is an investigation of political writing. That 
Pocock's account of paradigms is inadequate has, however, 
been convincingly argued by J.D. Rayner. Full exposition of 
his criticisms will be left until it can take its proper 
place in an account of political language, ( Ch .III). That 
there is a pressing need for such an account can be shown by 
brief consideration of two well known historiographical works. 
They are S.S. Wolin's Politics and Vision22 and W.H. G~eenleaf's 
Order Empiricism and Politics. 23 · 
Wolin claims that there is a Western political tradition. 
This tradition of political philoso~hy is the most powerful 
24 
restraint ·on the philosopher's "freedom to speculate". 
Comprising a "common political vocabulary" and "core of 
problems", it sets the terms of the debate. 25 , 26 Wolin claims 
further that there is but this one tradition, allowing no division 
into separate ideologies - a view from which we are led to 
believe that if a way of thinking does not belong to the 
tradition, so defined, then it is not "political". 
Greenleaf, on the other hand, identifies more than one 
tradition. He does not make traditions sound quite so 
7 
authoritarian, but does seem to equate them with schools of 
thought. Traditions are said to comprise a style persisting 
through time, and participants in them "share at least some 
. 27 
ideas,methods, and assumptions". Of course, if this were 
the case, then traditions would be easily identifiable. There 
would also be little dispute about their scope and membership. 
Unfortunately, where Greenleaf sees several traditions, Wolin 
sees one. 
We are reminded here of Oakeshott's words that"··· 
though a tradition of behaviour is flimsy and elusive, it is 
not without identity". 28 What is lacking is a criterion of 
identity for traditions, and for traditions of political 
thought in particular. Since there seems to be some measure 
of agreement that traditions of political thought are a matter 
of, among, other things, language, we would perhaps do well to 
retain, as a provisional definition of them, one of the 
definitions found in the OED: "the body (or any one) of the 
experiences and usages of any branch of art or literature 
handed down by predeC"essors and generally followed". Quite 
what this involves still stands in need of clarification 
however. I shall say no more here about the alleged authority 
of "paradigms", or about the alleged effect of traditions as 
restraints on speculation. I shall turn instead to the study 
of literary criticism for further clues about the content and 
continuity of traditions of writing. 
In the case of English literature, intuition might lead 
us to concede, more readily than in the case of political 
thought, that contributing to a tradition cannot be a matter 
of lite:-ally sharing a method, problems or problem solutions. 
Literature, Bfter all,does not .make obvious use of scientific 
8 
method. Nevertheless; F.R. Leav1s, in The Great Tradition, 29 
writes of Jane Austen's work has having a bearing on George 
Eliot's own problems as a novelist, and of Eliot's work as 
being"··· peculiarly relevant to[(Henry) J.F]James's 
interests and problems ... ". 30 The matter might appear to 
be explained by Leavis's remark that Portrait of a Lady is 
A "variation" on part of Daniel Deronda. 31 ' That assertion is 
made in order to argue that there is a "significant relation 
between the novelists". 32 It is just this relationship between 
members of a tradition that has so far appeared to be so 
problematic. The expected clarification of that relationship 
is not forthcoming, however, because Leavis then goes on to 
write that James develops "an art so unlike George Eliot's". 33 
Leavis is, after all, he tells us, concerned not with 
"indebtedness" but with influence. 34 In other words: "It is 
not derivativeness that is in question but the relation between 
two individual geniuses". 35 Leavis believes that it is "more 
"' 
than a guess" that Eliot had "some part" in James's 
36 development. The significant relation bet~een them, remains 
obscure. 
We have a tradition, but in it the relationship between 
individual contributors to the tradition, the sense in which 
they are one tradition, is not at all clear. Austen, Eliot, 
James and Conrad are said to be all innovators "in 'form' and 
method". 37 Moreover, Leavis remarks that calling Conrad part 
of the tradition does not demand the establishment of 
"particular relations" between Conrad and anyone of the other 
authors mentioned. 38 According to Leavis, all have learned 
from their predecessors, but without imitation. 
9 
Leavis's other explicit remarks about "the Great Tradition" 
are brief but revealing. The "Great Tradition" is"··. the 
tradition to which what is great in English fiction belongs 
Elsewhere, he remarks that the "great" novelists 
attain to greatness through an intense interest in life. Is 
this how.we are to identify the members of the "Great Tradition"? 
Other traditions of English literature are admitted by 
Leavis too. The minor traditions stem from writers such as 
Emily Bront~ and Walter Scott, and with regard to these more 
minor figures, Leavis's approach is reminiscent of Wolin's. 
Wolin writes of the innovators who extend the range of a 
tradition, rather than of the tradition's lesser figures who 
work within the same common order of problems. Leavis admits 
the existence of many so-called "classical" novelists, but he 
is mainly concerned with the major novelists who "not only 
change the possibilities of the art for practitioners and 
. 40 
readers", but also promote "human awareness" In some way 
the works of earlier "great" novelists "make possible" the 
later novelists' work.· That this puzzling "tradition" is, 
however, at least in part constructed by the critic, rather 
than reconstructed by him from evidence in the way we expect 
of a historian, is made clear in Leavis's introduction. Jane 
Austen, writes Leavis, "creates the tradition we see leading 
. 41 down to her ... ", "her work gives meaning to the past." 
The difference between the historian and the critic is clear 
here. For an historian, the past must be intelligible in its 
own terms. This is not the case with Leavis. For him, the 
pas_t. is to be given meaning in the light of the critic's 
hindsight. Yet, this notion of Leavis's, if it seems eccentric, 
is not unique. T.S. Eliot, in"Tradition and the Individual 
d •t• 42 Talent", also writes of participation in literary tra 1 1ons. 
10 
Moreover, he does so in terms of authors learning without 
imitation to write work~ which alter the meaning of the past. 
Eliot writes of tradition as being something obtainable by 
43 
an author by "great labour". It cannot be inherited. Authors 
who would be "traditional" must acquire a consciousness of 
the past through the study of European literature. A writer 
is "traditional" when h.e has that "historical sense, which 
is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal, and of 
44 the timeless and the temporal together". 
Inspite of this strange usage of "tradition" as a legacy 
to be striven for, rather than participated in, the way Eliot 
uses the notion has much in common with that of Leavis. 
Eliot does, of course, write that an author must be "set 
among the dead" 45 to be appreciated, but, and here we have 
the similarity with Leavis, he also maintains that a converse 
relation holds. Eliot believes that the creation of a new 
work alters all the internal relations of the past, alters 
all the relative values of past works. In Eliot's words 
II" 
II· what happens when a new work is created is' something 
that happens simultaneously to all the works of art which 
preceded it"~6 Again, just as the members of Leavis's 
Great Tradition are innovators, and the question of 
"indebtedness" does not arise, so for Eliot (see After Strange 
Gods), it is a mis-application of the word "traditional" 
to use it to denote "attempts to do what has already been 
done perfectly"~7 All but the "patently negligible" is 
origina1. 48 Tradition is not a question of standing still. 
Yet, where a tradition is concerned, Eliot draws our attention 
to the role of orthodoxy which "supervises" "the perpetual 
bringing up to date and criticism of tradition".49 
Now Eliot's After Strange Gods from which the immediately 
11 
preceding remarks are taken, is concerned with the ethical 
aspects of literature rather than the purely literary or 
aesthetic. He does, however, make some remarks in that 
essay relevant to what I have said about the notion of a 
school of writing. He comments that the names "romantic" 
and "classicist" are not something that authors "bother" 
about except when they band together under a name in order 
to help to make themselves better known to a contemporary 
bl . 50 pu 1c. Writing as a "romantic" or as a "classicist" 
author is something which Eliot doubts has ever done an author 
anything but harm. 51 
What are we then to make of the labels "classical" and 
"romantic", and of any other schools or traditions the critics 
discuss? At one point, Eliot remarks that, where such terms 
as "romantic" and "classic" are involved, "the opportunities 
for systematic misunderstanding and for futile controversy 
d • l l t • d l II 52 are accor 1ng y amos 1 ea ... Before, however, we 
conclude that the same must be true for all such labels, 
including perhaps "Liberal" and "Conservative", it is worth 
noticing the way in which the case of the terms "romantic" 
and "classical" as naming traditions has been defended. 
53 Mario Praz in The Romantic Agony compares the way in 
which the terms "romantic" and "classical" have been used 
with the use of "conservative" and "liberal". He concludes 
that the pairs of terms are alike; their meanings have been 
extended equally arbitrarily. Praz; nevertheless, defends 
his use of the word "romantic" against philosophers' objections 
to such "approximate labels" 54 It is as "approximate labels" 
that Praz finds the terms valuable. They cannot give, and 
we should not demand that they give, "exact and cogent 
12 
. 55 definition of thought". The label "romanti-c" is a "servic-
eable makeshift" whose "fictitious character can easily 
56 be proved". Its usefulness lies in the way that talk 
about a specified tradition hinders arbitrary interpretation 
of a work agreed to belong to that tradition .. Complete 
refusal to assign a literary work to any place amongst other 
works is simply a block to study. Admittedly, in terms 
of aesthetic appreciation, as Praz remarks"··· the work 
forms a unique world shut up in itself". 57 That, however, 
is a "philosophical truism", which if accepted, "would leave 
the critic no alternative but a mysticai, admiring silence 11 • 58 
Critics, although some might regard silent admiration as 
a more appropriate channel for their energies, interpret 
texts; and assignment of authors to a tradition helps them 
in this activity. 59 Praz gives the following example. Some 
of the imagery employed by the poet Aleman bears a 
superficial resemblance to that of Shelley. Yet it cannot 
be interpreted in the same way because the "aspirations" 
we find in Shelley's work are "the property of the Romantics"; 
d Al . t R t . 60 Th b . t. t an cman 1s no a oman 1c. e o v1ous ques 1on o 
ask , of course, is "why not". Praz tells us that tags 
such as "romantic" indicate "where the accent falls". 61 
Applied outside their period they become meaningless. If, 
however, we are to ask, "why are Dryden and Pope not called 
romantics?" Praz would, no doubt, repeat that the terms 
are approximate labels with no definite criteria of applica-
tion. We all know that Dryden. and Pope are not romantics, 
and we do need a label (why not romantic?) for writers such 
as Byron, Shelley and Coleridge whom we feel do belong together. 
To give Praz the last word here: 
"A knowledge of the tastes and preferences 
which belong to each period is as a sine 
qua non of the interpretation of ~ work of 
art, and literary history cannot afford to 
dispense with approximate terms such as these 
we have been discussing, terms which do not 
claim to be more than symbols of specific 
tendencies of sensitivity. They are 
intended to be empirical categories, and to 
condemn them as futile abstractions is as 
great an error as to exalt them into 
realities of universal import".62 
13 
A concept of "tradition" then is part of the critic's 
apparatus. In the way he uses it, the concept is indeed 
a vague one. That vagueness has been defended however. I 
have tried to show how literary critics talk of authors' 
membership of traditions. Leavis in particular juxtaposes 
passages by different authors, and claims that we can "see" 
the influence of one author upon another. Claims like these 
are the clearest suggestion given of what constitutes the 
bond between members of a literary tradition. Is the concept 
used by, or available to, the historian of political thought 
equally vagfie? C~rtainly, according to Quentin Skinner, 
such ascriptions of influence between writers are also·common 
63 in writings on t~e history of political thought. Unfortun-
ately, however, Skinner makes this observation as part of 
the evidence he adduces for his claim that many histories 
of political thought are methodologically un~ound. Is, then, 
the critic's conception of tradition inappropriate to the 
history of political thought? 
Skinner argues that attribution of influence in a work 
of political thought must at least demand proof of the repetition 
in the later work of features of the earlier one which is 
claimed to have influenced the author of the later work. 
Moreover, the appearance of these features· must be shown 
14 
not to be coincidental. Whether or not this is true, or 
possible, of political thought and writings, in literature, 
recurrence certainly cannot be the criterion for claiming 
that one author has influenced another. Eliot's remarks 
about the original and the negligible, and Leavis's 
distincti·on between "influence" and "indebtedness", confirm 
as much. Skinner, however, makes the further point that 
if the historian of political thought is to claim that a 
later work is not so much a case of strict repetition, but 
rather one of the later work containing "elements" of the 
earlier, and therefore a case of influence, then the historian 
must first identify what constitute the re-identifiable 
"characteristics" of a work. (This is the problem of the 
identification of continuity of a tradition in another guise). 64 
Could a second author.be influenced by an aside, rather 
than the main argument, or even by a misunderstanding of 
the argument? Any looser criteria of influence than those 
criticized by Skinner are simply talk of "a certain ambience"~~ 
talk which Skinner dismisses as empty. 
Attributions of influence simply become accounts of 
what the writer finds himself reminded of when he reads 
a given text. Yet a tighter criterion would be a denial 
of originality, a criterion of plagiarism rather than of 
influence. What then is left of our putative literary 
traditions? 
Skinner's arguments were put forward as criticisms 
of the method empl·oyed by historians of political th~ught. 
They cannot, I think, be transferred without qualification 
to the study of literary criticism, and.there used as criticism 
or the way 1i terary critics write of "influence" and, in 
15 
writing of "influence", of tradition. Skinner writes of 
accounts of a would-be historian's own reminisenses accounts 
of which work reminds the writer of which others - that 
is all his attributions of influence can be - in a way which 
makes it clear that he feels that little of lasting value 
is contained in such accounts. Yet, in the case of literary 
criticism, is not what we look for in a great critic a kind 
of connoisseurship, so that the connections he makes are 
illuminating and (to use a deliberately loose expression 
in this short excursion into the imprecise realm of aesthetics) 
somehow right? If the critic's use of the concept of tradition 
seems ill defined, that vagueness assists the reader in 
avoiding the blunder of seeking the familiar in an alien 
t th Sk . 11 h. 1" 66 argumen , e error 1nner ca s paroc 1a 1sm. Putting 
Shelley's but not Aleman's work in the romantic tradition 
stops us searching Aleman's writings for the aspirations 
familiar in Shelley's. The critics who adopt this defence 
of their~use of "tradition" do not however escape as easily 
from the accusation of having committed another of the 
blunders identified by Skinner. To fall prey to this error 
"prolepsis", is to confuse the significance of an author's 
work with its content. 67 To repeat an example given by 
Skinner, the significance of Locke might be that he founded 
the liberal tradition (Skinner says "school"), but that 
could never have been· his intention. 5 8 So is the question 
of whether or not Shelley is to be called a romantic to 
be decided by reference to the significance, or to the 
content, of his work? We return to.the problem· of criteria 
of application for Praz' s "approximate label"· Eliot, it 
. 
will be remembered, doubted whether any poet has ever 
benefitted from trying to write as a romantic. Certainly, 
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the author's intention that a work be a contribution to 
a tradition does not automatically make it a contribution 
to that tradition (one need only remember talents as diverse 
as those of V. van Gogh, and Wm. McGonagall in this connection). 
I shall also argue later that it cannot be simply the presence 
of certain "essential" elements in a political text that 
make it a contribution to the Liberal, Conservative, or 
any other, tradition of political thought. How are the 
labels to be applied? The literary critic assigns a work 
to a tradition in order to highlight its significance, but 
his unhistorical method of proceeding bars the historian 
of political thought (if Skinner is correct) from deploying 
the concept of tradition in the same way. 
Can we, in spite of the inapplicability of the critic's 
conception of tradition to the history of political thought, 
nevertheless admit the possibility of an aesthetic dimension 
in some works of political thought, something akin to what 
Wolin calls vision? Skinner points to a conflict of viewg 
petween those who would extract a philosophical argument 
of the greatest possible coherence from a text, and those 
who would recover its historical meaning. I suggest that, 
besides looking for the logical aspects of an argument with a 
proper respect for the historical setting from which it 
has been inherited,we should allow the possibility of something 
more akin to an aesthetic appreciation of the appeal of 
a text. We should consider the vision it presents, and 
how that vision has been rendered. If it is the-achievement 
of some writers of political texts to present an all-embracing 
account of their world; then, besides both the philosophical 
analysis which assumes the coherence of that vision, ·and 
the historical narrative of what the author meant by his 
17 
words and of what he sought to achieve by them, some 
organizing concept capable of performing the function of 
the apparatus employed by the literary critic is required. 
How else are we to avoid "a mystical admiring silence". (Praz) 
when we come to appreciate th~t vision as a self-contained 
account of the world? 
Before making a detailed examination of the way in 
which historians of political thought have already deployed 
the concept "traditioti",it is worth considering another 
field of academic enquiry in which that concept has been 
used. That inquiry is theology, and an examination of some 
aspects of the study is particularly appropriate at this 
point for, as one author puts it: 
" ... the language of theology is metaphor 
and its truth akin to the truth of poetry". 69 
That writer, Meredith Dewey, characterizes theology 
as "the science of the living God and of his (sic) work 
in and for a living world 11 • 70 Its language is metaphor, 
~ 
and metaphors change. Dewey's remarks in that essay ("The 
Anglican Tradition in Theology") encapsulate much of the 
position af the reformed churches in their debate with Rome 
about the relative importance of scripture and tradition. 
The nature of this debate, within which the theolog~cal 
concept of tradition has been defined, can best be described 
inside the framework of an account of the nature of theology. 
In giving this account I am indebted to the work of Theodore 
W. Jennings Jnr. and of Gerhard Ebeling. 71 , 72 
One dictionary definition of tradition, it will be 
remembered, asserts that a tradition is "a statement, belief 
or practice transmitted (especially orally) from ~eneration 
to generition''· Now if a tradition is solely one of oral 
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transmission, there will be no means whereby participants in 
that tradition could note variations between their own 
formulations and those of preceding generations. The matter 
is little different even when that tradition is based upon 
a set of texts which give an account, metaphorical perhaps, 
of a past event and its significance as the foundation of 
the tradition. That text can exist alongside an oral tradition 
of interpretation. The important thing about the interpreted 
religious text is that the past it portrays gives significance 
to the present. Elaboration of that significance, interpre-
tation of the text, is the task of theology. Still, although 
the truth of religion has been compared to that of poetry, 
the roles of theologian and literary critic are, nevertheless, 
not quite analogous. Unlike a poem, scripture is authoritative. 
Whilst each generation interprets a text anew, each interpre-
tation lays claim to being that authority. Discrepancy 
between interpretations then becomes a serious business, 
and discrepancies will be noticed, if successive elaborations 
of the significance of the divine message to the ever changing 
present are themselves fixed in writing as a body of text. 
Religious communities have had to decide which texts 
will make up their canon. The question of canonicity is 
one which has long been the subject of controversy, some-
times bitter, amongst Christians. Besides those texts written 
under the influence of a religious community's first leaders, 
the community might also agree to the inclusion, as part 
of the liturgical canon, of texts from various sources 
because of their historical importance in this role (Jennings 
73 gives the example of the book of Hebrews). Also among 
the collection of texts informing a religious community 
are those which function as sources of theological guidance. 
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These texts might comprise, for example, the decisions of 
councils of bishops which validate the work of theologians, 
as well as the work of prestigious theologians themselves. 
The Christian reformers of the sixteenth century, however, 
rejected Rome's doctrine of the equality of scripture and 
tradition which gave nearly equal emphasis to all the components 
of the above list. If we wish to know the meaning of "tradition" 
for the Roman Catholic Church, we need not look much further 
than the proceedings of the Council of TreAt. These allow 
for scripture to be supplemented by the tradition which 
begins wi.th the apostles and proceeds to the present 
incumbent of the See of Rome. The Reformers slogan of 
"sola scriptura", however, can be variously interpreted: 
and it has been. 
At one extreme, the modernist sees the Bible as a text 
to be treated "historically". Like any contemporary text, 
the only force its propositions are allowed to have are 
those recognizable by reason. Such an approach is a denial 
~ 
of tradition for it overlooks the subsequent history of 
the community in order to put the text in its original setting. 
The Bible then becomes simply another ancient text. The 
pietist, on the other hand, to give an equally crude 
characterisation of the opposite extreme, substitutes, as 
he reads the Bible, hi~ own private religious experience 
for the shared interpretation sanctioned by a community.In 
doing so, he is condemned to a silence reminiscent of that 
described by Praz in the case of a critic who re.fuses to 
assign a work to a tradition. 
Jennings points out that extreme subjectivism of 
interpretation can be avoided by appeal to the products 
of past inquiry, or, as Barth suggests, by appeal to the 
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community existing through time. 74 The problem facing all 
who engage in theological interpretation, but which is 
faced most acutely by the Pietists is that there is no 
universally agreed standard of acceptability of theological 
int.erpretation. With no test of validity, why should the 
number of interpretations not multiply until the number 
of sects becomes equal to the number of believers? 
If this argument seems to be decisive against the reformed 
churches and the doctrine of sola scriptura, it must be 
noted too that it is equally applicable as a criticism of 
the notion of Apostolic Tradition upheld by Rome. There 
too, the final appeal, admittedly on the part of a recognised 
authority, is to the guidance of Spirit, enjoyment of which 
is the basis of that authority. However, Barth's hint that 
participation in a community of theologians limits subject-
ivism illuminates important aspec.ts of tradition. We should 
not underestimate the significance either of that suggestion 
or of another of Barth's claims namely that the his~ory 
of theology is not only a theological task, but is to be 
undertaken within the Church; "the only possible sphere" 
f th t . 75 or e en erprlse. A similar point is, I believe, true 
of political discourse and political parties. I do not 
suggest that only party-members can write the history of 
a tradition of political discourse.. I suggest, rathe~ that 
they provid.e the key to who is to be considered to be a 
member of the tradition. That, however, forms part of a 
later discussion. My concern here is with the theological 
conception of tradition. 
Now, whereas it must be admitted that if the pronounce-
ments comp~ising a tradition were not committed to writing, 
their existence would be less well evidenced, and there 
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would be no evidence at all for the tradition as a series 
of decisions, the content of these decisions will, neverthe-
less, be preserved where they concern the last agreed form 
of ritual or preaching (examples given by Ebeling are 
auricular confession and infa~t baptism). 76 To be reminded 
of this fact is to be reminded that fundamental aspects of 
the existence 6.f are ligious community are tho·se concerned 
with proclamation - teaching and imparting a message - and 
with the ritual into which such proclamation is incorporated. 
This continuing transmission of what scripture reveals is, 
according to Ebeling, "a definite element in the Catholic 
conception of Tradition. 77 It also leaves us with the 
following difficulty. If the Church constitutes the 
tradition as the continuing act of transmission or "traditio" 
(to use Ebelings terminology), then, when it makes pronounce-
ments about canonicity, it is also the final arbiter of 
what is to constitute the "traditum" elaborated in the 
process of tradition. The distinction.between "traditum" 
II> 
and "actus tradendi", between what is to be transmitted 
and the act of transmission, disappears. To refer again 
to the dictionary definition, there ceases to be a distinction 
between the ;"statement, belief or practice" and the utterance 
whereby it is transmitted. The concept of tradition, then, 
in the-formula "Scripture and Tradition" appears to be 
problematic. Ebeling assures us that it is the subject 
of debate amongst present-day (1968) Catholics. 78 
The discussion of the theological conception of tradition, 
however, need not be abandoned at this unsatisfactory point. 
Ebeling puts forward a suggestion which merits careful 
consideration. The transmitted object of tradition seems 
elusive. This fact leads Ebeling, as a theologian, to the 
conclusion that what is being transmitted is neither a 
statement of a doctrine nor a law. I.t is: 
" the very person of Jesus himself as 
the incarnate word of God, giving its 
authority to the Gospel and to the event 
of the authoritative Word of faith: and 
correspondingly we have the Holy Spirit 
as God's Presence in the faith-creating 
World of Preaching".79 
Elsewhere he says that: 
"The Christian tradition is always in 
danger of becoming a legal tradition, 
and being false to the transmission of 
the Gospel. Doing justice to the tradition 
does not consist in the preserving and 
handing on of its content and forms, but 
in.its rightful use as ways and means of 
the Gospel".80 
This view seems to be in close agreement with that of 
Meredith Dewey quoted ~bove. Admittedly, in Ereling's 
conception the "traditum" appears to be elusive, but a 
history of the modes and continuing acts of transmission 
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is still perfectly possible. Just such a history is sketched 
by Norman Sykes, one of Dewey's collaborators in The Anglican 
T d •t• 81 ra l lOn. 
It's elusive "traditum" notwithstanding then, the 
theological conception of "tradition" is in some respects 
more tangible than that employed by the literary critic. 
It was impossible to specify what one author within a literary 
tradition- could be said to have transmitted to another. What 
had connected the various participants of a tradition was 
no more, nor anything less, than the critic's own judgement 
·Of their unity. The traditions of theology, by contrast, 
are more easily identified. A Regius Professor of Divinity 
at Cambridge assures us, moreover, that "attention to God" 
82 
cannot be construed as requiring no church service. 
Those who claim to be able to worship much better "privately 
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and alone" do not, he declares flatly, worship "the God 
of the Bible".83 Deliberate participation in a: theological 
tradition must therefore manifest itself as membership of a 
church denomination (or heresy). It is the church which 
preaches and bears witness to what is so proclaimed; so 
the theologist must be a member of a community of believers. 
His task is to show the significance to the present of the 
events recounted in scr,ipture. Only as a member of a community 
can he come to his fullest appreciation of the unity of what 
he calls "tradition". This last point will be of some 
importance in later chapters. 
Now some authors have (wrongly I believe) equated 
84 Churches and political ideologies. Historians of both talk 
of tradition. Are they using the same concept? Clearly, 
the claims made by some historians of political thought that 
"traditions" inform the subject matter of their studies stand 
in need of examination given the diversity of the notions of 
tradition I have discussed. It remains to be seen then whether 
or not the concept of "tradition" deployed by the historian 
of political thought should more closely resemble the concept 
deployed either by the literary critic or by the theologian. 
This investigation of the concept~ deployment will be 
preceded, however, by some further general clarification of 
the concept of tradition itself. This I shall attempt by 
means of a comparison of a group of related (and frequently 
conflated) concepts. It will then be possible to examine 
the claims made by a number of historians of political 
thought with regard to-what they have called "traditl.ons". 
My own suggestions regarding deployment of the concept will, 
I hope, also become clear during the course of the discussion. 
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II 
DISTINGUISHING CONCEPTS 
TOWARDS A MODEL OF TRADITION 
In this chapter I shall examine the notions of "custom" 
and "habit", as a·preliminary to the elaboration of a sense 
of "tradition" in which that word is not merely a synonym 
for "custom", and denotes a different relationship between 
past and present. Here, too, I shal~ examine what we mean 
by "habit", in ordey to distinguish it from "custom" and 
"tradition". This will be a first step towards my own 
account of the concept of tradition, in which following 
a tradition is distinguished from traditionalism. 
That the above distinction is not always made is 
immediately apparent to the reader of H.B. Acton's 
'Tradition and Some Other Forms of Order~' 1 In that essay 
Acton employs the following defintion of "tradition as: 
" .•. a belief or practice transmitted 
from one generation to another and 
accepted as authoritative, or deferred 
to without argument".2 
By limiting his discussion of traditional processes 
to the usage by which we talk of "traditional societie.s", 
Acton is led to argue that"··· role and imitation are 
characteristics of tradition" , and to suppose"··· that 
tradition and custom are closely connected if not identical 
notions, though we tend perhaps to use the word "tradition" 
for the more.elaborate and civilized forms of custom". 3 
He goes on to add that, as I propose, "a fuller treatment 
of them both would lead to the examination of such conceptions 
as habit and skill;,. 4 
Acton, then, writes of traditional practices as being 
characterized· by a slow r.ate of change, and of traditional 
societies as being societies whose members might engage 
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in disputes about who is to be king, but not about the value 
of the institution of kingship. 
Similarly, we find an anthropologist writing: 
"People usually cite, as the identifying 
feature of traditional society, the power 
and authority of tradition, which passes 
on from generation to generation a way of 
living and a view of life which do not 
change time and again in·.form and content 
according to the fashion of the period".5 
That anthropologist concludes, however, that tradition 
(in this sense) and transformation are not mutually exclusive. 
The validity of this point and of Acton's remarks about 
kingship are borne out by the accounts of two traditional 
societies, which I shall use to illustrate my remarks about 
tradition and custom. Before doing so, in order to make 
full use of th~se illustrations, I shall by way of introduction 
recall briefly the way in which "custom" has been understood 
by many political thinkers. 
Consider the following two examples. The first is to 
be found in Hege 1' s Philosophy of Right,. and the second 
in J.S~ Mill's On Liberty. 
Hegel gives the following definition of "rectitude": 
11 
••• When virtue displays itself solely 
as the individual's simple conformity 
with the duties of the station to which 
he belongs, it is rectitude."6 
And he adds to it the remark: 
11 In an ethical community, it is easy to say 
what a man must do, what are the duties he 
has to fulfil in order to be virtuous: he 
has simply to follow the well known and 
explicit rules of his own situation. 
Rectitude is the general character which·. 7 
may be demanded of him .by law or· custom". 
Custom, it seems is a matter of rules and the fulfillment 
of the duties appropriate to one's situation. Mill describes 
how this can be: 
"The effect of custom [Mill writes] in 
preventing any misgiving respecting 
the rules of conduct which mankind 
impose upon one another, is all the 
more complete because the subject is one 
on which it is not generally considered 
necessary that reasons should be given, 
either by one person to others or by 
each to himself".a. 
Is this account of custom reflected in traditional 
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societies? Does station in life in such societies determine 
the appropriateness and scope of individual behaviour and 
initiative? That this usage of "custom" is still current 
is confirmed by C.B. MacPherson's The Political Theory of 
Possessive Individualism9 . In that work, MacPherson's 
model of market society, with its well-known emphasis on 
individualism and contractual relationships, is defined 
partly by contrast with what MacPherson calls "status" or 
"customary society". 10 In taking this illustration as 
corroboration of what I have to say about custom, however, 
we should remember that he is dealing in models of so~iety, 
and his account of customary society should not be expected 
to conform in every respect, although it eoes in.many, 
to the actual societies I shall now consider. 
My first example of a customary society i~ that of 
the Nigerian Kingdom of Nupe until the time of the Second 
World War. It is described in S.F. Nadel's A Black 
Byzantium. In that account Nadel uses the term "tradi-tion" 
frequently, although the society largely conforms to what 
the above described usage of "custom" and "customary 
society".leads us to expect. Customs, as we have seen, 
is a matter of stations and _duties. The Nupe had systems 
of state and village ranks (unlike MacPhersonis model, 
promotion was expected) with accompanying special etiquettes. 
Village chiefs had a right to tithes, and had·exclusive 
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rights over certain commodities (lion skins, for example). 
The kings of Nupe once also controlled the kola nut trade 
as an exclusive monOpoly and "an instrument of sharp class 
prerogative" 12 distributing the nuts as a sign of favour 
in the highly stratified society. In 1936 Nupe still 
had 41 royal ranks, and in the days of slavery even slaves 
were differentiated by rank. Industry was hierarchical in 
the same way. Heads of Guilds held state ranks whilst the 
guilds themselves were organised in an order of precedence. 
In his description of the King's ceremonial ride from 
the mosque each Friday, Nadel writes: 
"This external arrangement of the Friday 
ceremonial is indeed a symbol of the 
whole structure of Nupe Kingdom with its 
rigid system of etiquette and precedence, 
its differentiation of status,rank and 
prerogative and its display of wealth 
and power" .13 · 
Nupe seems to epitomise the rule-governed nature of customary 
society and the way in which rules of etiquette and 
prerogative are appropriate to ranks not individuals. We 
might expect, therefore, personal·merit to be nearly 
irrelevant in that society where advancement between ranks 
is concerned. This was indeed the case. Promotion between 
ranks in Nupe was frequent, and largely a matter of 
seniority. Where individual and personal qualities affected 
promotion, it was largely a case of specific demerit (in 
state ranks, physical disability of any kind) obstructing 
the normal process of advancement. Lack of conc.ern for 
personal qualities, and a corresponding emphasis on rank 
or status are highlighted by the dealings of the old slave 
market. Before the abolition Qf slavery, dealers charged 
a standard price for male, and another price for female 
slaves. Purchasers did not strike bargains according to 
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their perception of the slave's suitability to his needs. 
A slave's status alone as male or female slave determined 
valuation. 
The conduct of warfare was also influenced by the 
social structure of Nupe !. It too "possessed its etiquette, 
its conventions, and rules". 14 The royal commander was 
chosen so that he was of a rank appropriate to the scope 
of the planned campaign. In the event of victory, only the 
booty appropriate to the rank of its taker could be 
retained by him. 
Nup~ of course ~as itself the product of aggregation 
of tribes, and of periodic-conquests. Frpm this cultural 
mixing stems, besides the other differentiations of rank, 
class differ~nces related to cultural origin. Food, music 
and dr~ss, varied between the classes. Yet Nadel emphasises 
that within each Nupe village a change in village life could 
only result from a divergence of interests in that community. 
ffiNadel notes, and as we might otherwi~e expect from the 
quotation from Hegel specifying station and duty, threats 
to the "unity of common life" endanger what Nadel calls the 
"traditional authorities". 15 
Here theh we are given a hint of the inappropriatness 
of taking the anthropological sense of "tradition" as the 
sense of "tradition" in which we talk of political traditions, 
rather than of traditionalist cultures. For politics is, 
above all, concerned with the adaptation of the arrangements 
of a society to changing circumstances. In Nupe, Nadel 
.only allows the possibility of factional politics in cases 
where the colonial "Native Administration" had excluded 
groups from participation in the traditional status frame-
work. Indeed, he calls for "a training in political 
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responsibility to the achievement of which the colonial 
16 
policy is ·irrevocably pledged". Nadel equates this 
"training" with "political education". · That this is an 
error of judgement is obvious to any who look now for 
examples of the Westminster model of government in Africa. 
It is a commonplace that the attempt to export the British 
system failed because Africa was not steeped in the "British 
tradition". Indeed, conclusions can be drawn from this 
post-colonial experience about the connection between 
political education and tradition. The discussion of 
education, training and tradition, and of related topics, 
will, however, be postponed until the concept of tradition 
has been more fully clarified. I shall try to distinguish a 
notion of "tradition", suitable to politics, from that notion 
of "tradition", which Acton takes to be synonymous with 
"custom". 
In a traditional society, then, the constituent 
relationships are those defined between ranks rather than 
between individuals. In what is seen as an unchanging·world, 
there is no great scope for individual initiative. That 
this is not simply the case in Nupe alone, can be amply 
illustrated by any account of life in rural India. Occupations 
there, for example, are still largely tied to caste. It 
is striking that modern circumstances have not ended the 
caste system, (it is said for example to be reasserting 
itself in the post-imperial Indian Army). 17 Instead, modern 
circumstances have been the occasion for an adaptation of 
custom, rather than for any increase in the scope of 
individual, choice and initi~tive. Members of traditional 
societies do not seem to regard their world as vne in which 
innovation is possible, or in which private attempts 
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at innovation are appropriate. The new is assimilated into 
the old in the same way that the Fulani conquerors of Nupe, 
or the Manchu invaders of China, were culturally absorbed 
by the peoples they conquereq. Sudden change is the change 
of a dynasty, not of the fundamental structure of society. 
Their cultural world does .not change so dramatically. It 
is a world of struggles over who is to be king, but not 
usually about the desirability of kingship; it is one of 
administration but not politics. Even the upheavals hailed 
as "revolutions" leave much unchanged. 
The customary, then, can be equated with the traditional 
in the sense of "traditionalist". A further· equation, that 
of "custom" and "habit", is sanctioned by the Oxford English 
Dictionary. But it would be a mistake to believe that the 
sense of "custom", described above in connection with traditional 
societies, is the same sense as that in which it might be 
said to be someone's custom to hum quietly to himself as 
c;>• 
he studied. It is equally misguided to believe that we use 
the same sense of "habit" when we talk of a person's habit 
of licking the tip of his pencil before writing, and when we 
talk of "the political habits of Englishmen". 18 
R.S. Peters describes "habit" as a word we use to say 
th . t b t t. 19 some 1ng ex ra a ou an ac 10n. To say that somebody 
did something "out of habit" is to deny that the action was 
done for an extrinsic end or with an intrinsic motivation. 
It is just the kind of thing that the person tends to do. 
Here Gilbert Ryle's distinction between habits and "intelligent 
20 ( capacities" is useful. Habits are built up "by drill" or 
) • t II b t • • 21 conditioning , and "intelligent capac1 ies y ra1n1ng. 
The first is a matter of simple repetition. The second, 
31 
however, involves "stimulation by criticism and example of 
the pupil's own judgement". 22 Drill dispenses with 
intelligence, but training develops it. Neither, I shall 
argue, should properly be called education, but that is 
not what is at issue here. The trainee thinks about what 
he is doing, thereby making each operation he performs 
into a lesson in how to perform better. Ryle makes the 
point too that there is a difference between the drill of a 
keen, and that of a· "merely docile", soldier. 23 There is 
no clear dividing line between intelligent performances and 
habits, but of a habit we can only say that it is a 
mannerism one has picked up. We cannot properly maintain 
that a particular habit is something that we have 
learned. What Ryle feels he can say about a person and his 
habits is: 
" he acts in this way whether or 
not he is attending to what he is doing; 
that is he is not exercising care or 
trying to improve his performance; and 
that he may after the act be quite unaware 
that he has done it. Such actions are often 
given the metaphorical title "automatic". 
Automatic habits are often inculcated by 
sheer drill, and only by some counter drill 
is a formed habit eradicated".24 
This is why, when we talk of a "stupid habit" we 
mean that a person is stupid not to try to lose the habit, 
not that his performance of the habitual act was, on 
this or that occasion 1 stupidly executed. He may not be 
aware that he has done anything at all. 
That a habit is not. an intelligent performance explains 
the consternation felt by generations of philosophers over 
Aristotle's suggestion about moral virtue coming about as a 
result of habit (Nichomachean Ethics II 11030a). 25 The 
problem is that if morality is a question of being good out 
habit then it cannot be a question of moral choice and 
decision or of self-conscious conformity to a rule or 
precept. Yet Aristotle is not alone in his beliefs. 
26 Oakeshott makes a similar point in The Tower of Babel. 
Burke too asserts that: 
"Prejudice renders a man's virtue his 
habit; and not a series of unconnected 
acts. Through just prejudice his duty 
becomes part of his nature".27 
Nevertheless, duty and habit, or rule following and habit 
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should not be confused. Peter Winch, for example, criticises· 
Oakeshott's argument that there can be such a thing as an 
habitual morality which can be learned by living with those 
who habitually behave in a certain way. 28 His argument is 
that the dividing line between rule-governed behaviour and 
habitual behaviour is not dependent merely upon whether or 
not any rule is consciously applied. For Winch, the test 
to identify any performance as an instance of .rule-following 
is simply to ask whether or not it makes sense to distinguish 
a right and a wrong way of carrying out that performaJ?.~e. 
Perhaps one does at first learn by imitation, as Aristotle 
suggests when he says that one becomes just by doing just 
acts, but one must also learn what counts as being just, 
if one is to be just in novel situations. Winch goes on to 
point out that if acquiring a "habit" means acquiring a 
propensity to go on doing "the same kind of thing", then 
this is ~lso true of learning a rule. However, there is 
a difference too. Winch illustrates this difference by the 
29. 
example of a performing dog. 
Imagine a performing animal drilled to commence his 
trick when a command is uttered.· The animal is not following 
a rule although it "does the same kind of thing" on every 
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occasion of the utterance of the command. The dog itself 
has no conception of what counts as a correctly performed 
trick, or of "doing the same kind of thing". The animal 
responds to conditioning imposed according to its trainers 
conception of what counts as getting the trick right. It 
has acquired a disposition to act in a certain way in 
certain circumstances. It cannot follow a rule. 
Habits and rule-following can be distinguished then. 
Custom, as we have seen, is sometimes a matter of station 
and duty, of ranks and of rules governing behaviour 
appropriate to each rank. In short, custom can be a 
matter of rule-following. We cannot, therefore, always 
equate custom and habit. It follows, then, that the meanings 
of "habit" and of "tradition" when it is used as a 
synonym for "custom" also cannot be equated. It would, 
however, be unsatisfactory to end the scrutiny of concepts 
with this conclusion. The discussion of tradition, habit, 
and custom raises further questions about the relationship 
between education and learning to follow rules. Moreover, 
my remarks about political education, training, and tradition 
call for an investigation of the relationship between rule-
following and following a tradition. However, unless there 
is also more to be said about "tradition" itself, there is 
little point in proceeding. For "custom" seems to be a 
notion of little use to the historian of political thought. 
Before embarking upon further elaboration of issues, I 
shall try, therefore,·to explore the possibility of a 
recognizable usage ·of "tradition" which is not synonymous 
with "custom" . Of course, that concept of tradition must 
involve a notion of-the continuity of the past with the 
present if the definition of "tradi.tiori" to be given is 
34 
not to be purely stipulative. Yet this notion of continuity 
is not unique to "custom" or '.'tradition". Present- action 
also bears the mark of past practice and thought in our 
rituals, in our conformity to convention, and in our claims 
to orthodoxy. Continuity in our social life is thereby 
preserved, and the observation licensed that we are disposed 
to act in certain ways on .certain occasions. Without this 
continuity,. of course, social-life becomes unintelligible; 
there could, for example, be no talk of practices or rules 
in such circumstances. 
I have noted that,whilst certain actions can be given 
more than one of the above descriptions as a case of 
custom, trad~tion or convention, without solecism, there 
are groups of actions to which each term is uniquely 
applicable. I shall try, by concentrating on these distinctive 
groups of actions, not to stipulate clear distinctions where 
actual usage blurs them, but rather to analyse the different 
ways in which the past can b~said to survive in the present. 
My aim is to locate a unique and non-synonymous sense .. of 
"tradition". 
In the foregoing discussion of "custom" and "habit", 
I noted that H.B. Acton took "tradition" to mean " a belie·:r 
or practice transmitted from one generation to another". 
I have already tried to clarify the relationship between 
the notions of "custom" and "traditional society", and to 
distinguish "custom" from "habit". However, as I have said, 
the work of clarification is not yet finishe-d. Rituals, 
orthodoxies and conventions also fall under the description 
of a "belief or practice transmitted from one generation to 
another". Here I shall ·try to distinguish ritual as a 
practice in order to differentiate it from, and to clarify 
further, the notions of "custom" and "convention". 
A ritual need not be solely of religious significance. 
It is always a ceremony of significance, a structured part 
of social life and some argue that it can structure 
participants' and outlookers' thought about social life. 
Ritual is ordered and precise. This exact repetition is 
vital. For what is distinctive about that group of 
ceremonies to which the term "ritual" is uniquely applicable 
is that some, or all, of the actions which constitute each 
ceremony are symbolic acts. Ritual bears a social meaning 
and a message, but this communication is a complex matter. 
Rituals have statable purposes. For example, a coronation 
·inaugurates a re~gn. Yet rituals can allude to, and have, 
several more "meanings". 30 I am, however, only concerne.d 
here with the overt symbolism of ritual, rather than with 
I 
any social "function" which can be ascribed to it. 
In rituals, actions or objects used as symbols became 
"extraordinary themselves" 31 (to use the terminology of 
.Moore and Myerhof), or they are ordinary objects used 
in a non-ordinary way to set them apart from mundane use 
(cf. communion wine). For rituals are acts of communication 
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with the unseen or unseeable, whether it be God or the State. 
Convention, by contrast with ritual, has no essential 
connection with symbolism. Still, conventions are also a 
part of structured social life. Transmission of them from 
generation to generation also helps to give continuity to 
.• 
soci-al living. ·What then is "convention"? ·It is defined 
in the Oxford English Dictionary as: 
"General agreement or consent, deliberate 
or implicit, as constituting the origin 
and foundation of any custom, institution, 
and: 
opinion etc., or ~s embodied in 
any accepted usage, standard of 
behaviour, method of artistic 
treatment, or the like". 
"A rule or practice based upon general 
consent, or accepted and upheld by 
society at large; an arbitrary rule 
or practice recognised as valid in 
any particular art or study; a 
conventionalism". 
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I suggest that, whilst custom can be a matter of station 
" 
and the duties appropriate to that station, convention has 
to do not with rank but with deliberate agreement. It 
is not that it is somehow proper to use the imperial .. 
rather than the metric system of measurement for measuring 
aircraft altitude, in the way that it is proper for certain 
ranks in Nupe to wear blue turbans rather than any other 
head-dress or turbans of a different colour. It is simply 
convenient for those who deal with aircraft to use that 
system for that purpose, although that there should be a 
~ 
convention about which system to· use is a matter of practical 
necessity. Being an aircraft controller does not, however, 
entitle one to measure altitudes in feet, in the way in 
which possession of rank in certain societies entitles 
one to wear certain clothing. Aircraft controllers have 
adopted a pre~existing system for measuring distances (itself 
a convention), and in accordance with that convention they 
use that system for measuring aircraft altitudes. They do 
so.whether or not they measure other distances in feet. 
If, however~ we talk of someone logging his altitude 
"in the orthodox way" (i.e. in feet), then we are guilty 
of a confusion. Admittedly, the Oxford English Dictionary 
reports being "orthodox" as being a matter of holding 
opinions recognised as correct, or in accordance with a 
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standard, and that the orthodox is the conventional or 
approved. Nevertheless, I shall try to show that the 
two terms "conventional" and "orthodox" do not overlap 
fully, and that each has a distinctive use. 
We talk of conventional-ways of doing things, but 
we usually talk of a person being orthodox in hLa beliefs. 
The conventional is what is accepted and agreed to. It is 
not necessarily what is agreed with. A French aircraft 
controller might regard measurement in metres as preferable 
to the system that he uses according to convention. It is 
a contingent matter that what is generally approved is likely 
' 
to be adopted as.a convention. In contrast with this, the 
claim to be orthodox within a body of opinion implies that 
one believes what is generally believed, because one holds 
to be true what others hold to be true. Questions of general 
J 
practical necessity arise here only for the hypocrite. 
Of course, conventions and the conventional - agreed to, 
but not necessarily agreed with - are a vital source of 
cohesion in political life in Britain. In a ballot, .for 
example, the minority generally assents to the view of the 
majority. That they do so is a matter of a decision 
procedure accepted by convention; and conventions can be 
ignored. Immediately after losing a ballot,minorities have 
been known to secede ·from the ballot-holding institution 
(Bolsheviks), usurp legitimate power (election a·r- ·Hernan 
Siles Zuazo Bolivia 1980), or refuse to relinquish the 
power they already held (tf. Costa Rica 1948- the government 
· precipi tate·d a civil war by "cancelling" the election in which 
the government candidate Calderon Guardia was defeated). 
An interesting example of the way in which the 
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conventions of British politics acted as a guide in times 
of crisis,and thereby helped the politicians of the day to 
avoid the possible alienation of a significant portion of · 
the electorate, is to be found in accounts of the events 
following the General election of December 1923. After 
that General Election, the Conservatives, although the 
largest party in the House, had no clear majority. The 
Labour and Liberal parties formed the second and third 
largest ·groups respectively. The Labour party had never 
before formed a government, and was the object of widespread 
suspicion amongst its opponents. Nevertheless, Asquith, 
the leader of the Liberals, after the moving of the 
Labour vote of censure on the Conservatives, asserted during 
the debate on the King's speech that after a resignation of 
the Conservative administration: 
"··· the party which naturally and properly 
succeeds to the task of Government, if it 
is minded to undertake it, is the party 
that is nume~ically preponderant in the 
Opposition".32 
He went on to say that: 
"Under the present conditions, unexampled 
as they are ... I think there,is no ground 
for departing from normal usage, and if the 
Labour party is willing, as I understand it 
is, to assume the burden of office in such 
conditions, it has the absolute undoubted 
right to claim it".33 
However, allowing a Labour government to take office would 
mean:. 
'' for the first time, the installation 
of a Socialist Government in the seats 
of the mighty".34 
Asquith had received many letters in which he was 
"cajoled, wheedled, almost caressed, taunted, threatened, 
brow beaten, and all but blackmailed" into becoming the 
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"savioor of society", bymmbining with the Conservatives to 
keep Labour out of office. 35 
Nevertheless, he rejected these pleas, maintaining 
that the Labour members were the Conservatives "natural 
d . t 36 an appropr1a e successors". 
The Labour party was asked to form the next government, 
after the announcement by the C_onservati ve party of the 
resignation of their government on 22 June. In a novel 
situation, those involved allowed themselves to be guided 
by convention to a solution which was agreed to by the 
House, in spite of the fears of some that Socialism would 
lead to all manner of economic evils. Indeed, those in 
need of reassurance found it in the way that all parties 
saw parliamentary convention as compelling, and that· no 
departure from it had occurred. Any "Socialist experiments" 37 
by the new government would, under the "constitution", be 
subject to the assent of the House. 
Opposed parties then, are bound into one society by 
conventions, which at the same time lend continuity to 
social life. The past endures in the present in other 
ways too. At this point it is useful to compare the above 
illustrated concept of convention with examples at some 
length·of the other concepts under consideration. I shall 
begin with an account of a well-known ritual. 
Consider the ceremony of coronation, familiar, at least, 
in all West European monarchies. This way of inaugurating 
a reign has changed little in form over the centuries. The 
anointment is possibly a survival from the imperial rites 
of Rome, and some argue that the robes with which the 
British monarch is invested are derived from the dress of 
·' 
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Byzantine emperors. The ceremony contains a wealth of 
symbolic objects and actions. The new monarch is presented 
with crown, ring, orb, sceptre_, and rod, "betokening", _the 
Royal attributes of Glory, Faith, Sovereignty and Mercy. 
And, in addition to the symbolism of the objects themselves, 
their presentation by a clergyman has been the basis of the 
claim that this part of the coronation symbolises. the 
Church's power to unmake Kings. What it has once given, it 
can also take back. Napoleon Bonaparte crowned himself, 
thereby emphatically denying that the Church had any such 
power. In British ceremonial, of course, the clergy still 
appear in the role of God's representative, acting as 
intermediaries for the Royal and the Divine. 38 Shils and 
Young moreover write of anointment as being the means by 
which the monarch is "brought in contact with the divine". 39 
The Queen "shows her submission before the Archbishop as 
God's agent, kneeling before him while he implores God to 
bless her". 40 
Coronation is a ritual, it is a ceremony laden with 
symbolism. To change the ceremony, as·Napoleon did, is 
to alter meanings and to express new relationships. Bearing 
that in mind, consider now a less clear-cut example of 
ritual; the Presidential "election" procedure in contem-
porary Mexico. The ruling P.R.I. (Partido Revolutionario 
Institutional) party selects candidates who campaign in an 
'election' in which the actual votes are never counted. 
Yet the form and procedure of balloting are rigidly ~dhered 
to. The P.R.I. "candidate" always wins. 
Far from regarding this activity as mere cYnical 
41 
deception on the part of the P.R.I., Vogt and Abel, who 
also provide a graphic description of a Mexican "polling" 
day,regard the above process as a ritual of affirmation. 
Whilst admitting that the "campaign" serves the pragmatic 
purpose of sounding public opinion, they claim that it also 
serves the symbolic one of" allowing the c"itizens to confirm 
that the correct "choice" has b~en made. 41 The whole 
procedure is seen as ritual communication with the "magical" 
and charismatic figure of the presidential "candidate" in 
whom "the continuity.of Mexico's historical and mystical 
identity resides". 42 
It is interesting, too, to note that Vogt and Abel 
surmise that, amongst the Mexican Indians they observed, 
the procedure was not conceived of as an ·election at all. 
Rather, the ballot papers were seen by the Indians as ritual 
offerings, on behalf of the community.to the president, in 
the way that they offered c0.pal incense as symbolic cigarettes 
~ 
for the gods in expectation of a tangible quid pro quo . 
The ballot papers are offered for, say, a new bridge, and 
the "ceremony",· although the procedure of "election" is 
closely followed, thereby acquires a meaning within the 
culture of the Indians. All this, of course, serves to 
emphasise the character of ritual as a series of actions 
which are understood by the community to have a symbolic 
meaning.· 
Examples of conventions and the conventional are, as 
we have seen, less complex. The only point which is not 
straightforward is that a practice can be conventional by 
being either, firstly, time honoured, even if of uncertain 
origin, or secondly, the product of a specific agreement. 
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An illustration of the first sense of "conventional" 
is the dress of the city ·gent. It is often described as 
his "traditional" garb, but is conventional in the sense 
o"f .being accepted and upheld by society at large (or at 
least the affected section). It is generally upheld as the 
acceptable clothing within a certain group of professions. 
Such dress, it should be noted, is not a privilege or 
entitlement pertaining to rank or status. It is also not 
the product of particular agreement. But this does not make 
my point here about acting in conformity to an unspoken 
convention at all analogous to the Lockean notion of "tacit 
consent''· Locke makes the claim that out enjoyment of 
the protection and benefits bestowed by government amounts 
to tacit consent to a regime for the duration of that 
enjoyment. So too, according to Locke: 
" every man that hath any possession,or 
enjoyment of any part of the dominions of 
any government, g§th thereby give his 
tacit consent" 
The problem in Locke's work is that the account of 
tacit consent raises the question of what more is required 
to constitute the express consent without which, Locke 
maintains, no one can be a full member of a commonwealth. 44 
The case of the city gentleman is somewhat different. 
When he wears .his pin-stripe and bowler, he is not explicitly 
exercising any kind of right, and he does not thereby incur 
any obligation,although his apparel indicates his own 
e~timation of his status. Moreover, by dre~sing in that 
manner, he has given his "consent" to nothing other than 
his own appearance. 
The·problem of "tacit consent" is the problem of 
the location of the source of the political obligation 
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either felt by, or expected of~ seventeenth century 
Englishmen. No such problem arises in the case of conventional 
dress. Those who actively deny political obligation are in 
open rebellion against the right of a would-be authority. 
The unconventionally dressed are usually tolerated as 
sartorial eccentrics. 
An obvious example of a convention in the second sense, 
in which practices are founded by agreement, are the 
conventions laying down weights and measures, and their use 
in appropriate activities. It is, however, worth pausing 
to note that it is not the convention (agreement) which 
acts as a standard. Rather, the convention (agreement) 
lays down the standard to be used, and it is the convention 
(agreed practice) to use it. My case is illustrated by the 
following. 
In 1783 the French adopted the decimal metric system. 
As a standard for this system, a platinum rod was marked 
~ 
out in intervals, to be called metres, each equal to one 
ten-millionth of the earth's polar quadrant according to 
available determinations of that distance. The new unit 
of mass - the kilogram - was taken to be the mass of one 
cubic decimetre of water, and a platinum-iridium cylinder 
was made as a standard. Later, the determination of· the 
metre as a fraction of the polar ~adrant was found to be 
achievable with a greater accuracy than that embodied in 
the plantinum rod. The definition of the metre was alt~red 
accordingly. It simply became the length equal to that 
marked on the French rod. By 1875 nineteen governments 
had signed an agreement to maintain and refine standards 
of measurement. Today, by agreement, the standard metre 
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is taken to be 1,650,76j.73 ~avel~rigths in a vacuum of 
radiation corresponding to the transition from the 2p10 
to the 5d5 energy levels of the krypton 86 atom. Four 
other basic units of temperature, time, electric current, 
and luminous intensity have also been agreed, together 
making up a system of units from which all other units 
are derived. That the system has standards then,is a 
matter of a certain piece of alloy, or a multiple of a 
determinate wavelength being understood to have a particular 
. . f. 45 s2gn2 2cance. 
To summarize. The units are agreed by convention 
(agreement), and it is the convention (agreed practice) 
to use that international System (SI) of units in scientific 
work (The British government concurred with this agreement 
in 1967). 
That, however, is not all that there is to be said 
about "convention". For the dictionary definition of 
"convention" also refers to " a method of artistic 
treatment'' as being a convention. This, I suggest, deserves 
further consideration. 
As an example of the above usage, I shall take a 
remark by Raymond Watkinson in his account of the Pre-
Raphaelites.46 He claims that some of those who were 
to become members of the pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood had a 
view of themselves as practitioners of a new art which would 
reject II as far as p9ssible all the tr~ditional conven-
tions" 47 By that phrase "traditional conventions", I 
understand Watkinson to mean what we might call "the 
conventions prevalent in the Academy.of the day". 48 He 
means, in other words, the practice transmitted by the 
45 
Academy which laid down a number of precepts. If this is 
the case, then "convention" has been misused. What the 
Academy set out to convey was not something generally 
accepted and upheld, something perpetuated in such works as 
Jonathan Richardson theElder's "Essay on the Theory of 
Painting", 49 in which the different colours to be used 
for the robes of the various apostles are listed. The 
Academy had a different objective. 
/ Reynolds, the founding president of the Royal Academy, 
was the exponent of what was, in so far as it laid down 
rules, a school of Art. The Academy had a style of its 
own. Reynolds had views about what was to be painted, and 
why, and how. According to him, idealised figures and 
landscapes~: must appear in warm mellow colours with 'cold' 
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colours relegated to the background. As we see from 
their work, the Pre Raphaelites did not share Reynold's 
views. Moved by their own doctrine of what was meant 
II" 
by "nature" and what constituted its representation, they 
used the forbidden cold greens and indigos in the fore-
grounds of their paintings, and paid·obsessive attention 
to detail and textures in a way decrie.d by Reynolds. Still, 
Reynolds was not simply the advocate (or founder) of a school 
of art for he did not recommend that any single master be 
followed. He was not a protagonist of Richardson's time-
honoured conventionalism, and he was hardly the advocate 
of convention in the other sense of agreement embodied 
in a usage, standard of behaviour, or me.thod of artistic 
treatment. For none of the works,his students were 
exhorted to study was set up to act as a standard. The 
artist aims at perfection, not at an agreed formula. There 
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is no method by which it can be achieved. The student 
begins by imitation of the perfections of the masters, but 
only in order to rival and finally surpass them if he: can. 
The more something can be properly called artistic, the 
less, in my view, it can be called conventional. The sign 
for an oscilloscope in a circuit diagrom is conventional. 
The paintings by Reynold's pupils are surely not. 
The last concept I shall illustrate here is that of 
orthodoxy. We are all acquainted with disputes about 
heresy and religious orthodoxy, but the concept is not 
confined to theology. Examples are also available from 
the political arena. 
ln my account of traditional societies and of custom, 
I argued that those societies have· little or no political 
life .. Politics is an activity belonging to a world of 
change. Nevertheless, political agents can, when faced 
by new circumstances,claim to be acting·upon precepts 
laid down by acknowledged past masters of the art who are 
regarded by the agents' colleagues as authorities on what 
is right or true. They can claim to be orthodox. I shall 
temporarily overlook questions about justification, political 
I 
identity, and about the acknowledgement of masters in 
political thought. My immediate aim is to provide an 
illustration of what can·properly be described as orthodox. 
Ordinary usage might endorse "conventional" as a synonym 
for "orthodox", but,. as we shall see in the following case, 
it is possible to .provide a typical instance of the orthodox 
which has little in common with typical cases of the 
conVentional as it has been illustrated in the preceding 
examples. 
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The Moscow edition of the "History of the C.P.S.U." 
describes post-Stalin efforts "to restore Leninist 
principles". 51 We read of new initiatives which "conformed 
to the spirit of Leninism", and of Stalinist violations of 
"l.eninist standards of Party life". 52 Yet if we turn to 
Stalin's own collected works we find him, in his turn, citing 
Lenin against Bukharin's -alleged "departure from Marxist 
53. Leninist theory". The Soviet leadership always claims to' 
be "Marxist-Leninist". For example, in the debate about 
whether the words "something in the nature of a tribute" 
are appropriate to describe the supertax paid by the 
peasantry (1929), Stalin claimed that Bukharin objected to 
the phrase in the belief that the expression was not commonly 
used in Marxist literature. 54 He was, in effect then, 
denying that the phrase was used by the acknowledged 
authorities. In reply Stalin quotes Lenin's"'Left Wing' 
Childishness and Petty Bourgeois Mentality (May 1918)" 
(sic) in which the term "tribute" is used. 55· He then 
.. 
refers to several other works by Lenin in which the same 
word occurs. In this way, Bukharin's objection to party 
policy is portrayed as dissatisfaction with "Leninist" policy. 
He is thereby alleged to be unorthodox. 
Both sides of the argument work within the framework 
of Marxism and Leninism (which in vol 8 of Stalin's collected 
works we find defined as a "development of Marxism") 56 The 
rest is familiar. Both the kind of fate which later befell 
Bukharin and the way in which the orthodox find compelling 
those opinions generally recognized as compelling by the 
authoritative voices of the faithful are already well-known 
to readers of Koestler's "Darkness at Noon ... " 
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Orthodoxy, admittedly, involves shared beliefs rather 
than practices.Still, the claim to believe must be sub-
stantiated by participation in shared practices (see pl29) 
We need only remember that although the difference between 
"Orthodox" Jews and their fellow Jews is one of belief it 
is manifested in differences in dress, practices, and 
observance of the Sabbath. What, after-all, are we to 
surmise of the self-proclaimed Christian who does not pray 
with his fellow Christians? I have already quoted (p.23) 
a theologian as saying that such a person might believe in 
G9d, but not in the God of the Bible. 
The oddity of the term "conventional wisdom" should 
now be clear too. We cannot simply get together to agree 
to know something. The orthodox are told what is true 
by those who claim to be in a position to know. Disputes 
are conducted within a framework of shared belief. The 
heretic, such as Galileo, who had criteria of truth which 
differed from those of the Church, can only be for.ced to 
outward conformity. 
I have given the above examples in an attempt to 
distinguish certain concepts, in order to make clear the 
different ways in which the past can be said to live on in 
the present. That ordinary usage blurs these distinctions, 
and can cause confusion, is made clear by the following 
list of "social rituals" compiled by two anthropologists; 
"etiquette , the greeting and departures'· gestures, 
. . 58 
manners, and'social forms'"· As a critic points out in 
the same volume in which that list appears, to use the term 
"ritual" for everything Qn the list· does not increase our 
understanding of any of them. 59 In fact nohe are symbolic 
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acts. It would, therefore, be more helpful to call them 
"customs", or "conventions", according to the circumstances 
in which they occur. However, when the Freudians talk of 
compulsive behaviour as "ritual" rather than habit (e.g . 
... . 
a c:ompulsi ve hand-washing ritual), doing so draws attention 
to the fact that such activity is not mere habit. It is, 
in its way, symbolic. The oddityof the usage arises from 
the non-social aspect of the activity. Ritual, in less 
metaphorical usage, is a matter of collective ceremonial 
and public meaning. Here then, we have the feature which 
distinguishes habit from custom, ritual, and convention. 
Habit has no necessary connection with social engagement. 
It does not govern engagement in a pr~ctice. Convention 
does just this, it is agreement to adopt one of several 
alternatives. Custom I have already discussed~ Orthodoxy 
differs from the others in being a matter of what is to be 
believed. "Orthodoxy", "custom", "habit", and "convention", 
then , are all separately applicable to distinctive sets 
of··circums tances. 
This raises again the question about the word "tradition" . 
. In my introduction I quoted T.S. Eliot's remark that orthodoxy 
"supervises" the "perpetual bringing up to date and criticism 
of tradition". Eliot's use of "tradition" in that observat-
ion is a deployment of the word in a sense which is not 
just a substitution of "tradition" for one or more of the 
t 
terms I have already discussed. It is a usage denoting 
something continually adapted. I suggest that it is this 
sense of the word that should be examined if we are to find 
a sense of "tradition" appropriate to the ever -changing 
world of politics and the "traditions", Radical, Liberal, 
or Conservative whose presence in the world seems to be 
60 generally accepted. 
Consider again H.B;. Acton's essay "Tradition and 
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some other forms of order". . In it he discusses beliefs 
or practices transmitted fro~ generation to generation, 
and accepted as authoritative or deferred to without 
argument. That is what Acti'on means by "tradition". If 
we accept his sense of the word, then we are bound to ask 
how tradition can be in need of supervision or tolerate 
"perpetual bringing up to date and criticism". Acton's 
view is clear. He writes that: 
Moreover: 
" ... the pursuit of scientific truth 
whether for its own sake or for some 
other end, is bound to be anti~traditional 
activity, for criticism which is essential 62 to science is the antithesis of tradition". 
"It [science] is apt,_ also, to be anti-
traditional 1n its effects on society, 
since changes in beliefs about how things 
are often lead.-·to changes in the way 
in which things are done". 63 
Changes in belief and practices need.not always be 
disruptions of tradition however. Alterations of custom, 
.. 
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of ritual, and of convention, and disruptions of orthodoxy, 
also fall under that description. Indeed, I have mentioned 
( p.24 ) that Acton supposes "custom" and "tradition" to 
be "closely connected if not identical notions". Is 
there, then, in current usage, a sense of ."tradition" 
which is not merely a synonym for the concepts for which 
it is often used as a substitute? 
Let us consider the discipline taken by Acton to be 
"anti-traditional", the study of natural science. What 
I shall suggest is that the practices of the natural 
scientists furnish examples of a balance between orthodoxy 
and critic ism, in the way proposed by Eliot, (see note 49 
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to Ch. 1), so that criticism;is not the antithesis of 
tradition, and constant bringing:up to date ensures a 
tradition's vitality. 
To claim that tradition informs the work of the 
scientist is, of course, by no means novel. Michael 
Polanyi, in his polemical Science, Faith and Society 
t dl . t . d t d. t . 64 repea e y assoc1a es sc1ence an ra 1. 1on. The 
argument in that work is relevant to the subject of this 
chapter. 
Polanyi observes that, because the exhaustive 
verification of empirical laws is impossible, acceptance 
or rejection of a falsification resistant theory by scientists 
is revealed to depend upon what the scientific community 
accepts to be. "beyond reasonable doubt". Scientists, as 
a community, are the arbiters of what is acceptable to 
science. For, although one can give rules for good laboratory 
practice, scientific investigation itself is not solely a 
matter of following established rules of scientific method. 
. . . 
It is clear that much progress in scientific knowledge (a 
greater comprehensiveness and economy of theory and greater 
scope of prediction and explanation) has been brought about 
by the scientist who is prepared to go beyond the prevailing 
orthodoxy even when there is no clear evidence to decide the 
matter, and much prejudice in favour of the establishment's 
view. First, however, each would-be scientist must learn 
to exercise his skill. He learns by example from existing 
practice which he· must recognize as "authoritative". 65 He 
must (at least at first) be convinced that science is 
.fundamentally sound. !n Polanyi's words, learning an art 
in this way is"· .• to accept an artistic tradition and to 
became a representative of it"?6 
And: 
"Novices to the scientific profession 
are trained to share the ground on which 
their masters stand and to claim this 
ground for establishing their independence 
on it. The imitation of their masters 
teaches them to insist on their own 
originality which.may oppose _part of the 
current teachings of science." 67 
52 
Polanyi's comparison of scientific with artistic tradition 
is apposite. Let us bear in mind here Reynold's Discourses 
Delivered to the Students of the Royal Academy. In those 
"Discourses", Reynolds advocated a training in the use of 
the various media available to the artist, a training 
analogous to the scientist's training in laboratory 
technique. He wrote that, whilst students could learn 
much by study of past masters, the object of the students' 
imitation of the most admired is to ·enable them to surpass 
their "heroes" just as Polanyi's young scientist "shares 
II" his master's ground in order to establish his independence 
on it". 
In accepting Polanyi's view of the professional up-
bringing of apprentice artists and scientists, I have 
reservations about his use.of the term "trained". Clearly 
something more than what I have earlier called "training" 
is involved in the professional upbringing of competent 
and accomplished scientists and artists. Towards the 
beginning of this chapter, ( p.~l ) intelligent perform-
ances, such as those of the trainee marksman, who learns 
from each target practice how to shoot better, were 
contrasted with the habits instilled in the well-drilled 
performing animal. Here it would be more appropriate, I 
suggest, to talk of the· education, rather than the training, 
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of young scientists learning to"share" and ultimately 
establiSh their irdependence On their master IS grOUnd, 
or of young artists learning not merely to imitate 
but to surpass the masters. "Training" is an appropriate 
term for the learning of accurate marksmanship, laboratory 
technique, or skilful use of brush and palette. 
Polyanyi, however, is talking about initiation into 
a tradition. 
My use of "education" in this restricted way is 
again an attempt to_identify the distinctive use of a 
word amongst many overlapping usages. "Education" has 
been used, in thi-s sense, by writers other than myself, 
and here I shall draw attention to two contributions to 
a coll~ction of articles entitled Philosophy and Education~8 
My aim is not to stipulate a definition, but to identify 
a distinctive usage. Israel Scheffler, the author of the 
first article I shall consider, has also written about 
the philosophy of science. The author of the second, 
Michael Oakeshott, has of course made contributions to 
(among other things) political philosophy and the history 
of political thought. 
Scheffler distinguishes "teaching" from "propaganda, 
condi:tioning, su.ggestion and indoctrination, which are aimed 
at modifying the person but strive at all. costs to avoid 
a genuine engagement of his judgement on underlying issues••. 69 
He illustrates what he means by "teaching" with a quotatio!'l 
from R.S. Peters. The object of the teacher is " .. to 
try to get others on the inside of a public form of life 
that he shares and considers·. worthwhile". 70 
The conclusion of Schefflers article, a comparison 
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and critique of various modes of. teaching, explicitly 
relates what he calls "teaching" to a notion of tradition 
as so~ething continually adapted. He writes that: 
" ... rationality is embodied in multiple 
evolving traditions, in which the basic 
condition holds that issues are resolved 
with reference to reasons, themselves 
defined by principles purporting to be 
impartial and universal". 71 
These traditions, be believes, ·prov.We an important focus 
for teaching, but we can talk of teaching a dog a new trick. 
Obviously, this has nothing to do with traditions of 
rationality or striving "to get others on the inside of a 
public form of life". This is why it is important to 
distinguish terms such as "education", "training", and 
"drill". Scheffler is writing about what I have called 
"education", and his use of the word •:teaching" is 
unhelpful. It has no distinctive use. It. is applicable 
not only to education in the above sense, but also to 
imparting a skill and to drilling an animal to perform a 
G' 
new trick. Now before my account of Scheffler's article 
also misleads us into thinking that teaching or education 
is simply a matter of dispensing .reasons and principles, I 
must also record his remark that"··· the concrete rules 
governing inference and procedure in the special sciences" 
"evolve and grow with the advance of knowledge", to form a 
"live tradition". 72 
Here we are reminded of Oakeshott's point that a set 
of rules has little value unless one is acquainted with the 
activity of which they are an "abstraction". He says, for 
example, that: 
" a cookery book presupposes someone 
who knows.how to cook, and its use 
presupposes someone who already knows 
how to use it".73 
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A recipe is of limited use to someone who cannot cook. 
Such a recipe is not a complete account of, say, the art of 
making pies. However, if one already knows how to make a 
pie then a recipe can be a guide to making the kind of pie 
desired. Still, the complete novice, who follows such a 
recipe, is more likely to cook something palatable than 
someone with no instructions about ingredients and their 
combination. In time - with practice and good advice - the 
~ecipe-following novice might become a good cook. For the 
novice cook here is not unlike the would-be artist who 
begins by painting by numbers. His application of paint 
to canvas is directed by the numbered patches which show 
how the original artist achieved his effect. In this way 
the novice might learn something about colours and composition. 
He also produces a visual image at his first attempt. Almost 
• 1 
certainly he is in a better postiion than the beginner who 
buys canvas, brushes, and paint, and sets to work. None the-
less, he is not yet an artist, or part of an artistic 
tradition. It should, then, in my view, be clear why 
Oakeshot"t concludes that the object of political education 
is to impart knowledge of a tradition of political activity 
in order to transmit to the student not only an understanding 
but also an invitation to participate in that tradition. 
Such an objective can only be achieved through enjoyment of 
a tradition, and from the observation and imitation of 
elders. 'The student should engage in historical study of 
what has happened, and-what others have thought about those 
events ·in the accepted manner of political thinking. Study 
of the student's own culture, and of other cultures, should 
culminate in philosophical reflection upon those traditions. 
We can learn; then, to participate in a tradition. 
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Having participated, we can continue the life of a tradition 
beyond the demise of those who imparted it. 
This continuation of tradition is not a matter of simple 
repetition or preservation, but of_continued innovation. 
Yet Po.lanyi believes that scientific inquiry is torn between 
"discipline" and "originality", and that this model of 
inquiry can be generalised to "other modes of discovery 
in literature, in the arts, in politics". 74 • 75 I suspect 
that what Polanyi means here by "discipline" is what I 
have called orthodoxy; he is unlikely to mean tha-t standards 
of·rigour and honesty are in conflict with originality. 
I believe that this point is important, because consideration 
of the tensions between orthodoxy and originality brings 
to light some of the most interesting features of natural 
science, and thereby of traditions in the sense in which 
we can talk of traditions of natural science. 
Oakeshott observes that: 
"··· 'the truth is that only a man who is 
a scientist can formulate a scientific 
hypothesis; that is, an hypothesis is 
not an independent invention capable of 
guiding scientific inquiry, but a 
dependent supposition which arises as 
an abstraction from within the already 
existing scientific activity. Moreover, 
even when the specific hypothesis has in 
this matter been formulated, it is 
inoperative as a guide to research without 
constant reference to the traditions ~f 
scientific inquiry from which it was 
abstracted".76 
Oakeshott is here, I suspect, more concerned to attack 
"rationalism in politics" than to write about science as 
involving tradition, but the point is, I think, still 
relevant. The individual scientist's work arises out of 
a tradition of such work. Moreover, is it not also true 
that the scientist cannot reject or ignore scientific opinion 
totally and yet remain a scientist? Where he is in 
dispute with one or more of them, surely he must ultimately 
submit to the judgement of his peers. Yet, if his work is-
found wanting, it might be that his successors, at a later 
date will have good reason to prefer his conceptions to 
those of his contemporaries. In other words, his view 
can, in the light of new circumstances, become tenable 
within the natural sciences. 
Polanyi makes the related point that: 
" ... the premises of science on which all 
scientific teaching and research rest are 
the beliefs held by scientists on the 
general nature of things.".77 
Those who do not share that understanding have little to 
contribute to science. A scientist, and a witch-doctor, 
for example, share no common ground whereupon their 
systems can be co"mpared. Conversely, scientists can have 
little to contribute to rival engagements. For one who 
seeks enlightenment ·outside the traditions of natural 
science, say through astrology, an achievement such as 
Newton's formulation of the equation: f = G Mt M2 
which defines the forces between planets in 
2 
r 
terms 
of their masses and the distances between them is not an 
achievement of any great significance. To the astrologer, 
planetary masses, and the distances separating them, are 
not important facts about the heavenly bodies, and, the 
'forces' that interest him are not at all like the forces 
~tudied in dynamics, which are defined in terms of mass, 
space and time. The findings of astrologers are probably 
of as little serious interest to astrcnomers.No innovator 
in'the casting of horoscopes is likely, by virtue of his 
achievement, to gain recognition by the Royal Society. The 
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scientific community then, is, I suggest, self-evaluating. 
The inspiration·of an Einstein, who modified the Newtonian 
meanings of "mass" and "energy" in order to side-step 
contemporary theoretical difficulties, could only be 
authenticated within the science of physics itself. 
Considerations such as these make T.S. Kuhn's 
"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions1178 plausible as 
a socidlogy of the scientific community. It was Kuhn 
who drew attention, in his 1969 postscript to the "The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutiom"to the way in which: 
"To an extent unparalleled in most other 
fields they .@embers of a scientific 
community] have under.gone similar 
educations and professional initiations, 
in· the process they have absorbed the 
same technical literature and drawn many 
of the same lessons from it".79 
Scientific specialists see themselves as, and ar.e 
seen as, the people "uniquely responsible for the pursuit 
of a set of shared goals, including the training of their 
80 p 
successors", That is, practising scientists, as "the 
producers and validators of scientific knowledge; derive a 
sense of community f.rom their shared activity. 81 Indeed, 
sociological research has shown that periodicals, and the 
publication of papers in them, play a major role in 
scientists' identification of themselves as members of a 
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specialised community. 82 If a periodical identifies itself 
with a certain discipline, a contributor to that periodical 
will usually identify himself with the same discipline. 
Acceptance of a paper by a specialist journal which is read 
r 
by workers in a given field leads to recognition of the 
author as a contributor to that field, and he tends to 
identify with it • · It has. even been suggested (Hagstrom) 
that establishment of a journal "devoted to a field with 
its own distinctive goals and .standards" is a precondition 
of the development of a "self conscious community of 
specialists". 83 
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This sketch of scientists and innovation in the natural 
sciences enables the construction of a model of tradition 
in which "tradition" is not merely synonymous with another 
concept. That this will not be merely an exercise in 
stipulative definition is, I hope, already clear from the 
works of figures such as Eliot and Polanyi. What still 
remains to be shown, however, is the appropriateness of 
this concept within the study of poltiical thought. 
Earlier discussion has already set certain conditions 
to be fulfilled by the model. 
Firstly, if it is not to be simply a synonym for 
"custom", then tradition must involve self conscious 
innovation and change (perhaps with a framework of orthodxy, 
as hinted by Eliot). This-condition also distinguishes 
tradition from convention. For conventions, such as those 
defining the metre, do not-change at all. They are merely 
replaced by new conventions. Here my second condition can 
be introduced. 
Secondly, there must be continuity through change if the 
tradition is to have any identity at all. The pietists' 
lack qf independent standards of interpretation, after all, 
brings them face to face with theological isolation. 
Thirdly, an account of tradition must provide us 
with a criterion for deciding whether or not a novel 
conception is an innovatory contribution to a given tradition. 
I shall now attempt to construct the model. My first 
condition was that traditions must involve change. It will, 
I think, be agreed that originality and innovation are vital 
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to the progress of science. Yet, as we have seen, that 
novelty cannot be said to be a contribution to scientific 
progress if it is never acknowledged by scientists as an 
authentic achievement within a particular branch of science. 
The pietists' theology was a private one lasting only as 
long as the individual. Traditions encompass both duration 
and change. Here, then, we can take up Barth's suggestion 
that an alternative to pietistic subjectivism is afforded 
by appeal to a community of practitioners. For, by agreeing 
with Barth, we also avoid the problem arising from Leavis's 
conception of tradition; that the unity of tradition, the 
choice of what belongs together, depends upon the aesthetic 
sense of the critic himself. If this point is generalised 
to cover all traditions, then we can state that no one 
practitioner, solely by virtue of his own opinions, and 
actions, can claim to be an authority or the author of an 
authentic achievement within a tradition. The justification 
for generalizing this point should, I have concluded, be 
clear from my remarks abou.t education and initiation into 
traditions.. . The genuineness of any such claim to authen:... 
tici ty can only "be ·established within the relevant tradition .. 
We tend to be sceptical about any claim to have founded a 
new science, and, indeed, no tradition can be founded upon 
an Urtyp except in its own popular mythology. It is 
the tradition that in retrospect licences the claim of 
that work to be an achievement of the tradition. Isolated, 
it would simply be the obsession of an eccentric. Such 
foundation is, as we have seen, a feature, rather, of many 
conventions. (Of course~ where conventions are concerned, 
any founding act must meet with the agreement of all parties 
to the convention). 
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All traditions, I suggest, must exhibit this circularity 
in matters of authentication. -No putative founding event 
or achievement can, by itself~ authenticate a tradition. 
Whether a scientist chooses to claim as a foundation Newton's 
Law of Gravity, the devising of relativity theory or 
Copernicus's or Aristarchus's heliocentric theories, 
their cl·al·m. ~to significance as scientific achievements is 
set within the discipline of science itself. Each recognized 
achievement becomes part of the tradition, helping us to 
identify it. A good scientific training is a sirequa non 
of the maintainance of the scientific traditions, just 
as good training must be the basis of the maintainance of any 
tradition. Its continuation depends ultimately, however, 
upon the ability of some of its practitioners to produce 
acceptable innovation. This ability is the product of 
talent, and education, conceived as the acquisition of an 
understanding _of the recognised achievements of the tradition. 
til> 
If we also accept that an innovator's work is authenticated as 
an achievement within a tradition by his peers in the·· 
tradition, then it should be clear that he must identify 
with that community and tradition. For the appeal to the 
community pre-supposes that the innovator can identify his 
community. In other words, a connection can, I think,be 
established between traditions, which in many ways are 
difficult to identify, and associations of persons, which 
are more easily identifiable. 
Traditions must have innovation. There must also be 
continuity. That continuity is provided by the ongoing 
community of pra9ticising (and innovating) scientists. 
Without them and their continual innovations, scientific 
knowledge would simply become what I have called an orthodoxy. 
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If science is to continue to thrive then scientists should 
always be found regretting the total success of the reception 
' : 
of their own innovations, in the way that W.J. Sollas 
complained of a meeting of the International Congress of 
Anthropologists in Geneva that: 
"some views which were admittedly heretical 
when originally put forward have since 
ceased to be so and have acquired indeed 
a dangerously orthodox complexion".84 
Those of solely orthodox opinion can be a hindrance 
to innovation. I have written, however, of orthodoxy as 
"supervising", not preventing,· innovation. What is 
authentication of innovation by fellow practitioners but 
orthodoxy, accepted belief, supervising innovation? This, 
I shall try to show in the rest of this thesis, is a vital 
relationship within traditions of political discourse. 
Already my discussion of orthodoxy has displayed one 
aspect of the relationship. I portrayed Bukharin as accepting 
Stalin's opinion that his utterances were unorthodox, because 
II' 
Stalin was leader of the party which Bukharin had joined 
and fought for. Bukharin acquiesced in his fate·in 1929 
because that fate was decided by the Marxists with whom 
he identified. He was a Marxist, and accepted the decision 
of Marxists. One suspects that the response of the members 
of.a real "right opposition" group, who did not find 
Marxism at all compelling, would have been less tame. 
Group identity is, of course, of paramount importance 
in the political arena: effective action demands cooperation 
and the rallying of support. Bearing this in mind, I shall 
argue that it is a mistake to try to give an account of 
identity and recognition within a tr~dition of political 
thought, without careful consideration of the affiliations 
of the politically active. The task of showing at length 
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how contributions to political thinking can be said to 
form a tradition, however, requires a separate discussion. 
(see Chapters III & IV). 
The point about participants in traditions having 
a sense of identity as members also seems to shed more light 
on the notion of orthodoxy; It is on the one hand, I have 
said, a matter of belief. On the other hand, I have also 
remarked that the orthodox must substantiate their claim 
to believe by participation in shared practices when action 
is appropriate. My above observations, and the sociological 
findings I have used to illustrate them, show how this can 
be,the case. The orthodox display their orthodoxy, whether 
in their garb and observances on the Sabbath in the case 
of orthodox Jewry, or in the Jew-baiting of the National 
Socialists. What is gained by this is the recognition, 
by the relevant community, which validates the individual's 
membership, and affirms the sense of identity all have as 
members of a community of believers. What is shown is a 
commitment. For, after all, correct recital of a 
catechism does not alone distinguish the true believer 
from the imposter. 
To summarize: I have argued that self-conscious 
participants in a tradition of activity recognise one another 
as such, and thereby have a sense of identity. I have also 
tried to show that it is not the case that such traditions 
are resistant to innovation. 
We sh~uld not, however, conclude from my discussion 
of natural science, and its mention in passing of the ideas 
of Thomas Kuhn, that traditions as they are here conceived 
are a matter of paradigms and the alleged authority of 
paradigms. It has been pointed out by one writer that in 
science, we have a "carefully circumscribed investigation 
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which is the paradigm". 85 Now, I am seeking to use the 
term 'tradition" to describe a number of practices besides 
that of natural scientists, in .particular, the practices 
of politics, and making political utterances. The practice 
of politics is not an investigation; "··· the notion of 
a paradigm gets no grip at all". 86 Moreover, members of 
different traditions of political discourse, say, Conservatives 
and. Liberals, do respond to one another in political 
controversy, but paradigms - notoriously - are incommensur-
.able. The nuclear physicist and the al·chemist may rebut 
but cannot communicate with one another. Traditions of 
political discourse, I suggest, then, are not paradigms, 
and are not governed by paradigms. 
Here I have attempted to elaborate a notion of tradition 
which could be applicable to the ever-changing world of 
politics, a notion of tradition for which there is no synonym. 
In my view, however, it would be unwise to dismiss without 
further argument, the claims of those who insist on the 
'. 
usefulness to the historian of political thought of the 
notion ·of paradigms, or of "traditions" which, unlike those 
I have described, are a prescriptive authority. 
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III 
TRADITIONS PARADIGMS AND POLITICS 
The authors of a number of articles, in various 
publications, have asserted that the history of political 
thought should be an "historical" study. What is usually 
meant by this is, that, the so-called "Great Texts" 
should not be studied in isolation from their"historical 
contexts". This view is not without opponents, however. 
It has,for example, been argued that the study of the 
history of political thought is best thought of as a 
t . 1 prac 1ce . Conceived in this way, the study should not, 
it is argued, be presumed to exclude philosophical analysis, 
discussion of a text's internal consistency, or indeed an-
achronistic analogy. The practice has not, after all, 
developed as an exclusively historical study. For that 
reaso~, it has· been suggested that the subject's best 
prospects for further development lie in increased awareness 
of the past and the present states of the practice, rather 
than the production of guidelines for writing "history 
of political thought". Those who seek·to prescribe a 
method for the historian of political thought must, therefore, 
face not only the criticisms forwarded by the proponents of 
rival "methods", but also those put forward by objectors 
to.the prescriptive enterprise per se. 
Consideration of the work of the methodologists is, 
nevertheless, instructive. Here I shall examine Professor 
·Pocock's argument that we should study the "means" an 
author had of "saying anything at all", if we are to 
''understand what he meant to say". 2 On this view,· what 
are ~mportant are the so~talled paradigms said to govern 
poli~ical speech. In Pocock's words: 
"The historian's first problem, then, 
is to identify the "language" or 
"vocabulary" with and within which 
that author operated. and to show how 
it functioned paradigmatically to 
·prescribe what he might say and how 
he might say it ... " 3 
I shall not, however, proceed to discuss at length 
what Pocock means by paradigms ~hich, he claims, impose 
limits on what an author can say. For, in the essay where 
Pocock makes this claim,there reigns confusion which 
4 
"renders ... elaboration nugatory". Pocock asserts that 
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"men· think by communicating language systems". This cannot 
be the case. For we communicate by language. Indeed, Pocock's 
theory of paradig~s takes its shape as he confuses "meaning" 
and "interpretation", "speech" and "language" and "utterances". 
He also writes of "the varieties of the political functions 
which languages can perform ... " 6 The only meaning I believe 
~ 
he could communicate by this phrase is in the sense: "that 
can be performed within a given language or languages"·; or 
"which can be 'performed' by making certain utterances .... 
By speaking a language, people engage in various practices. 
There may be language games, but languages are not the 
players. 
It is, however, a little unfair, in the case of 
Pocock's account of paradigms, to put such weight on the 
objection, namely, that a scientific paradigm is an investi-
gation carried out in a particular way (see bel9w), and 
that politics is not an investigation. It is a practice. 
This objection is not invalid, and it is also admissable 
to claim that competing political contentions are understood 
by rivals in the debating chamber in a way in which rival 
paradigms cannot be, but is not clear that Pocock intends 
"paradigm" to be understood in that way. 
Following criticism of his highly ambiguous use of 
"paradigm" in the 1962 edition of The Structure .of 
Scientific Revolution~, 7 Kuhn added a postscript 8 in 
which he states that he wishes to retain two distinct 
67 
usages of the term. One sense he rejects, for the purposes 
of exposition, in favour of the.phrase "disciplinary matrix". 9 
This denotes a scientific community's shared commitments, 
definitions and models. This notion, "disciplinary 
matrix", seems to be the sense of "paradigm" which allows 
one to assert that the paradigm prevailing at any given time 
is the discipline. 
_,---
Kuhn also wanted to use "paradigm" to mean "shared 
10 11 
examples" or "exemplars". Pocock makes it clear that ·he is 
impressed by this latter usage which highlights the way in 
which the practitioner learns to see a problem as like one 
already encountered, and therefore soluble by an adaptation of 
a previously used formula. For example the definition: 
F = rna where F = force m = mass a = acceleration 
is applicable to a freely falling body as: 
mg = 
md2 s 
~ g = acceleration due to gravity 
s = distance t = time. 
and so to a pendulum as: 
mgsinG = - mld2 9 de g = deflection of bob 
1 = le~gth of pendulum. 
Unfortunately, Pocock does not quite make it clear what the 
analogy between "verba" and "exempla" is supposed to be. He 
states only that his "verbal" paradigm is an "historical 
. 12 
event or·phenomenon to which there can be many responses" . 
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In view of the other criticisms, given above, of his account 
of language, it does not seem useful to speculate further 
about how such a paradigm might function. 
It is, perhaps, more useful to consider the critique 
that J.D. Rayner advances .. in· opposition to Pocock's view~ 3 
This argument is an examination of ideological perception 
as a form of utterance. My purpose here is to arrive at 
what I believe to be a better understanding of that mode 
of discourse, thereby_offering access to an assessment of 
the merits of Pocock's methodology and of my own account 
of"tradition". 
I have already suggested that Conservatives and Liberals 
can engage in meaningful debate about a political issue, 
. in a way that the alchemist and the nuclear physicist 
cannot debate, say, the nature of matter and its trans-
mutation. In what follows, I shall take Conservatism 
and Liberalism to be ideologies in·the sense given to that 
word in The Form of Ideology. My concern here will be with 
ideological utterance, in so far as it will be my task to 
show" how contributors to a tradition of discourse can· be 
accepted as authentically contributing to it, and how they, 
through such recognition, can identify themselves with the 
tradition. 
·What I shatl first have to attempt to show, then, is 
that the kind of identification and acceptance that I have 
associated with contribution to a tradition is possible· 
amongst participants in ideological discourse, and that 
contributors to a particular ideology, say to Liberal thinking, 
have a prime claim to be considered as constituting a 
tradition of political discourse. 
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When arguing that one of the two senses of "paradigm" 
distinguished above is inappropriate to. politics, I made 
the point that politics is not an investigation. We should 
not, then, expect different ideologies to be simply rival 
descriptions which merely differ in the emphasis that they 
put on the various aspects of political experience. It is 
not uncommon for phUQSophically minded critics to claim that 
the terminology of political debate gives rise to statements 
which are not susceptible to fal~ification~4 We need not 
conclude from this, that such statements are negligible. 
Certainly, in the way they are used by the ideologist, terms 
such as "alienation", "capitalism" or "liberty" lack a 
universal rule of application. Yet they are not invariably 
meaningless. Their sense, in a particular work, can be 
given by the examples which accompany the use of the term. 
It is by his use of such terminology,when accompanied by 
judicious use of metaphor, that the ideologist offers a 
characterisation of the world. 
Consider the following example. In a speech in Siberia 
in January 1928 Stalin gave his attention to ... Grain 
procurements and the prospects for the development of 
agriculture 11 •15 He described as "sabotage•f 6(elsewhere as 
17 
"machinations") the actions of the wealthier peasants. 
(Kulaks) who were widely believed to be speculating in 
grain. They were suspected of storing surplus grain after 
the good harvest and waiting for an upturn in the market. 
The·motivation of such activity is rational in terms of 
classical ecortomics, but Stalin expresse$ his disapproval by 
using the word "speculate" in the way in which others might 
use the word "profiteer". 
In. the following April, Stalin declared that forcing up 
the price of grain would not have been in the interests of -
and indeed would. have strained the loyalty of- the poorer 
peasants. Such peasants could not afford not to sell their 
crop immediately after the harvest, and so would be forced 
to sell in a buyer's market, only to buy again at a high 
price the following seed-time. 
·He then "explained" that: 
"That is why the Party had to retaliate 
to the blow of the Kulak speculators, 
aimed at forcing up grain prices, with a 
counter-blow that would knock out of the 
Kulaks and~eculators all inclination to 
menace the working-class and our Red Army 
with hunger." 18 
Stalin devoted much attention to the spring grain crisis of 
1928 because in his ideological picture its appearance 
19 
"cannot be considered a matter of chanGe". It was an 
20 
"action" of the capitalists against the Soviet Government. 
21 
This, according to Stalin was the "class background" of 
the crisis. 
22 
Kulaks" , 
Elsewhere we read of "the offensive against the 
23 
of "alliance", of "victory" and tt1at the 
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"grain procurement crisis" was"··· the fight of the capitalist 
24 
elements of the countryside against the Soviet Government". 
The recurrent military metaphor gives to the drab events of 
the ·farmlands the colours of struggle. That struggle, 
moreover, is class struggle. 
The peasant response to an increase-in supply, or at 
least the response of those peasants with the wherewithal 
to manipulate the market, is integrated by Stalin into the 
general view which makes it clear that the history of past 
societies has been the history of a class struggle to-culminate 
in the victory of the proletaria~. We can now see the 
Kulaks as"· .. the class whose economic principle is the 
25 
exploitation of the working class 4 •• "' Which is to 
understand them as both dangerous and ultimately -doomed. 
Their demise is to be hastened by collectivizing farms 
in order to diminish their control of agriculture. If 
we do not find that means-end relationship compelling, 
however, then the conclusion drawn by Stalin can have no 
force. That conclusion comes at the end of a .. mass of 
statistics about collective- farms. According to Stalin: 
"They show ... that the process of 
eliminating the Kulaks as a class 
in our country is going full steam 
ahead". 26 
Neither "class" not "exploitation" are likely to be 
referential terms·any Kulak would deploy in his market 
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transactions. They are part of the Stalinist account of the 
"true nature" of Kulak dealings. If we want to understand 
what, for example, a "class" is here, we must look to 
instances of the use of the term by Stalin. Clearly we 
cannot simply define a "class".as: 
"A division or order of society according 
to status; a rank or grade of society". 
or, what is "now the leading sense", 
"A number of individuals (persons or 
things} possessing common attributes 
and grouped tqgether under a general 
or "class" name, a kind, sort, division"· 27 
Neither definition tells us about struggle, ultimate 
victory or the abolition of all "classes", and neither defini-
tion helps us to decide whether or not Kulaks exist as a 
clasi in the sense of Stalin's speech. 
Accounts such as th.at given by Stalin of the "grain 
procurement crisis" are not good or bad· descriptions. They 
ar~ depictions of the world. As such, they are susc~ptible 
to judgements of appropriateness, but accepting a depiction 
as appr~priate can involve more than passive acknowledgement. 
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I have tried to show that natural science can be conceived 
of as a tradition {or set of related traditions) which 
thrives on criticism and conse,quent innovation. I have 
noted, too, the way in which a scientist's identity as 
a contributor to a tradition depends upon acceptance by 
fellow practitioners, an acceptance which might involve 
the publication of his work in the group's journal. I 
suggest that publication in a shared journal is not merely 
an endorsement of the contributor's work, as meeting 
requirements of honesty and accuracy, but also an affirma-
tion that that is the kind of work that members of the group 
engage in (should engage in). A statistical analysis and 
correlation of the alignment of planets with say, bird 
migration paths would be admissable in a journal of zoology 
whereas any attempts at correlation between the alignments 
of those planets and say, the characters of statesmen born 
at the relevant times is unlikely to be published there~ 
Ideology is not science, however. What is important, 
in the case of ideology, is not publication in, say, the 
·official Liberal journal, or even an endorsement in the 
form of a preface written by a leading party member. If 
an understanding is acceptable to Liberals, that is, if 
they deem its characterizations to be an appropriate depiction 
of their circumstances, then they themselves wil·l begin to 
articulate their experiences and express their aspirations, 
and dreads, in those terms. If the official Liberal 
journal publishes articles which self-professed Liberals 
do not find acceptable .in the above way, it will lose its 
readership (or gain a new one), and cease to be the Liberal 
journal or the identity· of Liberalism will have changed. · 
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A leading Liberal, who appears to endorse an account which 
fellow Liberals fail to find appropriate, may either have 
made an error of political judgement, or abandoned his 
Liberal credentials. Consider the case of the young 
Mussolini and the Italian Socialists. His office as editor 
of''Avanti" , put him in a position analogous to that of 
the leading Liberal given above. His last actions as editor 
of "Avanti" threatened the newspaper with the same fate 
as that of my hypothetical Liberal journal. 
Cassels describes "Avanti" as "the official voice of 
Italian Socialism". 28 In 1914 its editor, Mussolini, wrote 
an editorial favouring intervention on the side of the "Entente" 
states. Immediately afterwards, he was dismissed. In Cassels •.s 
·words: 
"Not content with breaching the principle 
of international proletarian solidarity, 
Mussolini flirted with the argument most 
despised by Socialists - that of national 
honor ... (sic)"29 
Mussolini's crime was to write about the situation in 
Europe by characterising Italy's neutrality, not in terms of 
standing aloof from a conflict inevitably involving war·of 
proletarian against proletarian, but in terms of Italy's 
failure to play a role in a great historical drama. Whilst 
this kind of talk was anathema to the Partido socialista 
italiana (P.S.I), it was compatible with the viewpoint then 
occupied by the syndicalist socialists, who characterised the 
war as a struggle between the international Right (Germany 
and the Left (Anglo French). It is not difficult to see why 
the P.S.I., who viewed the syndicalists with the disfavour 
due to a rival, dismissed Mussblini from the editorship of 
"Avanti" and terminated his party membership~ 
There was little else the-P.S.I. could have done. If 
Mussolini had been allowed to continue writing editorials 
in the same vein, "Avanti" would have become the journal 
of the syndicalists. Either the readership would have 
changed, as P. S. I. members ::cancelled subscriptions in 
disgust or confusion, thereby losing the P.S.I. leadership 
30 its means of communication with its members. Or (what 
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was no doubt uppermost in the minds of the P.S.I. leadership) 
the same P.S.I. rank and file readership, now_exposed to the 
syndicalist view in the journal they were ~ccustomed to read 
might have begun to see that syndicalist view as appropriate 
to their own situation, and might have forsaken the P.S.I.31 
Now in my discussion of 'tradition', I argue that the 
production of acceptable innovation in a tradition can be a 
result of an education conceived as the acquisition of an 
understanding of the recognised achievements of that 
tradition. In those remarks on education, I also wrote of 
the young scientist or artist being initiated into the 
tradition in which he had been educated,in the sense that 
he has become a person the identity of whose activity is 
informed by it. Here, I think, we can see more clearly 
the sense in which education in the ways of· a_ tradition 
of political discourse is an initiation into its currently 
accepted language and practices. Oakeshott wrote of the 
way in which the student arrives at an understanding of 
his political tradition through enjoyment of it, and 
through the observation and imitation of his masters .32 
An "invitation" to participate in the tradition is, in.this 
way; extended to the student. His learning to deploy the 
language of the tradition; in appropriate circumstances, 
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is the student's initiation into it. As·an initiate, he 
is recognized by other participants in the tradition as an 
authentic voice and contributor. 
Now my aim in· this discussion has been to. distinguish 
so-called "linguistic paradigms" from traditions of political 
discourse. I have attempted to indicate the incoherence of 
Pocock's account. I have also attempted to outline an 
alternative account of political discourse, an account 
compatible with the notion of a tradition which can thrive 
on criticism and innovation. Having criticised Pocock's 
methodology with regard to paradigms, I have little to say 
about his well-known essay "Time, Institutions and Action -
. 33 
on Traditions and their Understanding". For in that essay 
Pocock uses the term "tradition" to refer to what, in an 
earlier discussion ( Ch. 2 ), I have argued is more properly 
called "custom". He writes for example that: 
" A tradition in its simplest form, may 
be thought of asffi indefinite series 
of repetitions of an action, which og 
each occasion is performed on the 
assumption that it has been performed 
before; its performance is authorised 
though the nature of the authorisation 
may vary widely - by the knowledge, or 34 
the assumption of previous performance". 
His comments in the introduction to the collection, in 
which the above quoted essay appears, are equally revealing. 
He writes, of the final essay of· the collection, that the 
essay was added: 
"··· since all the historical material 
employed and the very concept of paradigm 
change itself presupposes an inherited or 
transmitted mental and linquistic structure 
and a consequent - one might say dependent -
willingness to criticise and explain that 
structure (or tradition) ... " 35 
There is a suggestion here that paradigms. and traditions are 
identical, or at least that traditions are paradigms. In the 
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last (and highly metaphorical) .essay of the collected 
volume, however, Pocock writes.of "classical man's attitudes 
. 36 
·towards his paradigms and. traditions", leaving the reader 
with the impression that paradigms are the original exemplar 
or Urtyp upon which tradition is based. 
I have argued, of course, that traditions, in the sense 
in which that concept is applicable to thought about the 
changing world of politics, cannot be based upon any kind 
of Urtyp. Moreover, if the above account of the form of 
ideological language is not mistaken, then we must note that, 
if paradigms which are 'exempla~s'as Kuhn uses the word, 
are verbal (as Pocock insists in his footnote, but fails 
to make clear how this could be)~7 then the notion of the 
verbal exemplar has no obvious application to ideological 
works. My reason for saying this is as follows: Terms 
like "class" are given substance by examples which help 
us to understand what is involved in the notion of a class, 
but successive ideologists, within a tradition, give 
different illustrations. Their characterisation are 
depictions of a changed and changing world. In other words, 
any analogy between, say, the appearance of the words "class" 
"revolution", and "bourgeoisie" in their various relationships 
in the works of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and 6thers, and the 
reformulations in different problem situations of F = rna 
as given by Kuhn, to illustrate his use of "exemplar", .is 
destroyed when we remember that all the expressions given by 
Kuhn are mathematical equivalents .. That is, they are equiva-
lent in a way that the visions elaborated by Marx and his 
successors never could be. Those ideologists are part of 
a tradition, in the way that Galileo, Newton and Einstein 
are part of a tradition. They do not share a paradigm. 
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Pocock's arguments have, nevertheless, influenced· 
a number of other accounts of traditions in political writing. 
One such account, containing a view of tradition with super-
ficial similarities to my own, has been put forward by Andrew 
Lockyer in an article entitled "'Traditions' as context 
38 
in the History of Political Theory". My account differs 
from Lockyer's on a number of important points, to which 
I shall here draw.attention. 
Lockyer's stated aim is to relate a method for the 
study of past ideas to a philosophy of history, his object 
being," ... to develop an idea of 'context' which is founded 
on an adequate philosophy of history"~g 
The required unit of context is, he contends, provided 
by "intellectual traditions". 40 Lockyer's start is not 
very promising, however, for he adds in a footnote, without 
himself remedying the defect, that the term "tradition" 
"···has not as yet been subject to critical appraisal". 41 
~ 42 He .then goes on to cite three articles; one by B.A. Haddock 
and two by Pr~fessor Pocock~3 Haddock is credited with 
referring to traditions, and with devoting "some remarks 
to the use of the cohcept"~4 The "fullest discussion of 
45 traditions", according to Lockyer, has appeared in Pocock's 
writings, especially the two cited. I have already discussed 
the first of these, "Time, Institution and Action". The 
second bears the title "The history of polical thought-a 
methodological enquiry" .46 In this latter essay Pocock 
writes of the history of pblitical thought as being 
·"established" and "flourishing" on terms which "appear to be 
conventional and·traditional". 47 I shall not dwell here 
on the distinction between "convention" and "tradition"; 
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Professor Pocock stipulates what he means by a "traditional 
48 . 
form of study" with the assertion that: 
"Simply, there is a body of thinkers 
to whom we have grown into the habit 
of paying attention, and a number of 
viewpoints from which they appear 
interesting to us".49 
Tradition is not a matter of habit (or convention); by 
following Pocock with insufficient scepticism Lockyer seems 
to have accepted a shaky foundation for his argument about 
tradition. Nevertheless he criticises writers such as 
Oakeshott and Acton from whose opinions he feels his own 
to diverge. Doing so will, he believes, locate his "own 
50 
position within an intellectual tradition". Here, at least, 
is a clue to Lockyer's own notion of tradition. He writes 
too that: 
"An in.tellectual tradition is usually, 
though not always a critical tradition; 
which means it will be embraced with some 
degree of self-consciousness, and this 
makes a difference. Although all traditions 
have a propensity for self-modifi~ation~ this 
will be overt and consciously performed in 
a c~itical intellectual tradition. It will 
therefore incorporate conscious innovation, 
involve partial acceptance and be· anunevenly 
distributed inheritance, it will nevertheless 
exhibit the features of prescription, 
continuity and community". 51 
Amongst intellectual traditions, we can, according 
to Lockyer, distinguish "ideological traditions" or ("more 
neutrally") "traditions of thought" from "traditions of 
argument or discourse" .52 The former "embody a shared 
set of beliefs and values" .53 The latter "centre on a 
54 
related set of questions or common concerns". "Traditions 
of·thought", he claims, "imply a degree of concensus not 
shared in traditions of discourse but· both crucially involve 
'authority' , 'continuity' and 'linguistic community'" .55 
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Lockyer takes Pocock as his immediate source in arguing 
that intellectual traditions are "intellectualizing traditions'~ 
56 
that is, they are "abstractions" from experience. These 
traditions are intended to provide a unit of conte~t for the 
writing ef an intellectual history founded on an allegedly 
"adequate" philosophy of history (Lockyer subscribes to a 
philosophy of history influenced by the w6rk of R.G. Collingwoo~ 
and of Hegel). ·In other words, Lockyer concludes that 
traditions of thought and of discourse are "historical subjects". 
Traditions provide the identity through change which makes ·the 
historical narrative possible. This last point I am inclined 
to agree with, but what is a tradition? In his concluding 
paragraph Lockyer writes that, in his essay he has: 
" ... not attempted to define the limits 
of what is to count as a tradition, nor ... 
stipulated necessary or sufficient 
conditions for locating an author within 
a tradition, because these are matters 
for historical scholarship." 57 
Now surely historians can only tell us when the concept 
"tradition" has been used by past authors, just as it is the 
case that lexicographers can only tell us how it has been 
used. It is the role of the philosopKer,· as method6logist 
to determine the logic of its deployment· in historical 
investigation. Lockyer's own article commends the concept 
to historians, but it is not itself born of "historical 
scholarship". Lockyer should at least have made clear what 
\ 
it is he is recommending. There is something odd about 
commending to historians the use of the _concept "tradition" 
without attempting to investigate its reference. As it 
appears in the article quoted, the limited account of 
"tradition" given by Lockyer seems fragmentary and lacking 
in coherence. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how much of Pocock's 
account of paradigms Lockyer finds·acceptable. He seems 
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to accept that "paradigms" are "authoritative". So, he 
says, are traditions. He does.not make clear how discussion 
of Oakeshott and Acton locates him (as he says it does) 
within an intellectual tradition, and so presumably subjects 
him to some "authority" (see definitions on page 78 ) . How 
does his critique of an argument put Lockyer in any such 
relationship? And with whom? Is the argument therefore 
vitiated by being governed by some authority? 
An author's conclusions might lead the persuaded to 
accept some authors as authorities. His choice of subjects 
for his critique does, I think, also provide a significant 
clue to the tradition he identifies with. Yet, of course, 
the notion that authority can simply order conviction is 
absurd. If a pope were to order Roman Catholics to believe 
the moon to be made of green cheese his own fitness to be a 
religious authority would be called into question. Belief 
is prior to authority in so far as it is the understanding 
that popes are divinely appointed which makes them an 
authority on religious matters for Roman Catholics. 
Lockyer's self-identification with a particular tradition, 
if it were based on acceptance of an authority, would also 
leave it open to those of another tradition simply to regard 
his arguments as either irrelevant or as a fit subject for 
rebuttal; they would not share his funda.rriental presuppositions. 
Part of the above problem of paraqigms and authority 
arise~ from the dichotomy made at the beginning of Lockyerfs 
essay between "ideological traditions" and "traditions of 
argument or discourse". Haddock, who also claims to be inspired 
by Collingwood,argues, in the very same article cited by 
Lockyer, that: 
And that: 
" if we direct our attention to the 
concept of political activity we will 
have established thepossipility of an 
unbroken continuum between the study 
of political institutions and political 
philosophy as traditionally conceived" ,58 
"The history of political thought becomes 
a history of ideas that begins in the 
closest relationship with political 
practice and extends on an unbroken 
continuum at every greater levels of 
generality until it is identical with 
political philosophy in_the traditional 
sense". 59 
I shall not rehearse Haddock's arguments here. 
Lockyer does not mention them. Intuitively, it seems 
probable, that, although "ideological traditions" "imply 
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a degree of consensus not shared in traditions of discourse" 
(Lockyer) 60 , if the difference between them (as Haddock 
claims) is a matter of degree, then the two alleged kinds of 
tradition are unlikely to be w~olly discrete entities with 
no overlap. Lockyer, no doubt, sees himself as participating 
in a "tradition of discourse" rather than an "ideological 
tradition", for he does not always "share beliefs" with 
Oakeshott. However, it is not consensus that gives even 
ideological traditiomtheir continuity. That continuity 
is given by the presence of an ongoing association of pract-
itioners who acknowledge successive contributions as authentic 
by adopting their various characterisations and views of 
the world. Moreover,. the contihui ty of tradi tiorn ~ other 
than ideological traditions, also depends upon the validation 
of contributions by present practitioners. After all, a 
Lutheran's opinion on a matter .of biblical exegesis would not 
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automatically become part of the Catholic tradition simply 
because it involved the same subject matter. Acceptance 
by leading Catholics is required first. This is what is so 
odd about Lockyer's belief that arguing against Oakeshott 
places him in a tradition .. We must wait to see whether or 
not, and by whom, Lockyer's. argument is taken up. 
Intertwined with the above is, in my view, a separate 
dichotomy confusion. Political thought, I wish to maintain, 
is not a matter of "abstraction" from experience. Lockye:r: 
criticises Oakeshott's notion of theory as "abridgement" of 
a tradition of experience, but does not make clear how the 
61 
notion of abstraction differs from it. He believes, never-
theless, that the fact that "there is always more than one 
way to abridge a tradition of experience - or that there is 
more than one intellectual tradition to be found within it" 
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"points to a weakness" in Oakeshott's theory. However, the 
works of Engels and Herbert Spencer are witness-to the way 
in which experience of mid-nineteenth century England can 
provide subject matter for two writers whom few-would include 
in the same tradition. Of course, if all that is required 
to locate oneself in a tradition, as Lockyer seems to believe, 
is to argue against a certain set of people rather than against 
anyone else, then we must place Fitzjames Stephens into the 
same tradit~on as J.S. Mill, although one is generally 
acknowledged to be a Conservative,and the other a Liberal. 
What has gone wrong here is that an ideological account 
is not an abridgement or an abstraction frorri experience. It 
is not a partial description; it is not a description at all. 
Ideological accounts characterrse an experience for the 
hostile and "describe" it for the initate.· No ideological 
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characrerisation can be equally illuminating to everyone in 
a political society to which controversy is indigenous. 
Lockyer wrj,tes of "Theories" as if they were simply 
contributions to a continuous rational argument in which all 
may participate. Some works,of what is usually called 
political theory, perhaps come near to being "theories" 
in this sense. But they all, I suggested above, lie on the 
same continuum ~s ideological thinking. None attain the 
character Lockyer ascribes to them. Any work which goes 
beyond the philosophical task of clarifying the concepts of 
political discourse in.order to indulge in talk about how 
communities are to be organized must presuppose an account 
of what is good for mankind. It must have a view about 
"human nature". It has then ceased to be a theory in the 
sense of an argument of general validity. For its fundamental 
premises can be rejested by anyone with a rival view of 
"human nature". Disputes between the two are conducted, not 
~ 
as arguments, ·but as mutual rebuttals. And, therefore, the 
question of who acknowledges the authenticity of such 
"theories" i.s vi tal to their location within a tradition. 
Talk of a "Western Tradition" 63 is less helpful than the 
investigation of those more clearly identifiable traditions 
which constitute the diverse experience of European man, 
whose existence Lockyer also hints at in his conclusion. 
The problem of how to identify contributions to a 
tradition is, then, an important one. It is also a problem 
which has presented difficulties to other writers than 
Lockyer. Much of the first part of Lockyer's essay is devoted 
to a critique of the work of Quentin Skinner. It is not my 
intention here to add to the large body of literature provoked 
by Skinner's views on the study of texts and contexts. My 
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interest centres, rather, on some remarks made about tradition 
in Skinner's essay "Some Problems in the Analysis of Political 
Thought and Action". 64 These remarks relate to the placing 
of authors within traditions.· 
In the belief that hiB "attempt to focus on the conventions 
of political argument tends to culminate in a study of genres 
and traditions of discourse II Skinner points out that 
his approach avoids a "weakness" which is "endemic" where 
"languages" or "traditions" are the historian of political 
65 thought's unit of study. This weakness seems to comprise 
two difficulties. The first is that: 
"··· if we merely focus on the relations 
between the vocabulary used by a given 
writer and the traditions to which he may 
appear connected by his use of this vocabu-
lary, we may become insensitive to instances 
of irony, obliquity, and other cases in · 
which the writer may seem to be saying 
something other than what he means". 66 
67 This, however, is only the "obvious danger". The chief 
danger is the second one, namely that: 
" ... if we merely concentrate on the 
language of a given writer, we may 
run the risk of assimilating him to 
a completely alien intellectual 
tradition, and thus of misunderstanding 
the whole aim of his political works". 68 
Now, the meaning of "tradition" here is, I ·suggest, that 
given in Greenleaf's Order, Empiricism and Politics (Skinner's 
reference is to an article in which Greenleaf barely mentions 
tradition) and is more akin to a notion of style (see. my 
p. 103). Greenleaf's use of tradition in this sense is 
criticised by Lockyer as presenting only "static and ossified 
abstractions". 69 If this is the case, such a tradition 
cannot provide the continuity through change required if it 
is to qualify as a subject of historical narrative. ~y 
object here, however, is not to discuss Greenleaf's conception 
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of tradition (see Ch. IV), but rather to investigate whether 
6r not my own conception is prone to the double weakness 
portrayed by Skinner. 
Clearly, because the conception of tradition for which 
I argue involves authentication of a contribution by being 
taken up by acknowledged participants in that tradition, 
my criterion of a work's being part of the literature of a 
tradition is not simply the presence of a specialised 
vocabulary. Therefore the objection that employing the notion 
of "tradition" as a unit of study leads, by its concentration 
on language, to insensitivity to irony and obliquity, misses 
its mark here. No such defence is, of course, available for 
Pocock's "linguistic paradigms". 
Skinner's second objection is more interesting, however, 
because it can be turned back agai~st his own understanding 
if it is construed as an objection to the conception of 
tradition advocated in this thesis. The risk of assimilating 
an author to an alien tradition is,I believe,much reduced 
~ 
by employing the notion of tradition· I advocate. Skinner's 
remedy, however, is that the historian should: 
"···not merely ... ·indicate the traditions 
of discourse to which a writer may be 
appealing, but also ask what he may be doing 
when he appeals to the language of those 
particular traditions". 70 
For him, what is important is not languages or traditions, 
but rather "the range of ·things which can in principle be done 
with them (and to them) at any given time". 71 The problem 
here, of course, is that there was nothing in the "range of 
·things" available for John Locke to say which could have 
made him a Liberal author. The term Liberal was not used for 
a political grouping before its adoption in the Spanish Cortes 
72 in 1810/ll. Now, Skinner's concern is with the correct 
location of authors within traditions, and Locke belongs 
firmly to the Liberal ttadition. This much Skinner must 
concede, since he writes of Locke as "the founder of the 
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Liberal School''· At least, ~ccording to Skinner, this is 
Locke's "significance". He·· does, of course, say that the 
hi·storians, however, cannot write of Locke as founding a 
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"Liberal school" because clearly it is nothing Locke himself 
could have intended, just as Petrarch cannot have intended 
to inaugurate the Renaissance. Nonetheless, Locke still 
belongs to the Liberal tradition. He belongs because 
Liberals (admittedly long after publication) have fobnd 
inspiration in his works, and they have seen fit to articulate 
their experience in terms derived from his writings. They 
have also acknowledged their source. 74 My model of tradition 
allows for the possibility of an author being claimed as 
founder of a tradition, that is an author, who could never 
have intended to contribute to a tradition, can be associated 
.with it. Unfortunately for Skinner's argument, however, 
til" 
there is nothing that an examination of the languages or 
"traditions"available to Locke in the seventeenth century 
could tell us about his later acceptability to Liberals. 
In other words, Skinner's method does not give us any clue 
about the tradition to which Locke belongs. The past is 
unalterable, even by a methodologist . 
. The history of the reception of Locke's work is 
instructive here. The Two Treatises were largely ignored by 
critics for some time. They only became "the principle text 
of the Whigs in the very different circumstances of mid-
l . . II 75 eighteenth century po 1t1cs . Algernon. Sydney's arguments, 
. 
in fact, attracted a greater contemporary fame than Locke's. 
His fame has since waned. Locke not Sydney wins the credit 
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for allegedly founding the Liberal 'school'. It is acknow-
ledgement by participants in a tradition rather than any 
special use of language, or indeed what an author said, which 
should be the criterion for adjudging an author to be part 
of a tradition. 
So far, in writing about traditions and the grounds upon 
which an author can be said to be a contributor to a tradition, 
I have tried to make the point that the concept of tradition 
enables us to conceive the necessary continuity through change 
which makes political ideas a suitable subject for the 
historical narrative. Of course, where the historian's 
subject matter comprises a series of individual contributions 
to what he calls political thought, the historian must still 
identify the continuity which informs a coherent narrative. 
The identification of such a continuity, and the location 
of an author's work within it, is the historian's principle 
task. Historians, however, have rarely performed it. 
ll" 
I have already attempted to show that the conceptions of 
"tradition" offered by the methodologists Skinner and Lockyer 
are not wholly free from objection. To that conclusion I 
shall now add a critique of a procedure adopted by some 
historians of political thought who have sought to find 
coherence in, and so write a narrative about, a sequence of 
related political texts. The particular approach I shall call 
"essentialism". I shall argue that it is a mistaken approach. 
I am not the first to take.this view, but not all writers 
on the subject have understood the word in the way I do. 
The word "essentialism" is employed by a number of writers 
to identify an error or misconception (but not always the 
same eTror or misconception) underlying some accounts of 
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ideologies. Noel O'Sullivan, for example, hopes that the 
method employed in his volume Conservatism will.not require 
him to ".. . identify an 'essence' or 'hard core' of·. 
conservative ideology, by fixing on the writings of one 
particular conservative thinker, or upon some one strain 
in conservative thought ... " 76 He insists on this on the 
grounds.that such attempts to identify "essences" will lead 
to the arbitrary exclusion of acknowledged "conservative" 
thinkers. In a companion volume to that by O'Sullivan, R.N. 
Berki,writing about "Socialism", uses the term "essentialist" 
in a similar way to denote a"··· departure which fastens 
on one or other socialist ideal declaring it alone to be the 
'essence' 
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of socialism". 
The best known reference to essentialism is, however, 
that to be found in volume two of Popper's The Open Society 
and its Enemies. 78 There he contras~the approach of 
the scientist with that of the Aristotelian essentialist. 
·on the one hand, the scientist, according to Popper, takes 
·a description and asks what shorthand symbol or name can be 
given to it. The essentialist, on the· other.hand, gives a 
definition which: 
"···may at one time answer two very closely 
related questions. The one is 'What is it?' 
for example, 'What is a puppy?': it asks what 
the essence is which is denoted by the defined 
term. The other is 'What does it mean?', for 
·example, 'What does "puppy" mean?' ; it asks 
for the meaning of a term (namely of the term 
that denotes the essence)". 'i9 
Popper regards both of these questions as misconceived, 
and the distinction between them as unimportant, but·I shall 
return to the subject of definition when I discuss in detail. 
some examples of essentialism. First, for the sake of clarity, 
. 
it is desirable to spell out why the authors quoted condemn 
the essentialist approach. 
As I have suggested, O'Sullivan argues against giving 
an essentialist account of "conservatism". His reason is: 
"There is the difficultypresented by 
the fact that not every ~onservative 
thinker will be found to subscribe to 
all the ideas found on the list of 
"canons of conservative thought"; and 
there is the further difficulty that 
not all who do subscribe to them would 
invariably be described as conservative." 80 
Berki's (obscure) objection is that the essentialist 
approach which declares a single "ideal" to be the essence 
of "socialism": 
" ... quite apart from ignoring the 
vast variety of socialist literature, 
commits the error of inflating the 
definition of its supposedly 'essential' 
value, subsuming all else under it." 81 
Both Berki and O'Sullivan, then, condemn essentialism 
as an inhibition in historical writing. However, Popper's 
point is more fundamental.. He objects to the constant 
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demand for definitions on the grounds that such an _approach 
is non-scientific. Moreover, the continual~demand that we 
define our terms threatens infinite regress. Scientists, 
we are told, make statements which "never depend on the 
82 
meaning of our terms". Admittedly Popper's self-identific-
ation with science - a discipline distinguished by its 
apparent progress- seems to serve the same end as his character-
isation of societies as either "open" or "c.losed" rather than 
as say "rule constituted" or "goal directed". Nevertheless, 
his view cannot be ignored in a discussion such as this. He 
·claims,after all, that disciplines which have used Aristotelian 
definitions have"··. remained arrested in a state of empty 
verbiage and barren scholasticism". 83 Popper's belief is 
that the progress of the sciences has been dependent upon the 
degree to which they have discarded the essentialist method. 
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In particular, he hints darkly that, because of essentialism, 
much of social science still belongs in the "Middle Ages". 
(This term, like "darkages", exposes his Liberal.identity). 
Here then are two objections to essentialism as an 
approach· to writing about political discourse. The third, 
Popper's objection, is a more general objection to 
essentialism as a contribution to knowledge. In what follows 
I shall attempt to outline a further objection to essentialism. 
I shall not be concerned with the elaboration of a general 
objection to Aristotelianism, or with simply the identification 
of any possible incompleteness in an essentialist account of 
a tradition of political discourse. My own objection is that 
the essentialist has misunderstood the form of ideology and the 
way in which contributions to an ideology are part of an ongoing 
tradition of discourse. In other words, I believe essentialism 
in the history of political thought to have a greater under-
lying complexity than is apparent from the objections posed 
above. O'Sullivan, for example, as we have seen, rejects 
essentialism as concentrating on one strain of thought. Now, 
I have already argued that it is a mistake to regard traditions 
and internal ideological debates as being founded upon an 
Urtyp. Furthermore, the conception of tradition advocated 
in this thesis enables us to see that contributing to political 
discourse calls for an innovation that can be acknowledged 
by that author's fellow practitioners.· This acknowledgement 
is conditioned by their judgement of prevailing circumstances. 
There can, therefore, be no "strain'' to be identified by the 
academic in say, Conservative. thinking, in addition to the 
"strains" Conservatives themselv~s have presented. Any 
' 
such "strains" could not, therefore, be mistaken for the 
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whole tradition (the mistake OiSullivan warns us against) 
by the author of any serious historical narrative without 
destroying the coherence of his narrative. 
In.other words, my opposition to essentialism stems 
neither from any general objection to Aristotelianism, nor 
from the suspicion of incompleteness in essentialist 
accounts of ideologies. Its basis is the conviction that the 
essentialist gravely misrepresents the nature of the 
historical understanding of political discourse. 
·"Essentialism" will be used here to denote the attempt 
to define, say, Conservative or Liberal thought as being 
each -the repeated elaboration of an enduring set of principles 
in the face of new challenges in the political arena. My 
grounds for asserting that essentialism is an error is now, 
I hope, apparent. Liberalism, Conservatism,_ and other 
ideologies, I have argued, can be regarded as traditions of 
thought or discourse. I have tried to show that a major 
feature of traditions in this sense is originality. Political 
viewpoints are both modified and "revolutionized" by changed 
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circumstances. Continuity through that change is present 
in the association of adherents who together adopt successive 
characterisations of their world in expression of their 
hopes and aspirations. A tradition involving elaboration of 
such characterisations cannot therefore ·simply be subsumed 
under a definition of what say, "socialism is" (as Berki 
rightly pointed out, but with little explanation) without 
the would-be definer himself adding a voice to a possible 
debate within socialism. He, of course, may be ignored, 
After all, it is political argument that establishes the 
boundaries of the orthodox. The academic simply maps them. 
Essentialism is a :tailing to which many academic writers 
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are prone. Instances of it abound. One political scientist 
mistakes traditions for broad categories by means of which 
similarities are "emphasised" . .s6 he concludes that: 
"Thus "liberalism" has become widely 
accepted as the correct category for 
Mill's thought, which is thereby over-
simplified by neglect of the conservative 
aspects of his fear of mass-society and 
of his later socialism".87 
Is this fear of "mass society" something articulated 
88 
only by all Conservatives? Is it exclusively their property? 
· . It might be the case that Mill expressed ideas which have 
since been professed by Socialists. But have Socialists 
used the vocabulary of Mill? Is his so called "socialism" 
their Socialism? Hobhouse acknowledges Mill's exposition 
of Socialism in the Autobicgraphy as "perhaps the best summary 
statement of Liberal Socialism that we possess~· 89 
Before going on to discuss further examples of this sort, 
it is worth noting that what is simply ,an error in the 
writings of an academic is a valuable tool to the.ideolog.ist, 
whose objective is persuasion not ~roof. This is further 
evidence, if evidence is still needed, for ·the fact that 
regardless of the academic trappings of some ideologic.al 
works the criteria of success of, and, therefore, the forms 
of, the two kinds of writing are different. Consider Spencer's 
The Man versus the State, directed at the "reforming" Liberals 
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of the day. 
The opening chapter of Spencer's book bears the tit~e 
"The New Toryism". In it Spencer aims to "justify" the·. 
"paradox" that essentially "most of those who pass as Liberals· 
91. 
are Tories of a new type". He reminds his readers of the 
"intrinsic natures of Toryism and Liberalism, properly so 
called", pointing out that: 
and that: 
" these two are definable as the system 
·of compulsory cooperation and the system 
of voluntary cooperation 11 .92. · 
" in the one party there was a desire· 
to resist and decrease the coercive power 
of the ruler over the subject, and in the 
other party to maintain or increase his 
coercive power". 93 
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By a display of "Whig" history Spencer also seeks 
"to remind everybody what Liberalism was in the past, 
that they may perceive its unlikeness to the so-called 
95 
Liberalism of the present". 
~For: 
"They h·ave lost sight of the truth that 
in past times Liberalism habitually stood 
for individual freedom versus state 
coercion". 96 
Spencer's claim is that "Liberal Statesman and Liberal 
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voters" had become confused about "the aim of Liberalism". 
They had assumed that this aim was "welfare", because what 
Liberals had in the past aimed at had tG>- in fact, promoted the 
"popular good". 98 Thus Spencer alleges: 
" ... that popular good has ·come to be 
sought by Liberals, not as an end to 
be indirectly gained by relaxation of 
restraints, but as the end directly to 
be gained". 99 
By characterising-Liberalism as having had an "aim", from 
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which those calling themselves "Liberals" had deviated, Spencer 
directs an appeal towards those who would be "true" Liberals 
rather than Tories-by-another-name. Of course, the whole 
construction collapses if we do not accept Spencer's claim 
to be able to identify the intrinsic natures of Liberalism 
and Toryism, or if we do not accept that being Tory or Liberal 
iS a matter of imposing or resisting coercion. There is no 
Liberalism apart from that "so-called Liberalism" of the 
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"Liberal Statesman and Liberai voters". Indeed,Spencer's 
work can be contrasted with tnat of another acknowledged 
Liberal, L.T. Hobhouse. In his book Liberalism Hobhouse 
also tries to outline the pri~ciples of Liberalism,as a call 
to arms. He does so in terms Spencer would, no doubt, have 
regarded as symptomatic of the new-Toryism. Both Spencer and 
Hobhouse ar~, nevertheless, acknowledged as members of the 
Liberal tradition by subsequent Liberal writers.100 
Essentialism, then, can lend a spurious clarity to the 
ideologist's case. In an academic account, however, essentialism 
has no place· BY indulging in it, the academic is unable to 
recount the varied commitments of adherents whose beliefs 
and practices change with time. In their determination to find 
one solid set of compatible contributions to what I have claime:i 
is a tradition,essentialists ignore the liquidity of ideological 
conviction. What is sired is alone called, say, Liberalism 
or Conservatism. Of course, it is much easier to recommend, 
or criticise, what are alleged to be a group'-s essential 
doctrines or beliefs, than to engage in detailed analysis 
of a tradition in all its variety and complexity. The works 
of Spencer and Hobhouse are clearly partisan. Other 
essentialist writings are less easily identified. Let us 
look again at O'Sullivan's Conservatism. 
O'Sullivan, it will be remembered, attempted to define 
essentialism. The essentialist was said to fix upon one 
thinker or one "strain" of thought. And O'Sullivan claims 
to avoid that misconceived approach. Instead, he offers 
• 1 d f • • t • II 101 C t • • a "s1mp e e 1n1 1on . onserva 1sm 1s: 
" a philosophy of imperfection, committed 
to the idea.of limits, and directed towards 
the defence of a l'imi ted style of politics" _10 2 
This definition, O'Sullivan believes: 
" .... avoids bo~J: difficulties [of what 
he calls essentialism; see my p ~9 J 
since it is broad eriough to fit all 
thinkers who have considered themselves 
conservatives or are generally regarded 
as such, whilst at the same time directing 
attention towards the idea upon which all 
conservative thought depends; the idea 
that is, of imperfection".l03 
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Now O'Sullivan seems not to have noticed that, _in writing 
of those who considered themselves to be "conservative" and are 
generally regarded to be such, he has hit upon a criterion of 
identification which renders hiS definition otiose. He claims 
for his definition that it"··· provides the means for dis-
tinguishing conservative ideology not only from liberalism, 
but also from the radical ideologies which lie to its left 
and to its radical right". 104 
It may be unnecessary to point out here that Conservatives 
quite easily distinguish themselves from adherents of other 
ideologies, without recourse to any single criterion. I 
shall endeavour to show that, for all his protestations, 
O'Sullivan's work is essentialist, in the·sense I have given, 
in that it disregards evidence of identity. Still, the 
unsound historiography of essentialist work, far from being 
of no further use to the historian can, I suggest, be of 
considerable interest. What is an error in such a work from 
an academic point of view is also an aid to the ideologist 
in the presentation of his vision. 
On the face of it, O'Sullivan's Conservatism looks 
like a purely academic work. Yet in his preface he informs 
his readers that he is attempting "neither an exhaustive 
examination of conservative political practice, nor a 
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comprehensive study of conservative thought at large". The 
work is rather: 
'' an examination ~hd critique of the 
internal coherence and stability of each 
of the three principle kinds of argument 
against radical change derived by 
. conservative thinkers from different 
conceptions of human imperfection".l06 
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To this end he has selecte'd "the most coherent and systematic 
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formulations of each position". This selection has, he 
admits, "occasionally been influenced by a desire to draw 
attention to conservative philosophers whose writings deserve 
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more attention ..• " In other words, it seems that 
O'Sullivan wants to emphasize particular aspects of 
Conservative thought. Certain writers "deserve more 
attention". Indeed they may, but the historian is only 
concerned with the attention they received. In short, if 
O'Sullivan wants to claim this attention for a thinker 
because he was regarded as influential is his own day, then 
he would have to write a history. This he does not do. 
O'Sullivan's criterion of "conservatism" is his own stipulated 
identity and his criteria of significance are coherence and 
system, not past acknowledgement. His enterprise is that of 
presenting a viewpoint as forcefully as possible. 
O'Sullivan seeks to avoid fixing "upon some one strain 
of conservative thought". For this is what he calls 
"essentialism". I have defined essentialism slightly 
differently, as the attempt to "fix" the content of a 
tradition of thinking. That attempt denies that traditions 
are adaptable or allow·innovation. I have also suggested that 
essentialism is often a feature of ideological writing. 
O'Sullivan's work appears to me to be partisan .. · Is he also 
then an essentialist? 
One of O'Sullivan's objections to essentialism is that 
the approach can lead to the inclusion amongst "conservative" 
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thinkers of those who "would not invariably be regarded as 
conservative" .109 Nevertheless, he writes of Benjamin 
Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville both that they are 
"conventionally" "classed as liperals" and that: 
"··· their deep scepticism about the 
future of democracy and the absence 
from their thought of the characteristic 
liberal idea of progress makes their 
inclusion as conservative thinkers 
entirely appropriate". 110 
. . 
·It is the definition of "conservatism" as a "philosophy 
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of imperfection"that warrants this conclusion. Yet, in the 
same work, we find O'Sullivan writing of"the contempt for 
the idea of imperfection and of a lim·i ted style of politics 
found in the German conservative tradition" .112 
O'Sullivan's definition had led him to be caught in the 
very traps that he lists as being those the essentialist is 
prey to. His confusion is again clear when he cites that: 
"where Stephen and Mill differed ... [it J 
was about the most efficient political 
methods for promotingithe spread of 
virtue in the world". 13 · 
Now Fitzjames Stephen is.said to be a "conservatfve" 
which means, according to O'Sullivan'·s definition, that he 
believed humanity to be imperfectible. Yet he sought to 
promote virtue? What makes J.S. Mill a Liberal and Stephen 
not? O'Sullivan· maintains that: 
"What seems at first sight to be a 
direct clash between a 'hard' version 
of conservative ideology and the 
liberal creed turns out, on closer 
inspection, to be much more a clash 
of temperaments than of philosophies". 114 
I find this an impossible escape. Are Conservatism and 
Liberalism nomore than moods? I conclude that O'Sullivan's 
exercise in definition needs to be reconsidered. I would 
now like to indicate the inappropriateness of his strategy. 
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The first chapter of Conservatism begin with the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary definit~on of "conservatism". This 
definition is an example of what Richard Robinson, in his 
115 book.Definition, calls a lexical definition. It is the 
reporting form of "nominal definition", reporting or establ-
ishing the meaning of a symbol. However, the definition: 
lib 
. d" d t . t . . t" . t"t t• •• 116 e1ng 1spose o maln aln ex1s 1ng 1ns 1 u 1ons , is 
a description of an attitude which could be attributed 
equally well to many cavemen as to, say, Burke. What 
O'Sullivan calls "conservatism" is an ideology dating, he 
maintains, from the time of the French Revolution·. Of this 
"conservatism" he writes: 
"It was defined (as it has continued 
to be defined) in opposition to a very 
novel and quite specific idea".ll7 
Already O'Sullivan has moved away from nominal definition, 
from the definition of the word "conservatism". The question 
has become not "how have we used the word "conservatism" " 
but the very different question "what is conservatism " 
O'Sullivan goes on-to write that: 
"Conservatism as an ideology, then, _ 
is characterized, in the first instance, 
by opposition to the idea of total or 
radical change ... " 118 
Immediately afterwards he reopens his discussion of the 
symbol "conservatism" and asserts that opposition to radical 
change explains why the name "conservative" was chosen. This 
sleight of hand is effected by avoidance of the use of a 
capital letter for t0e n?rne of the Conservative Party. Now, 
. . 
by attempting the misconceived task of giving ~ real definition 
of "Conservatism", of defining the thing, not the word, 
O'Stillivan presents hi~self, as I shall attempt to show, as a 
target for the charge that he only succeeds in stip~lating a 
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definition of the word "conservatism", that is, of stipulating 
how the symbol should be used, and to whom the adjective 
"conservative" should be applied. To do so is, of course, 
to engage in ideological debate. 
O'Sullivan's ill-starred attempt at definition seems 
to be a multiple confusion. It is, at one and at the same 
time, an attempt to analyse "the" Conservative "idea" 
(although elsewhere (p.30) he admits that no ideology is 
"homogenous"); or a search for identical meaning in all 
uses of the name "conservative"; or a search for a key to 
explain an historical phenomenon. That last activity, the 
search for a definition from which a greater body of 
knowled&e can be inferred, is usually, according to Robinson 
effected by a stipulative re-definition of the definiens 
in this case "conservatism". At this point, it is, I suggest, 
worth noting Robinson's remark, reminiscent of the comments 
of Mario Praz on the same subject quoted earlier (p.l2) 
namely, that: 
" the meaning of some words is primarily 
denotative and only secondarily connotative, 
and for them examples are the best method 
~f definition. In these words the denotation 
determines the connotation rather than what 
logicians often declare, the connotation 
determires the denotation. That the word 
is applied to these particulars is a more 
central and abiding element in its usage 
than that it connotes a certain character. 
What is romanticism (in the literary 
context)? It is Shelley Wordsworth, Keats, 
Scott, in contrast with Austen, Dryden, Pope. 
Such examples as these are the.most permanent 
and widespread element in.the meaning of the 
word "romanticism". They remain, while each 
writer's attempt to reach the connotation is 
discarded in turn ..• "119 
O'Sullivan's putative connotation for "conservatism" 
can, in my view, be discarded_on the grounds that the 
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connotation he supplies is not normally coextensive with the 
denotation of "conservative". He calls recognised Liberals 
"conservative". He appears therefore, to be prone to the 
consequences of essentialism as he himself states them. 
O'Sullivan's error seems not to be simply a failure to define. 
H~ seeks to impose a coherence on Conservative thinking that 
no ~raditions, as I have conceived them, will bear.. If my 
argument is correct, we just cannot give a definition of 
"Conservatism" (or of "Liberalism" or "Socialism"). We can 
only say that it is the ideology of the Conservative party 
and its supporters. To this extent, I have argued, 
"Conservatism" is unlike Praz's "Romanticism". To overlook 
this difference is to commit the error of the political 
scientist quoted earlier (p.9~. "Conservatism" unlike 
"Romanticism" is not simply a broad category. It is the 
name of an ideology whose varied characterisations are 
continually changing in a changing world. I do, of course, 
insist that such changes are not arbitary. 
There is, however, a broad category, "conservatism", 
but the term begins with a lower case letter. That could 
be the basis on which to distinguish the two terms, but 
unfortunately an aversion to the use of capital letters is 
not uncommon in essentalist works. Of course, it is not 
always present. Spencer, for example, as we have seen, 
,. 
uses capitals, and Hobhouse takes the pun no further than 
to contrast "Liberal Socialism" with "Socialism that is 
illiberal". Still, the capital letter of "Liberal" 
does little to prevent confusion when, throughout his 
account of Liberalism, that word has so clearly been linked 
with "liberty". It is interesting to note in passing that no 
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ambiguity occurs when the capital letter is omitted from 
"Socialist"(the difficulty would have occurred, however, if 
the party had been called the "Social" party). Nevertheless, 
~ssentialist accounts of Socialism or Marxism are, I suggest, 
still to be expected from any.author who accepts the claim 
that those ideologies are sciences whose theorists extend 
their scope and application from generation to generation. 
Furthermore, if accounts of Marxism are unaffected by the 
affliction to which accounts of o~her ideologies are prone.· 
in the matter of capital letters, those other ideologies are 
not immune to being defined, like Marxism, in terms of 
developments from a basi~ foundation. Let us look at 
another example. 
The following adjectival uses of "liberal" all occur 
within the space of four pages in C.B. ·Macpherson's The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism; "liberal 
institutions", "the liberal state", "constitional liberal 
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state", "liberal democraci~s" and "liberal theory". Use 
of a capital 'L' in "liberal theory" might have cleared some 
confusion. But Macpherson seems happy to exclude the 
possibility that anything in the "liberal democracies" 
could be anything but "liberal" . He wants to tell us about 
the dilemma of modern "liberal democratic theory". This, of 
course, is much easier to do if we claim, as Macpherson does, 
that "liberalism" is indeed a "theory": 
"··· Locke completed an edifice that 
rested on Hobbes's sure foundations. 
Locke's other contribution, his 
attaching to this ·structure a 
facade of traditional natural law, was 
by comparison unimportant. It made 
the structure more attractive to the 
ta~ of his contemporaries. But when 
tastes changed, as they did in the 
eighteenth century~ the facade of 
natural law could be removed, by Hume 
~ 
and Bentham, without damage to the 
strong and well-built utilitarian 
structure that lay within. Hobbes, 
as amended by Locke in.· the matter 
of the self-perpetuating sovereign, 
thus provided the main structure of 
English liberal theory". 122 
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This is what I have called "essentialism". Admittedly 
Macpherson bases his case on epiphenomenalist claims about 
"the market society". He also writes of "liberalism", 
rather than "Liberalism", as a theory. However, he mentions 
only those writers from whom Liberals have drawn inspiration. 
That Liberalism is not an academic theory. It is an 
ideology. By failing to distinguish "Liberal" and "liberal" 
Macpherson transfers his attack from a Liberalism, that he 
perceives to be out of touch with economic reality, to the 
"liberal institutions" and "liberal democracies" which he 
feels lack "moral justification". 
The essentialist, then, by claiming to have identified 
fixed and unchanging features in what I have called a 
tradition, simply misrepresents the identity of that discourse. 
He also fails to make clear what it is that makes any work 
a contiibution to one tradition rather than another. 
Consequently, by over-looking the way that, in the changing 
world of politics, adherents of various ideologies have 
"taken up" works, which they have felt to be appropriate-
in the circumstances they have conceived themselves to be 
in, the essentialist cannot, in ·the final analysis, present 
an account which i.s not partial, · in one, or both, senses of 
that word. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PARTIES AND 'DOCTRINES' 
In the previous chapter I attempted to describe the 
way in which the essentialist mistakes the nature of 
ideological discourse, and, consequently, fails to give 
an undistorted account of what I have called a tradition 
of discourse. I have advanced the argument that,whilst 
essentialism is presented as a real solution to the would-
be historian's problem of identifying a continuity through 
time, the appearance of continuity displayed is achieved 
at the expense of a successful account of change. 
Essences, after all, are immutable, and, hence, they are 
incapable of transmutation. 
A number of critics (including some I have already 
mentioned) are also liable to seize upon, either the 
applicability of a designation such as "nationalist", or 
"II' 
upon what they take to be the recurrence of a "theme", as 
indicating an identity capable of historical exposition. 
In what follows I shall seek to illustrate some of the 
ways in which such projects can come to grief. 
Consider first Order, Empiricism and Politics. 1 Its 
author, Professor Greenleaf, claims that a tradition of 
writing exists wherever a style is common to a number of 
writers and persists through time. If that style is not 
long-lived it can, he claims, be properly called a school 
of writing. Those who adopt a tradition of communication 
are said to write with a common purpose, and to argue 
by one method from the same basic assumptions. 2 (Elsewhere 
this condition is weakened to "a sufficient measure of 
agreement to be distinctive). 3 It is, moreover, Greenleafs 
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belief that"··· those who take the same side will share 
at least some ideas, methods. and assumptions". 4 These 
constitute some sort of "common ideological denominator" 5 
which is what he would "set forth" 6 as their identifying 
characteristic. Order, Empiricism and Politics, he 
maintains, is about two groups of writers, each one with a 
method and a set of basic assumptions. Greenleaf claims in 
other words to deal with two "traditions", one of which·, he 
asserts, gained predominance over the other, largely due 
to the undisclosed fact that the political reality of 
England changed during this period under the pressures of 
civil war and monarchic exile, from an absolute·state to 
a constitutional one. 
· Greenleaf calls one of the competing views "The 
political theory of order11 , claiming that its "metaphysical 
foundation" lay in the "phi.losophy of order" 7 This latter 
philosophy, was "a particularly widespread and influent-ial 
conception of the universe" which "prevailed" during "the 
medieval and ea,rly modern periods". 8 It was superseded 
by the "political theory of empiricism ", which Greenleaf 
ascribes to members of the second "tradition". 9 
In this context, the ;appro·priateness of the word 
"tradition" seems questionable. I shall devote the greater 
part of this section of my thesis to the attempt to 
construct.an argument to the effect that the notion of a 
common purpose said to be shared by various political 
writers can· be misleading. I believe that this point is 
important, because having a common purpose is part of what 
Greenleaf means by participating in a tradition, and, what 
I understand by the latter involves persons actually 
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associated in a party. 
In my view such notions of a common purpose, can only 
lead to a confusion of the historical mind Interestingly, 
the attempt to identify a common philosophy is not unique 
to Greenleaf. It is, for example, to be found in a 
.. 10 
volume entitled Nationalism. 
I~author, Elie Kedourie, also of the London School 
of Economics, seeks to identify an attitude "expressed and 
propagated in the teachings of a philosopher [Kant]"~l He 
attempts to recount how a "new political temper" was "made 
12 popular". In particular, Kedourie wishes to give ·an 
exposition of a philosophical argument which he identifies 
as being about "self-determination". 13 His claim is that 
such a philosophy gave rise to "habits and attitudes" 
which "helped to make self-determination a dynamic doctrine"~ 4 
Yet how can a "habit" arise from a philosophy? Indeed, out 
of its context in a philosopher's argument, what meaning 
does "self-determination" have here? The case is analogous 
15 to that of Greenleaf's talk of "defence of Royal power". 
We must ask the questions "which monarch" and "self-
determination for whom". 
Both Kedourie and Greenleaf acknowledge a debt to 
Lovejoy, the exponent of the notion of "unit ideas" 16 , but 
Nationalism differs from Order, Empiricism and Politics, 
in so far as the latter is solely what is usually called 
an intellectual history, whereas the former adds to its 
intellectual history two sections entitled "Nationalism 
and Politics". 17 These sections comprise accounts of a 
series of outrages committed, and dilemmas faced, by selected 
agents in the ~rena of politics. The suggestion seems to 
be that "nationalism" is unworkable in practice. 
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. . 18 
It is a form of "rationalism in politics". 
What I believe has happened here is that Kedourie's 
emphasis on "doctrine" has led him to neglect the actual 
course of political events. We are given,at best, a set of 
cautionary tales, and cautionary tales are not history. The 
historian cannot allow himself the luxury of attacking 
politicians or the "doctrines" to which they allegedly 
adhere. His task is restricted to reconstructing a 
narrative from the relevant evidence. If Kedourie had 
confined himself to this it would, I believe, have become 
clear that there are no grounds for the assertion that 
"nationalism" is one "doctrine" or that its essence is 
th~t ''the will of the individual should merge in the will 
of the nation". 19 A nationalist is a Polish nationalist, 
a Macedonian nationalist, a Hungarian nationalist or a 
Serbian one. The leaders of the movements to which they 
belong have not acknowledged one another as being part of 
one and the same "Nationalist Party", even if it is correct 
English to describe all of them as being "nationalist" in 
outlook. That "nationalist" movements differ in their 
aims is illustrated in Nationalism itself. In it Kedourie 
describes how "nationalist" separatist movements in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire were not united in a common cause. 
We are, for example, presented with the spectacle of Kossuth 
championing Magyar territorial claims at the expense of 
20 those of the Serb~. . Indeed, part bf Kedourie's case is 
that nationalist claims almost invariably conflict. Yet 
"nationalism" .is said to be one "doctrine". 
Kedourie's notion of "nationalism" leads him to forge 
connections between certain events and the ideas expressed 
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in disparate publications. In fabricating these connections 
he claims for "nationalism" a dramatic beginning, a duration 
and a catastrophic end. His first chapter begins: "National-
ism is a doctrine invented at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century." The appearance of unity achieved by such talk 
can, in my view, be misleading. Just how misleading I 
believe it to be, I shall try to show presently. My 
immediate objective is to compare Kedourie's Nationalism 
with an account of many of the same events by the eminent 
historian Johan Huizinga. Whilst it is true that many 
compatible histories can be reconstructed fromthe same 
collection of evidence, the difference between the two 
accounts is nonetheless significant. 
Huizinga's "Patriotism and Nationalism in European 
History" narrates the changes undergone by two groups of 
-.21 
concepts. The first group is that familiar from the 
terms "fatherland" and "patria" and from the text of the 
·~ 
"Marseillaise". The sec.ond group is that denoted by "nation" 
in its medieval and later uses. Huizinga's account, of 
course, differs from Kedourie's by covering a much larger 
period, but the vital difference between the two accounts 
is that Huizinga attempts to recount the career of what 
might be called a consciousness of nationality. Kedourie, 
in contrast to this,lists the sources of what he takes 
to be elements of nationalist doctrine. It is not the case, 
however, that the professional historian relies upon hind-
sight to locate the "origins" of "enduring ideas". He is~ 
I suggest, much more concerned with the reconstruction of 
the way people actually thought at any particular time. 
This thinking is reflected in their language. Conceptual 
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schemes can be studied in their own right rather than as 
forerunners of later schemes,of thought. Huizinga's 
references to.Herder and to the Brothers Grimm, for example, 
do not,··. therefore, appear simply as parts of a description 
of the midwives and· wet-nurses who attend the birth of a 
new "doctrine". Moreover, whilst Huizinga, like Kedourie, 
discusses the French Revolution, Huizinga's approach can 
clearly be seen to differ from the latter's when he makes 
the observation that by the middle of the nineteenth century: 
" the word liberty had lost none 
of its fervent, sweeping note since 
the days of the French Revolution; but 
the ideal of freedom had taken on more 
positive, and in a certain sense more 
restricted· forms. The content of the 
aspiration to freedom varied in each 
specific case." 22 
Awareness of just this variety is part of what distinguishes 
what I hold to· be the historian's understanding from the 
constructions of Lovejoy and Kedourie. 
Huizinga notes, too'· that the Dutch language has phrases 
equivalent to "national consciousness", "sense of nationality", 
and "national awareness", . as well as to what they cal1 
"nationalism". English speakers, however, use "nati_onalism" 
in a way which blurs these nuances of meaning. The attempt 
to treat all aspects of nationalism as the subject of a 
single historical study is therefore unlikely to prove 
satisfactory if the scope of such a study is only restricted 
by the ordinary English usage of the word "nationalism". 
The attempt has been ma9e (see below) and the result 
resemble$ nothing so much as a baconian natural history. 
If an author works without any clear limit to his subject 
matter, .beyond the demand that anything included be capable 
of being described as "nationalism", then he includes all 
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or any phenomena to which that word can be applied. This 
approach has led to a failure to distinguish, for example, 
the sense in which Churchill is called a fervent nationalist" .23 
(along with Mussolini and Stalin) from the sense of the word 
24 in say, "the Nationalist Welsh Party". Churchill,on the 
one hand, was a Conservative politician who asserted the 
national interest of the British people against the 
conflicting national interests of other nations .. What L.L. 
Snyder calls the N.WP.,on the other hand, is a party which at the 
present time bases its claim to independence on a belief in 
the right of natives of part of a state to self-rule because 
of, among other things, the cultural differences between 
themselves and the remainder of the population of the same 
state. In this case, any N.W.P. measure, be it one of self-
assertion "on behalf of the Welsh", or a concession to those 
who deny any N.W.P. claim, is a "nationalist" measure. It 
is what the self-proclaimed Nationalists have assessed as 
-~ 
a Welsh act. Only if·we are deceived into believing that 
all who call themselves "Nationalists", as self-identified 
members of various putative nations, joining parties holding 
the same body of beliefs, are essentially nationalist 
will we find an element of paradox in what L.L. Snyder, 
. 25 
following Morgenthau, calls the "A.B.C. paradox". What 
Snyder finds paradoxical and a "self-contradiction" occurs 
when, the leader of: 
"···nation B invokes the principles 
of nationalism against nation A and 
denies them to nation c ... " 26 
This apparent self~contradktion signals that something is 
wrong with the notion that there can be universal principl~s 
of nationalism, and with the notion that the views of 
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"nationalists" are everywhere the same. Snyder's use of 
what, on his own admission, "is not a neat fixed concept" 
can lead to confusion. 27 Yet he and other authors write of 
nationalism as if it were, in character, the same identifiable 
phenomenon as say, Socialism. They write as if each, be it 
"natiorn.Jism", Socialism or National Socialism, were a 
definable cluster of beliefs or propositions. I have already 
tried to show that to write of Conservatism, Liberalism or 
other traditions of discourse in this way is to commit the 
error I have called "essentialism". To talk of nationalism 
in the same vein is, for the reasons given above, to 
compound the error. To give an essentialist account of 
Socialism or Liberalism is, I suggest, to misrepresent 
the views of an identifiable association of political agents. 
This, of course, also leads to a misidentification of some 
of the sources of their ideological inspiration. The 
accounts of "nationalism" described above then do not only 
commit the essentialist's error. They purport 
to be accounts of the views of the "nationalists", when no 
single such grouping exists. Now, one of the things I have 
attempted to show is that, to identify a set of polftical 
beliefs of this kind, at anyone time, we must answer the 
question "who holds these views"~ since there are no universal 
"nationalists" only Scottish Nationalists or Welsh Nationalists 
etc. In other words we cannot identify a set of beliefs as 
being those of "nationalists"; even less can we identify 
an enduring "nationalist" view (that would be aggravated 
essent~alism). The attempt then to give an account of 
·what nationalists have always said in "the nationalist doctrine" 
is,frbm the point of view of this thesis,doubly mistaken. 28 
What I believe to be the weaknesses of Greenleaf's 
G 
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claim that traditions are a matter of a persisting style, 
and of common ideas and methods, should now be clear. My 
case is that talk of "monarchists", "order theorists" or 
"empiricists" is prone to the very same objections which 
beset talk of "nationalists"~ The important thing omitted 
in such cas.e.s is the identification of an ongoing association 
of people, who artictilated their views in the language of 
the texts assembled as either "the political theory of order" 
or "the doctrine of nationalism". If no such historical 
association can be identified, then what good reason can be 
given for grouping a particular set of texts together in 
this way? That the arguments seem similar to the collector 
(or that each text ·seems to be the earliest example of an 
idea believed to be a component of some generalised 
"nationalism"), ·surely cannot be adequate justification. 
Yet in Orde:i:', Empiricism and Politics the "political 
theory of order" is claimed to have the one "philosophy 
of order" as.its metaphysical foundation; a foundation 
which is "at once a philosophy, a political theory, -~ 
explanation of social structure and a guide to practical 
policy". 29 There is, however, an obvious distinction to 
be drawn between philosophy, as an academic discipline, and 
what we call a "person's philosophy". 30 This distinction 
seems to have been obscured here. The "philosophy" in 
question is said to be an explanation and a guide. But the question 
how can such an explanation be a guid~ to action is ignored. 
Whe;re Kedourie entertains a connection between "Nationalism 
and Politics", Greenleaf avoids the possibility entirely. 
For him what is important is a style of writing, not 
an organisation of persons for political action. This 
preoccupation with "style" leads him, in my.view, to ·mistake 
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the inference of the texts he di~cusses. He takes them 
to be contributions to "theory". By "theory" I understand 
the conceptual framework that determines the form of an 
understanding of an experienc'e. Such frameworks are 
judged by standards of internal coherence. My objections to 
regarding ideological works as contributions to a theory 
have already been outlined in my discussion of essentialism 
( Ch. 3). Here, I am concerned only with the .organizing 
principles of Greenleafs text. He thinks it is important 
to discuss what he calls two styles of argument, by which 
he seems to mean two commitments based on different 
p~esuppositions. Occasionally, however, he notes that 
the empiricists show what he regards as traces of order 
theory in their works. ' 
The problem is particularly acute in the case of Edmund 
Burke. An extensive use of order theory seems to be joined 
to his other beliefs. Nonetheless, Greenleaf claims Burke 
as relonging to the "less extreme empirical tradition" 31 
His constitutional views are said to be those of a Whig. 
Here one is inclined to ask whether "empiricist" beliefs 
have been given more weight in this assessment of Burke 
simply because of Greenleaf's belief that the "general 
32 
cogency" of order theory had "declined" by Burke's day. 
Certainly, the example of an apparently hybrid view like 
Burke's is a problem.in a discussion of two competing 
"styles" of argument. At last, in an attempt to put 
flesh on his account, ~reenleaf discusses, not styles. of 
writing, or ideas alone, but political activity. 
He claims at the beginning of the conclusion to his 
bOOk that·"the politi~al theory of order by no means died 
33 
out with the royalist debacle of the 1640's." Greenleaf 
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then talks of the component ideas which furnished "strands 
in the development" of "modern conservatism 11 • 34 Could it 
not, however, rather be the case that the royalists, with 
their distinctive talk, became acceptable to, and absorbed 
into, the association which became the modern Conservative 
party? Greenleaf's putative explanation of what he sees 
as a mixture of styles in Burke's writing is as follows: 
"··· as the general cogency of the philosophy 
and political theory of order declined, those 
who may be called natural royalists or 
authoritarian conservatives were, temporaril~ 
without an acceptable and persuasive ideology. 
But, being temperamentally disposed to accept 
the status quo, as time went by they came to 
be reconciled to the mixed constitutional 
system. They came to invest it with all the 
sanctity previously attributed to absolute 
monarchy and demanded that it should not 
be al ter.ed or overturned. Thereby, they 
found themselves allied with a point of view 
they would previously have rejected". 35 
Greenleaf seems to have found that he cannot support 
his arialysis of Burke solely by reference to the persistence 
of a style of writing. He is obliged to refer to political 
~·~ 
agents. But, rather than show a concern for their beliefs 
and projects, he writes of their temperament. Should we 
not look instead to the political problems faced by th~ 
political groups who displayed their acceptance of "order. 
theory" in their vocabulary, so that we can discover why 
that ~ocabulary came to be deemed by them to be inappropriate? 
In Kedourie's Nationalism,mentioned earlier,another 
collection of similar ideas is· taken to be a unity capable 
of coherent exposition. '!'hat account of a "doctrine" and 
"attitude" was seen, in the light of Huizinga's.narrative, 
to be inadequate. Nevertheless, Kedourie's book is, with 
regard to my present concern, superior to Greenleaf's" in so 
far as Kedourie puts some emphasis upon the actions of 
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specific agents and policie§ bf specific movements. 36 
I cannot agree with Kedourie, however,when he quotes with 
approval Heine's comment that as a revolutionary Kant puts 
Robespierre in the shade. 37 Philosophy is an academic · 
discipline. Political ideology and philosophical politics 
are not. Kedourie himself notes that a philosopher cannot 
be held responsible for the "implications" which others 
draw from his work. What.is important, then, is not just 
what Kant wrote. Of at least equal importance, I believe, 
are those very "implications", however "fantastic, far 
fetched or negligible" Kedourie thinks they would have 
seemed to Kant. 38 It is the specific convictions, in the 
name of which a particular agent claimed to have acted, which 
demand attention, not the various sources which allegedly 
supplied them. Emphasis on the writings of Kant, Fichte, 
Herder and Rousseau merely creates the illusion that there 
is one nationalist doctrine subscribed to by all nationalists 
everywhere. Kedourie writes of academics becoming "the 
acknowledged founders of powerful political movements". 39 
Marx's alleged remark about not being a Marxist is al·i that 
is required to remind us that being the founder of a 
"doctrine" is a matter of acclaim and acknowledgement by 
later adherents. Moreover, is it not a mistake to attempt 
to recount a history of "nationalism" as a doctrine taking 
life half a century before the foundation of any party calling 
itself "nationalist"? It surely is as much of an anachronism 
as to write of "national~sm" in the middle ages if no one 
at the time had the concept "nationalism". 40 The evidence 
to decide the matt~r is furnished by what remains of the 
language.of the time. (Huizinga puts its appearance no earlier 
than the nineteenth century) 41 It seems implausible too, 
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when writing of the twentieth century, to assert that 
Hitler's annexation of the Sudetenland, or any other of 
his policies, was an achievement of "nationalists". It 
was a National Socialist one .. 42 The important thing is 
to discover how the actors in question conceived what 
they were doing. My claim is that there can be no 
actions motivated by "nationalist" "doctrine" much before 
the advent of any particular Nationalist party (acco~ding 
43 to Huizinga this took place in the late nineteenth century) .. 
Even if Liberals rather than "nationalists", or as well as 
"nationalists", were impressed by Kant or Herder, their doings 
are still Liberal deeds. Of course, if self-proclaimed 
Nationalists somewhere were to claim Kant as their inspiration, 
then I agree that Kant's work has a place in that tradition. 
Still, the conclusions of a philosophical analysis are just 
as abstract as the arguments from which they follow. 
Discussion of the concept of "self-determination" is not the 
'II" 
same as making a political decision in the name of self-
determination. Governments decide upon and enact r~.gulations, 
not about n.atural rights or equality, but about bilingual 
road-signs and graduated income tax. Parties out of office 
make decisions about alliances, ballots or bombings required 
to gain power. The decisions are made with regard to 
circumstances thought to prevail. When boundaries are redrawn 
with talk of "the freest opportunity of autonomous development"1L 
the actual decisions that are enforced concern specific villages 
and the advantages and disadvantages of including one village 
rather than another within a border. Admittedly the location 
of a village within a border might be given a favourable 
characterisation by a Nationalist party, but I cannot se·e 
how this can justify the claim that an eighteenth century 
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philosopher specified in advance of their existence the 
practices of the Nationalists. 
There are no "nationalists" who in some way apply the 
work of Kant and Rousseau to political life. Kedourie is, 
of course, right to doubt the value of academic philosophy 
to the business of ruling. What I cannot believe is that the -· 
"nationalists" of whom the writes operate "in a hazy region 
midway between fable and reality". 45 They act in. the real 
world. It is to like-minded members of that world that 
they offer their justifications. Such groups, rather than 
what intellectual historians have claimed to be the provenance 
of their views, are, if what I have said is correct, of 
paramount importance to any historian of politics and 
political discourse. Nevertheless, to recount the historical 
identity which can be ·conceived by means of the concept of 
tradition which I advocate, the historian must do more than 
pay close attention to the actions of a party's members . 
• Sometimes we are presented with a narrative which attempts 
no more than that. Here an example is instructive:·· 
Keith Webb.·, in his The Growth of nationalism in 
46 
. Scotland , gives a brief narrative of Scottish history, 
with an account of earlyindependence movements and strivings 
for autonomy. He goes on to discuss the fortunes of various 
more recent organisations from which he judges the S.N.P. to 
have grown. Then he concentrates onthat party, its failures 
and successes. The last third of the work comprises a 
comparison and criticism of various academic accounts of the 
party's growth and appeal, and an attempt to assess its 
future. Taken·as a whole, the account seems a little 
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bloodless in comparison with Nigel Tranter's partisan 
foreword. 
Tranter writes: 
"··· this work is .not ·basically for the 
politicians, however.much they may need 
it, but for the ordinary folk of Scotland, 
all who have any interest at all in the 
state and future of their land. And, with 
the Scots, as has been indicated, that means 
us all. Also, to be sure, it is for our good 
friends and neighbours south of the Border, 
most of whom probably are only a little less 
bewildered than their paid representatives". 47 
Little or nothing of this talk appears in the pages 
written by Webb. Whilst Greenleaf concentrated on literature 
and rejected the political arena, The Growth of Nationalism 
in Scotland tends to the opposite extreme. Unlike Kedourie 
in Nationalism, Webb gives a detailed narrative of what he 
considers to be one country's Nationalist movement, but 
where Kedourie gives us alleged philosophical sources 
rather than politicans' justifications, Webb gives us 
nothing. He tells us that "four positions can be discerned 
CO' 
th • d. d • II 48 on e ln epen ence lssue They are those of the 
devolutionists, federalists, those claiming dominion status, 
. . 
and those claiming independence. His terse account·of 
the compromises, defeats and agreements culminating in the 
present position of the S.N.P. tends, in my view, ·to 
deprive us of the insight to be gained from a reconstruction 
of the terms and characterisations employed in the debate 
in which Scottish Nationalists have engaged. Webb devotes 
little more than ~hree pages to his discussion of "Morality, 
Justification and Desirability". 49 In them we are given 
an inkling of Scottish nationalist imagery, the official 
Scottish Nationalist history of Scotland, and the vision. 
of a future Scotland. He notes elsewhere, too, that certain 
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measures are characterised as representative of an 
alternative "S:ottish WaY". 50 Unfortunately, without a 
fuller narrative incorporating Scottish Nationalist talk, 
the full reasonance of that ',characterisation is lost. 
My conclusion here,_' then, is this. When giving an 
account of a tradition of political writing, it is 
insufficient simply to list, with synopses of their agruments, 
the philosophers with whom responsibility for an ideology 
might ultimately be thought to lie. An account of a 
tradition, that is, a narrative of a historical unity, must 
involve substantial mention of those without whose acknow-
ledgement no work could be part of that tradition. Their 
existence as an ongoing political association provides the 
continuity of ide~tity which informs the historian's 
narrative. To write of essential aims or enduring: theories 
is, I have tried to argue, to ignore the changing world 
of politics, and the ideological form in which it is 
characterised. I have. suggested too that there is a 
~ 
difference between an ideological work and an academic one. 
Here we need only remember how Greenleaf treats the authors 
he considers as in some way writing works of theory; In 
seeking a common denominator for these works, he looks no 
further than the questions posed and the answers given. 
He ignores their aspect as ideology, and the role of 
ideology in political life. Kedourie, in contrast to this, 
gives an exposition of the work of a number of philosophers, 
and accuses ideological adherents of a misunderstanding. 
-For Kedourie that misunderstanding does not lie in.the 
mistake of trying to do the impossible by trying to translate 
philosophy into action. His objection, rather, is that 
"nationalists" succeed in doing just that, and ·so engage 
\ 
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in some sort of misconceived politics.' Huizinga's work 
however, casts doubt orl whether the evidence even supports 
Kedourie's belief.that "nationalism" is one "doctrine". 
Simply to recount (as L.L. Snyder has done) all the 
available information about phenomena which, for one 
reason or another, could be called "nationalism" is, I 
believe, of little help to anyone. If an account is to be 
coherent, one must first identify a continuity. That 
identity is, I suggest, to be found by the historian .of 
political thought when he has a clear conception of a 
tradition of discourse. Identification of such a tradition 
can often begin with the location of the association of 
people who find inspiration in a number of works in turn, 
and give a tradition its continuity, but as we can see from 
Webb's account of Scottish nationalism, it is not enough to 
recount the agreements through which a party came about. The 
addition of a synopsis of the practical demands emerging 
from the policy debates does not remedy the defect. Further-
more expositions of philosphers' works, such as Kedourie's 
treatment of Kant in Nationalism, only appear to resolve the 
inadequacy. These expositions can only be an.aid to under-
standing the possible or probable sources of ideological 
charact~risations of the world. It is an account of the 
ideologists' work as ideology, rather than as "theory", 
that is required if the distinctive vocabulary of a party's 
policy debates is to be understood. This last element is 
vital for our understanding of traditions of discourse. 
Changing circumstances affect the acceptability of that 
discourse to its potential participants, as policy is adapted 
to meet hew ends. Without an account of tha~ discourse 
the history of a party becomes nothing more than a narrative 
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about men taking practical decisions on more-or-less 
pragmatic grounds. The history of political thought 
would then become just a series of synopses of texts 
lacking any real justification for the inclusion of any 
of its components. 
In outlining a conception of tradition usefully 
deployed by the historian of political thought I have 
tried to show that an appreciation of the part played 
by innovatory contributions to a tradition is essential 
to that historian's narrative. It is part of my case that 
an ideology inevitably changes as it continues to play a 
part in a changing world, and so the historian's organizing 
concepts must enable him to construct a narrative in which 
such innovation informs his account of change. I suggested 
above that the historian of a tradition of discourse 
ignores ~t his peril the instability and mutability 
displayed by party policies, political disputes, and the 
~ 
vocabulary of debate. That the vocabulary of politics 
must change, if it is to remain the medium of communication 
in a world of changing political realit~ seems to me to 
be b~yond doubt. Yet political identities endure. How 
is this possible? In what sense is there an authentic 
Liberal, Conservative, or Socialist voice to be heard at 
any time, in the political arena of a state? Who decides 
what it is to have any one of these identities, and how 
is this ·arbiter identified? In order to attempt to answer 
these questions, I shall propose an account of the role 
of ideology in political life, which, as I have already 
hinted, will not be an account of a theory I practice 
relationship. 
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The ideologis~ offers to his readers, not straight-
forward descriptions, but characterisations. His:account 
does not consist solely of e~pirically testable statements. 
Rather, his readers can come to see what he presents as 
wisdom about their world to be an illuminating portrayal 
oftheir experience in that world. We might, in a comparable 
way, expect a work of fiction to present us with insights 
into the human condition. The difference between the 
two is this. A characterisation can be conceived to have 
application in the world. It provides a motive. Unlike 
the reader or hearer of a description, the adherent of an 
ideology cannot be in possession of a well-formed intention 
to act by virtue of his acknowledgement of the authenticity 
of a characterisation. Characterisations differ from 
descriptions in that there are no fixed rules of application 
for a characterisation which would enable one to judge 
the success of an attempt to act .in that character. The 
~ideologist's characterisations specify conceptual rather 
than causal or contingent relationships. Ideologists have, 
for .example, characterised the relationship between "bourgeois" 
and "proletarian" and between "monarch" and "subject". This 
achievement should not be underestimated. Such conceptual 
relationships, although they cannot be eng_ineered into 
existence, can be constituted by verbal exchange and 
affirmed in symbolic action. 
How can an action be symbolic? Consider S.C. Brown's 
example of a commander handing over his sword as an act of 
. 51 
surrender. Brown points out that the act is not a natural 
act of submission in the way that an untrained dog's 
exposure of its throat to an agressor can be an act of 
submission. Still, the commander's act is not merely 
conventional either. It is a way, according to Brown: 
"···of acknowledging and thereby 
confirming a situation ~hich already 
exists. The general who ceremonially 
hands over his sword is acknowledging 
defeat but is already beaten." 52 
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A relationship can, I suggest, be affirmed symbolically, 
but the above example deals with a defeat, with a more or 
less. verifiable state of affairs. Its symbolic contenf 
is small. Let us turn then to a more complex instance. 
Brown takes from D.Z. Phillips's Death and Humility 
the example of a dirge which exhorts the dead to "come 
home". 53 Brown points out that such a song would, if 
"addressed" to an absent, long over-que, but still presumed 
living person, have a different character. The living 
person is "set apart" from the singer by being absent. But: 
"That is not the way in which the 
dead are 'set apart'. They are 
set apart by the way in which they 
are continually present to those 
from whom death has separated 
them". 54 "' 
The sense of that presence finds expression in the 
ritual. Brown is, of course, aware of an air of paradox 
surrounding what he ·says. His defence is that: 
"··· the ritual is not rendered 
pointless by the problems of 
articulating what someone who 
engages in it might offer as his 
belief. On the contrary, the 
practice provides a measure of 
the adequacy of such articulations." 55 
In the above ritual, the continual "presence" of the dead 
is expressed. A, relationship is affirmed. It is, of course, 
a relationship which cannot be tested empirically, as is the case 
with the ideologist's characerisations of a political 
relationship. Indeed, it is part of my case that aspects 
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of symbolisation can also be found in political life. The 
particular kind of act I have in mind is exemplifed by 
Stalin's persecution of the so-called "Kulaks". 
that: 
What, first of all, is a kulak? R.E.F. Smith writes 
"The Bolshevik use of the word 'kulak' 
is really rather a distortion of its 
original meaning. Originally, at 
peasant level, it meant not so much the 
tight-clenched fist as the cupped hand 
in which smaller men are held. They may 
be held in oppressive grip or they may 
be held protectively; there is an 
ambiguity about the term in its original 
meaning. The Bolsheviks came to use it 
simply to mean the oppressive and 
threatening fist of emergent capitalism 
in the countryside." -56 
The te.rm "kulak", then, is a characterisation, not a 
description. It has no fixed rule of application. 
Calling any given peasant a "kulak" was a matter of 
judgements of appropriateness rather·than strict empirical 
evidence. Confusion, therefore, r~igns amongst those 
who have tried to achieve a non-arbitrary definition of 
"kulak" in the light of what we know about "de-kulakization"~7 
I-t has been pointed out that the "dekulakization" itself 
was embarked upon without a clear definition of who counted 
as a kulak . Of course, in view of the nature of the term, 
.. we should no longer be surprised that "kulak" lacks rules 
of application . 58 In fact, ·local administration, and 
party and village meetings, simply decided for themselves. 
It was not a matter for "special political authorities-with 
particular professional ethics". 59 Rather the authorities 
stirred up emotions. They did not describe the action 
in terms of "juridical" or "police" measures, but instead 
·characterized it as class war. Use was made of "pqwerful· 
124 
and emotionally highly coloured pejorative invectives" 
such as "vampire" and "bloods.ucker". 60 In other words: 
"The function of definition changes 
from a mainly normative one to a 
basically emotional and highly 
charged political stimulant". 61 
By characterising the Kulaks as a·class of emerging 
capitalists, then killing them, the Bolsheviks sought to 
establish that they (the Bolsheviks) were indeed the 
"vanguard of the proletariat", the party of the class 
destined for ultimate victory in the history of class 
struggle. Their programme of "dekulakisation" falls 
into the category of symbolic rather than purely instru-
mental action because the identity of the Kulaks is 
conferred rather than possessed. Just as there are no 
Revolutions, only illegal seizures of power, so there were 
no Kulaks; only peasants with one or two cows, or a 
threshing machine, or a hired hand. To identify such a 
peasant as. a "Kulak" or Lenin's act· of treason as a 
~ 
revolution, is to fit the farmer or the insurrection into 
a frame of reference in which the Kulak is portrayed as a 
"capitalist", and the insurrection as the "Revolution". 
For those who could see themselves as proletarians 
(or as allies of the proletariat) "kulaks were to be 
eliminated, and the "Revolution" furthered in the country-
side. Thus their identity was affirmed for the Marxist/ 
Leninist. The presence of blood-sucking "kulaks" in the 
Soviet Union was "established" by the party acting in the 
name of the "proletariat". .The Bolsheviks, who were thereby 
acknowledged by their supporters to be the "vanguard of 
the proletariat" :became in their eyes, the legitimate 
government of the Soviet Union. 
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What if some Bolsheviks disagree with this policy? 
Such disagreement cannot be tolerated because it must split 
the party and damage its claim to legitimacy. Must we 
conclude, then, that not only _obedience, but also 
orthodoxy, is demanded by party loyalty? Certainly, 
obedience (much less orthodoxy) cannot be induced by the 
production of compelling evidence that a particular policy, 
say, utilises the best available means for "destroying the 
Kulaks as a class". No such proof can exist. The only 
evidence available concerns the success or failure of the 
methods actually used for the expropriation, deportation 
or execution of selected peasants. The party, however, 
has a leadership which is the source of authoritative 
decisions on policy matters. A party leader is to a greater 
or lesser extent a successful politician in a particular 
tradition of political activity. His claim to be in 
authority is clear to all who ackno~ledge the authenticity 
of that practice and party procedure. Now, in an attempt 
to forestall the objection that I am guilty here of 
confusing being in authority (in the party) with being 
~authority (on ideological issues). I would like to 
draw attention to the following points. 
Firstly, a strong claim to leadership can be made 
by one who is accepted to be an authority in the relevant' 
sph:ere (or has the· support of such an authority). We need 
only remember here.Hitler's '!inspiration" and Stalin's 
academic pretension. The party leader, I have said, 
is a successful politic ian. Yet,· if a leader's success 
is measured by his contribution to the revitalization of 
the Aryan race or the construction of socialism; then 
"being successful" cannot be divorced from skill in the 
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elaboration of the ideological significance of his actions 
or policies. The aspiration to orthodoxy is, therefore, 
vital to the retention of leadership. 
Secondly, whilst it is true that belief as a depiction 
of the world. itself. entails no obligation to accept 
anyone's authority, it does make membership of the relevant 
party an int~lligent step. The party is the association 
of people who claim to, say, engage in class or national 
sturggle. They are more effectively able to affirm their 
identity in their actions since that identity is a class 
or national, rather than an individual, one. Party 
membership and participation is the affirmation of identity 
for the adherent, and forming a party does entail an 
obligation to follow its leader. We do, after all, feel 
that someone who claims to be an adherent of an.ideblogy, 
but neither joins the relevant party nor acknowledges the 
authority of its leader in the political arena, but merely 
asserts his adherence, is either the victim of a misunder-
standing, or guilty of bad faith. The case is analogous 
to that of someone who fails to react to an insult to 
. . 
a person he claims is a close friend. He is likely to be 
asked if the friendship has ceased. In both cases the 
performance of certain appropriate actions is lacking .. 
In support of the above two points about authority 
and party· membership it is worth bearing in mind Alexander 
' t. d . t. t t. 62 Macintyre's distinction between a prac 1ce an a 1ns 1 u 1on. 
Institutions sustain practices, and are "structured in terms 
63 
of power and status". There are goods "external" to the 
practice as contrasted with the practice's "internal goods". 
These "internal'' goods "are indeed the outcome of competition 
to excel, "but" their achievement is a good for the whole 
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community who participate in the practice." 64 
In Macintyre's example, the practice of portrait 
painting, the internal good to be achleved is excellence 
in showing "how.the face at any age may be revealed as the 
face that the subject of a portrait deserves .. 65 In 
pursuing that excellence, the artist finds that other 
"internal " good; that of living part of one's life as 
a painter. Judgement concerning either of these goods, 
in Macintyre's words: 
" requires at the very least the 
kind of competence that is only to 
be acquired either as a painter or 
as someone willing to learn 
systematically what the portrait 
painter has to teach." 66 
I suggest that judgement of the "internal" success of 
Lenin or Stalin, for example, is only to be acquired as an 
adherent of the C.P.S.U._ (Bolshevik), or as someone 
willing to study systematically what the ideologist has 
to say (their "external" success is,I think, plain). 
It has been part of the case of this chapter that this is 
the understanding to be acquired by the study of the 
tradition of a practice. I have also suggested that a 
party leader is, besides being an ideologist,one of the 
party's more successful politicians. ·One aspect of that 
success must be that he increases or consolidates the power 
or advantage of his party in the political arena. By 
doing so, he advances his candidature as the continuing 
authority. At the same.time, haying: been chosen according 
to the party rules. he is entitled to continue being in 
authority. To view a party leader's success in these 
. 
terms only is, however, to vieW th~t success from the 
stand-point of an unini tiat.ed observer. It is, to adopt 
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Macintyre's terminology again, to view the politician's 
achievement in its "external" aspects. There is also 
the "internal" aspect mentioned above, ; assessment of 
which requires ·an appreciation of the language of adherence. 
The successul politician must always be able to depict 
his actionsin appropriate ideological terms to show them 
to be appropriate to his party. On the one hand, then, 
should a leader be unable to justify an action (even one 
regarded by neutral observers as being to the party's 
advantage) in terms acceptable to his own followers all is 
likely to be lost in internal controversy. .On the other 
hand, control over the party machine - Stalin, for example, 
became powerful as general secretary - enables the 
possessor to interrupt the careers of those who question 
the appropriateness of a favoured politician.' s utterances. 
Macintyre's distinction between goods internal and 
external to a practice can also help to clarify matters of 
leadership and party conformity when we turn to questions 
of adherence and party membership. Macintyre remarks that 
"every practice requires a certain kind of relationship 
b t th h t . . t . . t" 67 e ween ose w o par 1c1pa e 1n 1 He gives· the 
example of a person A who lies to C about some matter, 
whilst telling the truth to B. A differenc~ in :the 
relationships of B and C to A arises out of the lie. 
Macintyre accounts for that difference by arguing that 
"their allegance to each other in pursuit of common goods 
. 68 has been put in question". Much the same account applies, 
I suggest, to the case of someone who claims adherence to 
an ideology yet fails to join the relevant party - the 
institution which, to use Macintyre's term, "sustains" the 
t . 69 prac 1ce. Adherence to an ideology seems to demand 
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party memb~rship. On b~rtain oc~asions particular kinds 
of actions are required to substantiate one's claim to be 
party to a particular relationship. I have attempted to 
show that party policy can be understood as the affirmation 
of an :ldentity by a symbolic action which affirms a rela-
tionship. Such a relationship cannot, however, be affirmed 
unless one participates in the action of the party which, 
through its official spokesmen, authoritatively: elaborates 
the significance of its policy as the· act of a party 
standing in the relationship specified. Stalin,say, could 
claim to be "furthering the revolution". 
The adherent becomes a party-member because the party 
is the organisation of those engaged in the continuing 
elaboration of the ideology, and the institution which 
sustains the relevant practice. A new member, if he is 
to be more than a fellow-traveller,must, in my view, 
acquire a command of the vocabulary used by its .members 
when they communicate the support they give to its 
policies. If he does not he remains no more than a 
fellow-traveller. A party is the tangible organisation 
sustaining a tradition of discourse. For the reasons 
suggested above, the party leadership tries to maintain 
the monopoly of decision over what is an acceptable 
contribution (one illustration of such a monopoly was given 
in my account of Mussolini and "Avanti" ( Ch. III).) 
.It might be argued against my account of brthodoxy 
and party loyalty that a party, say the Liberal p·arty, is 
not the sole arbiter of what is an appropriate policy. 
The example of Herbert Spencer -can be used to illustrate 
the point. He simply denied that most of the members of 
the contemporary party were real Liberals. If Spencer 
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could be convinced that he ·was a Liberal whilst the 
majority of the Liberal party were merely "Tories of 
a new type" (see Chapter III) ,why should the historian 
of political thought, writing about Liberalism, concern 
hismelf with parties at all? I propose the following 
two points in reply to this objection. 
Firstly, Spencer's work only counts as a contribution 
to the Liberal tradition to the extent that 
he was accepted by other Liberals. This acceptance need 
not be explicit. All that is required is that Liberals 
take up the characterisations he uses to depict the world. 
Failing this, the label "Liberal" is of course entire.ly 
inappropriate, (in fact Spencer was asked to become a 
Liberal candidate for Leicester in 1884), and a label 
such as "Social Darwinist" would be more apposite. 
Secondly, we must remember that the ability to 
communicate is a necessary ability for individuals who 
·~ 
are to form an association for any joint action. It is 
through the common belief in a depiction of the world that 
symbolic action of the kind described above is possible. 
The party leader decides upon the action to be pursued 
by the loyal party members. What is to count as the 
authentic action of an adherent is thereby specified. 
Disagreements about policy can, therefore, become disputes 
about who is a "true" Liberal. The loser conforms, or 
ceases to be regarded as a true adherent. Orthodoxy, 
of course, remains a matter of belief, and belief cannot 
be compelled. Nevertheless, full acceptance of a policy 
as correct does imply orthodoxy because of the symbolic 
nature of ideological action. 
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Consider again Stalin's dispute with Bukharin, used as 
an illustration of my discussion of orthodoxy in chapter two. 
It was largely a disagreement about policy. The Bolshevik 
policy in the countryside in 1924 can, if my argument is 
correct, be seen to be an affirmation by the Bolsheviks of 
their identity as destroyers of "capitalism". The policy 
is conceived as one_ofproletarian action in a world of classes 
and class enemies. Now Stalin alleged that the source of one 
of Bukharin' s "group's" disagreements with the party-line was 
a failure to note the conditions which made the policy appropriate. 
Stalin claimed that the time was approaching for a new 
revolutionary upsurge and that _therefore the Comintern 
should be purged of "Right elements" as part of the battle 
against Social Democracy, in preparation for the new 
1 t . . d 70 revo u 1onary per1o . Bukharin, according to Stalin, 
contended that "capitalism" was stable and in a period of 
"reconstruction" and that a purge was, therefore, inappropriate. 71 
How was the matter resolved? Stalin did not support his 
position by the presentation of evidence, such as say, economic 
data. That, after all, can only tell us about industry, not 
about a means of production antagonistic to the proletariat. 
Instead he asserted that to adopt Bukharin's view was to adopt 
the view of Hilferding "a point of view which communists 
72 
cannot adopt". 
To accept Bukharin's view would have been to accept a 
view acknowledged to be unorthodox. This is not the only 
occasion on which this charge is levelled at Bukharin.Else-
where in his attack, Stalin accuses him of believing that he 
had corrected Lenin. The accuqation was made in such a way 
as to suggest that this would be an absurd_ thing to attempt. 
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Deciding the right or wrong way· to "abolish a class" is a 
matter of orthodoxy, not facts. In that understanding of the 
world: 
"To refuse to fight the right deviation 
is to betray the working class, to betray 
the revolution". 73 
Orthodoxy, then, is implied by unreserved support for a 
policy. Yet orthodoxy can only prevail as long as champions 
are available to elaborate it unopposed. As El~et remarked, 
orthodoxy "supervises'"'the perpetual bringing up to date and 
criticism"of tradition. It does not prevent it. When 
innovation ceases, the tradition is dead. 
In the first part of this chapter, I considered authority 
in party rela~ionships, and the business of the execution of 
policy as an affirmation of a member's identity. I attempted 
to distinguish participation in a tradition of discourse from 
the institutions of the party which sustain the associated 
practice. The formal· party. institutions, so to speak, 
administer the practice, and the party as a whole is fndisting-
uishable from that practice, gaining its identity from it. It 
is implicit in the above account that a belief inspired·by a 
distinctive depiction of the world is vital to the existence 
of a political association in a way that formal par.ty 
institutions are not. A sense of ideological identity, a 
sense of standing as a body in a relationship specified in 
the ideologist's characterisations, is affirmed in the action 
which can only be effected by an association. Still, the nature 
of that action is not something to be discovered by a careful 
reading of the ideologist's work. It is planned within the 
association, and recounted by the historian. 
To accept these conclusions is, of course, to take up a 
position in the debate between Lewis Nami:er's supporters and 
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critics about the relevance of expressions .of "principle" 
to the explanation of political action. 
Namier, in the work I shall now discuss, The Structure of 
74 
.:...P_o_l_i_t.:...J._· c_s~a_t;.._t.:...h~e--=...;A:....:c.:...c_e.:...s.:...s.::...:::.i.:...o.:...n_.:...o:....:f:..._G.:::....:...e..:..o..:..r5g!....:e__;:I:..:I::..::.I ~ was writing about 
the period shortly after 1760, a period before the foundation 
of parties as we now know them. But this does not place 
Namier's work beyond the scope of my argument, for political 
discourse, as I have described it, does not pre-suppose the 
existence of a highly-formalised party organisation. It is 
rather the discourse of those engaged in common political 
action. If this were not the case we could not easily make 
intelligible a situation in which the common objective is the 
bringing into question the authority of the formal pa~ty __ leadership. 
My earlier example of Mussolini's dismissal from the editorship 
of "Avanti" is a reminder that party cohesion can be threatened 
by a party's own.rank and file when that membership comes to 
see certain characterisations (which are not endorsed by the 
leadership) as being more appropriate to their own situation 
than the leadership's own elaborations. My account of-political 
agents, then, who articulate their political experiences and 
aspirations in a vocabulary derived from an ideologist's 
depiction of the world, and acquire a sense of identity in 
the process, stands opposed to Namier's portrayal of a House 
of Commons which was entirely venal in its motivation. 
Namier maintained that: 
"As the exhilarating Parliamentary game 
between party teams was not played· in 
1761, and men do· not go into politics for 
health, clearly some other rational aim 
had to be provided •.• " 75 
That "aim", according to Namier, was profit. "Party labels" 
were hardly relevant. In his own words, "the only people 
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under no such obligation to profit" were the country gentlemen. 76 
Their motive in seeking election was affirmation of their 
prominence· in their·own "country". It is not surprising 
therefore that·Namier paid little attention to debates and 
professed policies in his history. What is odd is that he 
should go on to remark that eloquence and debating power were 
important in the House. Does this not contradict his 
assessment of political talk as "cant", and of politicians 
77 
as men to be bought rather than swayed? 
Namier, after all: 
According to 
"Eighteenth century Administrations, 
not being able to control individual 
members through a party machine and 
a party electorate, had to bind their 
following by honours, places of profit, 
contracts and pensions ... " 78 
I am not in a position to quarrel with Namier's description 
of the eighteenth century electoral system as not being 
conducive to the electorate's selection of M.P.'s for their 
beliefs. However, it does not seem to follow from what Namier 
~ 
, writes of the electoral process that M.R's did not act in 
the light of their beliefs once elected. What Namier has 
ruled out from the beginning is the pr.esence of what I out-
lined in the preceding section; a relationship between group 
discipline and belief. I have attempted to argue that, although 
in practice the two are usually inseparable, it is not the 
party machinery but the belief and the vocabulary by which it 
is articulated which are the source of commitment. The 
institution sustains the practice, that is, the practice has 
(logical) priority. Fr6m this point of view, then, it is the 
cohesiveness of the various factions in the absence of conviction, 
not cohesion in the absence of formal party institutions, which 
stands in need of explanation. This account of conviction 
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is precisely what is lacking in Namier's work; he seems to have 
regarded evidence of expression of commitment as irrelevant 
to his work. 
The emphasis in Namier's work on what would now be 
termed "corruption", and the corresponding lack of any·account 
of "principles" has been noted. by several authors. Herbert 
Butterfield, for example,in the course of a plea for narrative 
history, as well as "structural analysis", notes Namier's 
contradictory recognition of the importance of independent 
members, and concludes that: 
" ... over and above the structure of 
politics, we must have a political 
history that is set out in narrative 
form - an account of adult human beings, 
taking a hand in their fates and 
fortunes, pulling at the story in the 
direction they want to carry it, and 
making decisions of their own". 79 
Is such a history possible if we ignore the evidence 
of deliberation and motivation provided by agents' own 
~ 
professions of belief? As I have remarked, Butterfield makes 
an appeal for a narrative history of the reign of George III. 
Yet the writing of narrative history will not alone correct· 
Namier's distorted perspective if Skinner is right in his 
assertion· that the "Namier.ite argument" is not (as his critics 
have tried to show) untrue, but invalid. 80 Both Namier and 
his critics are said to fall victim to the same fallacy. I 
shall dwell on Skinner's point at some length, attempting 
both to show how it differs from my own view to which it bears 
a superficial resemblance , and to defend those historians such 
as Butterfield whose views more readily coincide with my own. 
The Namierite interpretation with which Skinner takes 
issue concerns Bolingbroke's opposition to Walpole. The 
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Namierite claim (according tq Skinner) is that Bolingbroke 
was movectsolely by a lust for power. His professions of 
principle were merely "ex post facto rationalisations" 8 ~ 
Against that claim, historians .of the Butterfield school, 
Skinner maintains, protest that some political agents are 
sincere .in their professions. The latter assumption has the 
"greater explanatory power" because it enables the explanation 
f . f" f t. 82 o a spec1 1c course o ac 1on. The Namierites, he argues, 
are always faced with the problem of explaining why an entirely 
venal agent selected one set of rationalisations for his actions 
rather than another. The anti-Namierites, however, are in a 
position to produce accounts (admittedly not identic~l~accounts) 
of why Bolingbroke professed the principles he did. This 
advantage, Skinner contends, is outweighed by the loss of 
plausibility engendered by the anti~ierites'naive supposition 
of Bolingbroke's "unwavering sincerity". 83 Yet Skinner does 
not attempt to falsify these accounts. Rather, he attacks 
"a shared and m~staken assumption underlying both this and 
the Namierite view of the connections between professed poli~ical 
principles and actual political behaviour". 84 This assumption 
is that: 
" ... it is only if we can show that a given 
political·principle genuinely acted as a 
motive for engaging in a given course of 
political action that one can hope to 
establish the need to refer to the principle 
in order to explain the action". 85 
Skinner takes the position that the above supposition is 
invalid. His preferred premise is that: 
" ... the motives of Bolingbroke and his 
party were entirely unprincipled· and 
self-interested". 86 
He maintains, nevertheless, that it does not follow that 
no weight should therefore be put on the professed principles 
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of those persons when trying to account for their behaviour. 
He points out that "Bolingbroke and his party" always claim 
to act from "the principle of patriotism 11 • 87 Indeed: 
"· .. the essence of'Bolingbroke's coup 
lay in matching this principle to his 
party's practice in just such a way as 
to be able to imply to the Whigs, with 
maximum plausibility, that their own 
Ministry was pursuing at least two 
policies known to every good Whig to 
-be peculiarly liable to endanger 
English political liberties. This 
made it possible to leave the 
correspondingly strong impression that 
to oppose these precise policies was, in 
the circumstances, to be concerned above 
all with the idea of preserving English 
political liberties. But to be concerned 
with the preservation of English political 
liberties was what was meant at the time 
by being a true patriot. This in turn 
enabled Bolingbroke and his party to claim 
with maximum plausibility that they were 
genuinely motivated by the spirit of 
patriotism. And this provided them with 
the element of justification which ... was 
essential if they were to be able to 
continue with the successul pursuit of 
their otherwise unconstitutional policy 
of conducting a "formed opposition" to 
the King's chosen Ministry". 88 
Skinner believes that he has shown here why "Bolingbroke 
and his party" considered what they did to be rational. In 
fact, he believes that he has shown that what they did was 
......... 
rational in the circumstances. Bolingbroke is presumed not 
to have been sincere. The "range. of actions" open to 
"Bolingbroke and his party" in their opposition to Walpole 
was nevertheless limited to "the range of actions for which 
they could hope to supply recognizable justifications". 89 
Thus Bplingbroke's and his followers' choice of justifying 
principle for their behaviour made it rational for them to 
90 
act "in certain highly specific ways". 
I e~dorse .Skinner's view that it is essential not 
optional, for any political historian to be an historian of 
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political ideas. What I feel unable to agree with is the 
way he goes about that task in his account of Bolingbroke's 
motivation. My reasons are as follows. 
Let us first consider the assumptions made.about 
Bolingbroke's "true" motives. If it is naive to assume that 
he was totally sincere, it is surely misanthropic to begin 
with the premise that he was totally disingenuous. Whatever 
the drawbacks of the first assumption, it does at least 
satisfy Ockham's rator principle. But Skinner seems to 
share Namier's presupposition that the pursuit of power is 
solely a matter of self-interest. I do-not accept that 
assumption. I suggest that the power of office can be sought 
for the way in which it affords greater scope to those 
engaged in the enactment of symbolic deeds in affirmation of 
an identity specified by an ideology. (of course, as far as 
the adherent is concerned, he just is carrying out 'the 
revolution'). Such pursuit of power cannot be said to be 
wholly motivated by self-interest without the risk being 
run of embracing the vacuous assertion that all action is 
governed by self-interest. 
My main objection, however, is to what Skinner has to 
say about political ideas and talk. He writes of a "Whig canon" 91 
or "a Whig tradition", 92 and claims that Bolingbroke used 
"the immensely strong resonances of this tradition of thought 
to further his own cynical and self interested political 
93 
ends". Yet, without an analysis of why a selection of 
w·ri tings can be called a Whig "canon" or "tradition",. that 
is, without saying why some authors are "accredited theorists" 
of the Whigs 94 , he cannot justify the claim, without further 
evidence, that Bolingbroke merely cynically used the tradition. 
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Why not regard Bolingbroke as attempting to contribute 
to the tradition instead? An adequate account of tradition 
would surely neither leave Bolingbroke's status as con-
tributo~ or exploiter open to doubt, nor would it allow that 
status to be assumed rather, than discovered. 
It is Skinner's contention that Bolingbroke deliberately 
spoke the language of the Whigs in order to disrupt their 
confidence in Walpole's ministry. Certainly that is a 
possible enterprise for an individual to undertake. The 
peculiarity of Skinner's claim lies in the way in which 
expressions of principle are ignored totally as possible 
sources of "party·" cohesion. If Bolingbroke and his 
followers professed Whig principles to mislead the Whigs, 
then one is entitled to ask quite how they justified their 
policy to one another. If what Skinner claims about the 
profession of principles being a political decoy is true, 
then yet another (so far undiscovered) set of principles 
must surely have been current within Bolingbroke's faction 
if we are to allow them to have talked of their action 
amongst themselves. It would be an odd political grouping 
which had no such "principles". They would be little more 
than a gang of conspirators talking of personal profit, 
perhaps in an ~tmosphere of mutual distrust. Could such 
a band endure as long as Bolingbroke's opposition? Of 
course, it is possible that Bolingbroke's followers were 
merely dupes taken in by Bolingbroke's rhetoric. But this 
is not what Skinner is arguing. 
Skinner's object, we must remember, was to show the 
relationship between professed principle and political action. 
In my view,.· this attempt to show that, even whe.re an agent 
is being disingenuous, his professed principles accord 
with his actions would,if it could be convincingly 
formulated, prove too much. After all, Skinner concludes 
that "an agent's professed principles invariably n.eed ·to 
be treated as causal conditions of his actions" because 
only a limited range of action will appear to fit the 
rationalizations judged to be acceptable by his peers. 95 
. . 
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This conclusion effectively deprives us of any real notion 
of bad faith. By stipulating this connection between 
principles and actions, Skinner is left in a position where. 
he can only guess real intentions. His method makes 
explanation stop at professed principle and action without 
accepting those professions as evidence for belief, motive 
or intention. The latter are thus left inaccessible and so 
a matter of presupposition. 
What I feel should be called into question here is 
Skinner's approach to historiography. He uses a kind of 
explanatory history to illustrate his ideas regarding the 
writing of the history of political thought. For such 
purposes of illustration, this kind of historiography has 
distinct disadvantages in comparison with a more narrative 
style of history writing. Skinner is forced to accept the 
work of other historians as authoritative sources before he 
can begin his exercise in explanation. 96 The explanations 
so produced are then given in support of the ideas 
concerning the right approach to writing history. I have 
already quoted Butt~rfield's plea for narrative history. 
In support of that cause I would like to draw attention here 
to a reply made to some of Skinner's methodological _articles 
97 by Mulligan, Richards and Graham. · 
In one of the articles which they analyse, Skinner 
writes that: 
" even if the emergence of capital ism . 
predated the emergence of its ideology, 
and even if the professed ideology never 
provided the capitalists with any of their 
real motives, it is still essential to refer 
to the ideology in order to be able to 
explain how and why the system developed". 98 
The above named critics argue that, in the case of 
emergent capitalism, the words that Skinner claims were 
transformed by the protagoni$tS of nascent captialism in 
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order .to give their behaviour a favourable"description'did, 
in fact, carry that favourable evaluation before the time 
of which Skinner writes. They conclude, therefore, that 
their article "··· has demonstrated that the wrong 
actors, the wrong time and the wrong justifications have 
99 been produced by Skinner to explain an historical phenomenon". 
Now Skinner writes of the "paradox" of Bolingbroke, the 
"arch-enemy of the Whigs", providing "the clearest and 
~ 
most stylish survey of a number of key Whig ~olitical beliefs"~OO 
we can, however, question whether Skinner is quite clear what 
. . 
the "paradox" is. The clarity I have in mind is that which 
could be achieved in a narrative setting out how that state of 
affairs came about. In fact, Skinner seems simply to assume 
that Bolingbroke wrote in the context of a system which 
comprised the Whigs and their opponents. The danger of 
making such assumptions is revealed by the appearance, since 
Skinner wrote that article, of a narrative of a much more 
comple~ political scene in which Bolingbroke's contribution 
1 th th d . 1 101 appears as intellig.ib e ra er an para ox1ca . Where 
Skinner's approach rests on assumptions about historical 
"fact" how can it be secure? 
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If his examples can be shown not to work, what of the 
claims about the relationship between action and principles? 
Skinner argues that there is a'need to refer to principles, 
even if insincerely held, because these principles can be 
used to justify only a very limited range of actions. His 
examples seem to me to fail to make the point convincingly. 
We are to understand Bolingbroke as picking his justifications 
so that he could act in a particular way, whilst the range 
of plausible justifications available to Bolingbroke acted-
as a limit on his actions. In Skinner's words, these 
"principles" were "causal conditions of his actions". 102 Must 
we accept that Bolingbroke was quite so cynical? I think not. 
Let me now contrast my view with that of Skinner. It 
is as follows. Ideologists create characterisations of the 
world. Almost any action· can be justified to fellow adherents 
in terms of the accepted ideologis~s characterisations, for 
by acting together in the name of those characterisations, 
they affirm their possession of a particular identity 
specified in the work of that ideologist. All involved m~st 
admit their action to be appropriate, but the range of 
available justifications does not limit the scope of action. 
This is because ideological justifications are not merely 
picked to justify a chosen course of action. Ideologies 
are not instruments grasped to attain non ideologically 
conceive~ objectives. The id~ology and its characterisations 
are believed in, not selected according to policy. As I have 
tried to show, where a policy chosen according to practical 
considerations seems to sit uneasily with an accepted view 
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f th 1 103 . o e wor d , we should expect the characterisations 
of a new depiction of the world to come to be taken up 
in the speech of adherents. It is precisely such speech 
that is overlooked in Skinn~r's talk of the subversion of 
language. A common vocabulary promotes cohesion in a 
political association by offering the means whereby a 
collective identity can be articulated. 
Certainly the political historian must be a 
historian of political ideas. In my view that entails 
that he must attempt to narrate the history of a tradition. 
He must look to a group of agents in order to see what 
they did, and how they spoke about their actions. This 
is not because ideologists are out to hoodwink non-adherents 
by subverting their evaluative language in order to 
legitimate the action of their (undeceived) adherents. 
It is not because, as Skinner proposes, the range of 
evaluative terms available sets a limit to what the 
rational agent can achieve whilst retaining the plausibility 
of his rhetoric. Rather, the narrative which encompasses 
both actions and ·professions of belief can· give an account 
of the practical demands faced by political agents, of 
the action they took, and the language in which that 
policy was debated. Is that not, after all, the information 
we would need in order to make sense of the doings of a 
politician we could actually observe? 
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CONCLUSION 
In this.thesis I have tried to give an ac6ount of 
political writing of the kind which usually forms the 
subject matter of histories of political though~. I have 
presented this writing as a depiction of the world- an 
accumulation of characterisations discernable in the 
political discourse of various associations of persons. 
Such utterances constitute the means by which common and 
distinct identities are affirmed,for which reason I 
concluded my last chapter with the argument that the 
historian of political activity must also be an historian 
of political ideas. To attain historical understanding 
the historian has to be the historian of a tradition or 
traditions. Political ideas and political actions cannot, 
in my view, be divorced from one another, and recounted in 
separate narratives, without an impairment of intelligibility . 
• The historian of political thought must also narrate the 
history of a distinct style of conduct. He must give an 
account both of the ideological understanding of .the. 
politically related, and the politics of that relationship. 
Without an exploration of the continuity of both belief 
and practice, the attempt to write a history of ideas 
becomes the familiar series of synopses of well-known 
texts. The pretensions of such a work to being a history 
are defeated by its incoherence. 1 It gives neither an 
account of persistence nor one of n6velty. It lacks the 
vital feature of the historical narrative; continuity 
in the phenomenon that it seeks to render intelligible. 
This is the aspect I have called tradition. Let us review 
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some ~f the features of this concept. 
If the concept of tradition were to preclude the 
notion of innovation it would be of little relevance to 
an attempt to recount the shifting commitments of· those 
engaged in political activity. This is one of.the themes 
I have tried to stress. At the same time, the continuity 
that allows a serie$ of novel contributions to be an 
historical subject is provided by the ongoing presence of 
an association of political agents. Such an association 
is, of course, constantly gaining and losing members. 
But that is no ground for denying its persistent identity. 
This identity is sustained by acknowledged contributions 
to the ideological understanding of its membership. It 
is the positive response of that membership in the. 
vocabulary of a conviction that authenticates any innovation 
within their tradition. 
Of course, questions of orthodoxy arise in all such 
associations, and formal institutions exist to resolve 
such matters when political debate ~eaches an impasse, 
although there are impasses of such proportions that these 
arrangements have to be abandoned. The apparent problem, 
which has caused great difficulty for many historians.of 
political thought, that of distinguishing contributions 
to a tradition from what seem to be similar works, simply 
disappears. What is to be recognised as a contribution to 
a .tradition is decided by the participants in the tradition. 
It should be rememebered, however, that .official histories 
of "doctrine" can·only constitute evidence to be considered 
by the historian of political thought. They cannot supplant 
parts of his narrative. For it is in the wtiting o( party 
histories that the essentialis·t comes into his own, and, 
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as we have seen, his work is a misrepresentation of the 
tradition of ~iscourse about which he writes. He seeks 
an essence in. the wholly mutable, leaving all to hang upon 
a supposed definition. The essentiali~t cannot be said to 
be a bad historjan. Rather he is no historian.at all. 
"Definierbar ist nur das, was keine Geschichte ·hat 112 
Nevertheless the work of the essentialist cannot 
be dismissed. He is not merely an academic who has failed 
to· reflect upon the nature of his subject matter. He can 
be a person attempting to identify the basic tenets of his, 
or another's, beliefs because he feels that there is some-
thing to be done or refrained from in the political 
arena. He is not then concerned, that is, with the past 
as past, but as a guide in present engagement. Although 
not an historian, he is an historical phenomenon - an agent 
of change. 
He becomes such an agent when the alleged essentials 
~ 
of principles he elaborates come to be considered in the 
light of present crisis and the concomitant need to act, 
to be lacking in some vital respect. In that case, "revision" 
might be called for. However, proposals are often made 
more acceptable when, as the essentialist would say, they 
can be shown to follow from already accepted beliefs. In 
my view,these accepted beliefs do no more than dramatically 
illuminat~ the recitation of the essentialist's proposals. 
Such a 'tlemonstration", even if it can be effected to the 
satisfaction of the intended audience, is of course, not 
a history. It is ruled by the present concern ·- of forging 
. group cohesion and providing motivation for the achievement 
of some political end. This cohesion, I suggest, is in part 
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achieved by the way that significance is conferred upon 
favoured polities in ideological talk. 
What makes it possible for the adherents of an ideology 
to support a policy as the .authentic action of persons with 
the identity they claim to have and seek to affirm need 
not be a work specifically written to effect such under-
standing. Rather, an already known and published piece 
could be taken up by the perplexed who find in it a 
depiction of what they take to be 'their present predicament. 
Not all contributions to a tradition therefore are deliberate 
attempts to influence the reflections of the particular 
group(s) who find inspiration in those works. What is 
historically important then is· not solely what an author 
actually intended, but also what others have made of his 
work.· This is something which is overlooked by writers, 
such as·Quentin Skinner, who undertake to present an 
understanding of a text in a particular context. This is 
a valuable contribution to the history of political thought 
but, as I have noted, the oddity of Skinner's account of 
Bolingbroke's career and his motives suggests that the 
latter account arose, in part, from a weakness in Skinner's 
historiography. My main point was that.he ignores the 
possibility that professed principles, as he calls them, 
can be indigenous to the pra9tice of a group,and that 
such 'principles' cannot simply be imposed even by its 
accepted leaders. In such matters a balance must be struck 
between what a leadership -recommends and what the membership 
is prepared ·to accept. ·I think it is plain that those in 
authority cannot in their pronouncements go far beyond 
what is intelligible to their followers, witho~t putting 
their title to leadership at risk. The existence of a 
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common vocabulary is vital to the unity of the association, 
and that vocabulary is never fixed. The way in which 
depictions of the world can·be said to be "taken up", 
whether by party members spontaneously or at the recommen-
dation of the party leadership, is something to which the 
historian must always return because the adherent has the 
ideological identity in question. The presence and 
identifiablity of those adherents are the keys to the 
notion of tradition I recommend here for his consideration. 
Let us look again then at the various notions of 
tradition, identified at the beginning of this thesis, in 
the light of what I have attempted, in the course of my 
argument,to say about traditions of discourse. 
The literary conception of tradition embodied in the 
work of Leavis raised the question of the unity of traditions. 
Identification of the component parts of the 'Great 
Tradition' depended upon the critids aesthetic sense. 
Earlier authors judged to belong to the tradition are 
~ 
considered by Leavis to have had a part in the development 
of subsequent contributors to the tradition. Yet the 
connection between those authors remained mysterious. It 
is not a notion of tra-dition that can be usefully deployed 
by any historian, for the work of later novelists is 
conceived to be made possible by the work of their 
predecessors who thereby gained a-historical significance. 
In other words they became "historically" significant 
through the medium of the critic's hindsight, and hindsight 
is not something which has-a place in the historical 
understanding. 
T.S. Eliot, too, conceived of the literary past 
as endowed with meaning by the art of the present. Both 
Eliot and Leavis~guect that tradition is not a matter of 
repetition or elaboration of past achievement. That, 
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after all, is plagiarism. But Eliot's notion of tradition 
is more complex than Leavis's iri two vital respects. 
Firstly, Eliot contends that orthodoxy regulates innovation 
in a tradition of conduct,and, secondly, that innovatory 
authors have learned from preceding writers without 
imitation. I have taken up both of these notions and 
elaborated them to produce an account of education as 
initiationinto a tradition. In my account, education 
is to be understood as learning, perhaps by imitation at 
first (but only at first), to go beyond the work of one's 
acknowledged maste~s. The initiat~s work is novel, not 
merely derivative. What links him with the tradition, 
to which he has introduced innovation, is not "influence" 
but authenticity acceptable to other respected practitioners. 
In this sense, I believe, we can talk of traditions in 
art and literature. Eliot, however, doubted that terms 
such as 'romantic' and classical' are of much interest 
to authors themselves. Still if their value to the author 
is doubted then Mario Praz's defence of their usefulness 
to the critic as approximate labels should not be overlooked. 
It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to conclude that, 
because the critic has a use for such vague labels, the 
names, 'Conservative' or 'Liberal' can be used with the 
same ease by the historian of poli tic.al thought. Words 
such as 'Liberal', 'Socialist', 'Conservativ~', Fascist' 
and 'National-Socialist' (the list is not exhaustive) are 
not indefinable because, of any vagueness in meaning, but 
because the Liberals,like the Socialists and the others,do 
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not always draw' inspiration from the same source. Of 
course, we can say what Liberals now generally profess, 
or have professed at a stated time in the past, but 
this is no certain guide to their future professions. Yet, 
Praz was not completely wide of the mark when he found 
the pairs of terms 'Conservative' and 'Liberal' and 
'Romantic' and 'Classical' comparable, for,'just as by 
'Romantic'· we mean Byron and Shelley but not Aleman or 
Pope, so when we think of Liberals, J.S. Mill or 
Asquith might spring to mind, but Margaret Thatcher should 
not, for the same reason that Aleman cannot be a Romantic . 
. "'· 
Indeed, although ideological labels are unlike the 
critic's categories, with respect to their vagueness, 
what I take to be one more similarity between them 
appeared in my discussion of delnition (pp. 66- 68). 
Both·sets of terms are of the type ·in which denotation 
determines connotation rather than one which is more 
often the rule where the de~otation is determined by 
the connotation. A failure to observe this peculiarity 
is, I believe, one of the essent~alist's more common 
faults. Essentialism, however, has already been discussed. 
Here my objective is to review the various notions of 
tradition with which I began my account of the concept 
of tradition and its relevance to the historian of political 
thought. Some contrasts and comparisons between them and 
the concept of tradition I subsequently attempted to 
elaborate should now be clear. One more academic use 
of the concept •tradition'~ referred to in the introdtiction 
remains to be discussed. That is the theological one. The 
other common usage whibh is frequently found in the works of 
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social anthropologists;_is, I argued in my second chapter, 
synonymous with 'custom' inthe way that 'traditional' 
is sometimes substituted for 'conventional'. The theological 
use of 'tradition' however.is, I believe, of interest in 
its own right, and the controversy aroused by it within 
the Christian community has_played a part in my deliberations· 
on .tradition and the history of political thought. 
· The Protestants, it is generally accepted, have 
·rejected the Roman Catholic teachings on tradition, in 
.favour of a doctrine of sola scriptura, and ,having rejected 
the authority of the pronouncements of past theologians, 
the Protestant can, without inconsistency, reject that. 
of present ones too, and thereafter rely solely on 
individual revelation. But the price of such consistency 
is vulnerability to accusations of subjectivism. The 
charge is not inescapable however. Barth, for example, 
suggests that fruitful appeal·can be made to the community 
of believers. I find that suggestion illuminating because, 
in my view, whether or not we argue that such a community 
has a part to play in matters relating to personal 
salvation, in politics such an appeal could inform 
a political identity. Effective action, in the modern 
political arena, demands the exertions of a cohesive 
and committed group. In advocating the concept of tradition 
elaborated in this thesis I have attempted to place what 
I take to be the correct emphasis <?n such associations.· 
In writing of the controversy surrounding theological 
tradition I noted that the 'tradi tum' · of the Roman 
Catholic conceptiory of tradition proved to be 
elusive. .Nevertheless, it is possible to · 
write a history· of the traditio, or series of acts of 
transmission. This notion of tradition does then have 
some claim to recognition as an historical subject . .What, 
in my view, makes the concept of a tradition of discourse 
clearly an historical subject is that it allows for the 
continuity through change which can be narrated by the 
historian. The enduring assocaition of practitioners 
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provides that continuity whilst the vocabulary of adherence 
changes in the face of political reality. Continu-ity, 
then, does not depend upon the identification of a traditum, 
the elusive object of theological surmise that has led 
one theologist to suggest that the transmitted object 
of christian tradition is "the very person of Jesus 
himself as the incarnate word of God•. Fortunately, only 
the .essentialist need postulate an enduring traditum, 
and I have argued that his .work cannot be considered to 
be a history of political thought. 
Whilst my object in this thesis has been to elaborate 
a conception of tradition which has a place in the writing 
of histories of political thought,as we have seen, not 
all of the conceptions of tradition discussed have been 
suited to the historian's purpose. They are all, however, 
in rough accord with the dictionary definitions with which 
my discussion began. Those definitions of tradition were: 
And 
"a statement, belief or practice 
transmitted (especially orally) 
from generation to generation." 
" ... the body (or any one) of the 
eXperiences and usages of any branch 
or school of art or literature 
handed down by predecessors and 
generally followed." 
153 
I suggest that the concept of tradition which I recommended 
to the historian of political thought falls no more 
awkwardly: within the scope .of the above definitions than 
the other notions I have considered. At the same time, 
it is important to remember that the body of usages 
and experiences transmitted in such a tradition, the very 
vocabulary of adherence, is always subject to change. No 
less is true,however, of the body of theories and 
postulates we call scientific knowledge, and science, too, 
has been described as a tradition. 
My argument then, is that there is a conception of 
tradition deployable by the historian of political thought. 
Denial of the ..:concept~_s-- claim to the name 'tradition' 
would in my view, be erroneous. The concept has much in 
common with other conceptions of tradition. Yet it is 
distinguishable from them,. and is not merely synonymous 
with another concept such as that which identifies it with 
custom. The historian, who uses it to inform his narrative, 
is in a position to take account of the way that the world 
of politics remains in ·constant flux as the arrangements of 
society are adjusted with .the emergence of' or demand for' 
new confrontations and conciliations. 
What I have attempted to do, during the course of this 
thesis, then, is to seek out one concept amongst the various 
overlapping usages by which we talk in a complex, but not 
unlimited, language of a greatly more.·variable world. That 
concept (for which I have ciaimed the name 'tradition') is, 
I have argued, vital to the historian's understanding of his 
subject matter. In so arguing I have objected to the cl~ims, 
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perhaps coloured by recollections of what we mean when 
we speak of 'traditionalism' (see Ch. II), that traditions 
are in some sense authoritarian. The notions of· prescriptive 
paradigms, in the way that is has been used by some 
historians of science, and writers on scientific method, 
can, I have argued, have no place in.the history of 
political thought. Science is an investigatbn. The 
p~actice of politics is not. Nevertheless, the fact that 
we can talk sensibly of a party member following 'the party 
line' should make us reluctant to jettison, without more 
ado, all accounts of authority from a discussion of 
political talk and adherence to ideology. Often, of course, 
we talk of the 'orthodox membership' or the 'party faithful'. 
But I have tried to take care to distinguish orthodoxy, 
which is a matter of belief, from acceptance of authority, 
which does not even always demand suspension of disbelief. 
Belief, after all, cannot be ordered. 
II' 
In objecting to some of the claims that have been 
made about authority and tradition I have employed Alasdair 
Macintyre's distinctiDn between what is internal and. external 
to a practice. Institutions were said by him to 'sustain' 
practices. Clearly, office holders of institutions have 
authqrity (de jure at least) by virtue of their office. 
Yet, if the claim to an office is made on the basis of 
policies, advocated or executed, it can only be made by 
elaboration of the significance o~ those policies in terms 
of the political vision from which party members gain 
inspiration. ·From the point of view of the ordinary 
party member, acceptance of a policy implies orthodoxy, 
because it implies acceptance of the significance of the 
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proposed action. "Fellow-travellers" need not be 
considered here. There can be no serious adherents who 
are not party members. I argued this point in Chapter IV, 
in which I discussed what constitutes the claim to be in a 
particular relationship. Adcording to the view put 
forward in that Chapter, ideologies specify relationships 
between identities, which are affirmed in political action. 
The argument given above, in shortened form, is the 
basis for much of my criticism of a number of accounts 
and histories of parties. The ones I have in mind are 
those which describe at length all the institutional 
changes and major policy decisions of a party.' s existence 
without giving the reader some insight into the debates 
which gave those actions their meaning for the agents of 
them. What is, I believe, lacking most in such:_ accounts 
is an appreciation of the language of adherence. The 
,, opportunity arises here for the historian of political 
theory to display something akin to the aesthetic 
appreciation of the adherent's vision, which was mentioned 
in my first discussions o~ the literary critics. Some 
writers, however, in seeking to reconstruct that vision, 
have confused ideological writing with academic philosophy. 
The history of a tradition of discourse is, by them, taken 
to be that of the further elaboration of a theory. This 
essentialist error has been compounded by some writers who 
have failed to take proper notice of the political groupings 
of which they claim to write. The result is an account 
of a phantom political _association concocted from all the 
actual political groupings which are thought to subscribe 
to elements of the philosophical 'doctrine'. I illustrated 
my objections to this kind of writing with the case of_ 
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nationalism. My argument was as follows. 
There is no "paradox .··or nationalism" in the case· 
where a 'nationalist' party both fights against a regime 
identified as an oppressor of·the nation, and, at the 
same time· deqies .. the 'nationalist' aspirations of 
another 'nationalist' party. Any inconsistency. in the 
first party's 'nationalism' is only present if it is 
believed tha~ 'nationalism' is one 'doctrine'. But 
_my argument has ·been that to identify such a movement 
one must look. to an assocaition of adherents of the 
putative 'doctrine'. Who is to count as a member of 
that party is a matter of acknowledgement by the 
membership of the party itself. That is, for the historian 
it is a question of evidence, not an opportunity for a ' 
philosophical analysis of utterances. 
My proposal _is this. The location of bodies of 
practitioners, of the kind described, whether in the 
II> 
fine arts, the sciencffior politics, is a necessary 
condition for the identification of traditions of such 
pursuits. Some works·are 'taken up' by those practioners, 
so becoming contributions to the tradition,. and it is 
the character of these contributions, as_innovations 
rather than imitations or repetitions of past practice, 
which allows us to talk of traditions in this sense in 
political discourse at all. I believe that, to paraphrase 
the words of Michael Oakeshott: if traditions have been 
tricky things to get to know, they are indeed not without. 
identity. 
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APPENDIX 
'The Liberal Mind' 
Just as some authors have tried to consolidate all 
"nationalists" into a single movement informed by a single 
ooctrine, ;·nationalism', so common use of the word "liberal" 
can mislead the unwary into seeking to give an account of 
that diffuse "liberalism" which is not the preserve of any 
one Liberal party. K. Minogue is one such author,· and 
his The Liberal Mind1 is one such account. 
In the preface to that book, Minogue 1nforms us that 
his "aim" is to "analyse the long tradition of liberalism"~ 
On page one we are told that: 
"Liberalism is a political theory closely 
linked these days with such democratic 
machinery as checks and balances in 
government, an uncontrolled press, 
responsible oppo"si tion parties' and a 
population which does not l~ve in fear 
of arbitrary arrest by the government." 3 
Minogue then goes on (in one sentence) to define a "liberal 
state"· and adds that:. 
"A liberal political philosophy is a 
description of this kind of state, 
combined with the attempt to work 
out the· general p-rinciples which can 
best rationalize it". 4 
Now all this is less obviously an essentialist account of 
Liberalism than that given by say Macpherson, Hobhouse or 
Spencer. It seems more like an account of what we mean by 
"liberal" when we say. that Kruschev was more liberal than 
Stalin. In a brief inquiry entitled "Is Liberalism an 
Ideology", towards the end of the introduction to The Liberal 
Mind,. Minogue remarks that: 
"In discussing liberalism, we must 
at least initially assume that it 
is a simple entity. This is not to 
suggest that there is a pure essence 
of liberalism, nor need it impel us 
towards the fruitless pastime of 
seeking to isolate 'true liberalism' 
from a collection of counterparts". 5 
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But after discussing some· of the possible divisions 
in "liberalism'', he conclude.s that: 
"The unity which allows us to discuss 
liberalism over the last few centuries 
as a single and continuing entity is 
intellectual: we are confronted with 
a single tradition of thought ... " 6 
Such a "tradition" is claimed to be an "abstraction", 
·however. No. one is a "liberal pure and simple". 8 Here 
the difficulties come to the fore. What Minogue has to 
say makes sense, perhaps,of his "liberalism" but not 
of the ideology, Liberalism. Yet the two are not 
distinguished. Note the ambiguity in the following 
sentence: 
"Liberal intellectuals draw upon 
other traditions; and liberal 
politicians, simply because they 
~are politicians, cannot be 
consistently liberal". 9 
No one would deny that Liberals might not be consistently 
liberal. But to say that Liberals cannot be consistently 
Liberal is hardly to state the self-evident. If a 
Liberal leader a;Lways has the backing of his party, who· 
is to SfiY that he is not a Liberal and that his policies 
are not Liberal policies? Losing the backing of the party 
that acknowledges him as a Liberal, that is, ceasing to be 
a LiberaL (or perhaps be_!rig inconsistently Liberal~, does 
not make him more .of a politician (this is what we might 
expect from Minogue's remark above). Conversely, we do 
not deny someone the title of politician because he nas 
not had the career of a Gladstone. So, perhaps, "liberals" 
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cannot be consistently "liberal". Yet Minogue claims 
that his "liberalism" is an ''ideology" and a "movement" 
and that J.S. Mill would be a guide to what a "liberal· 
pure and simple" would be like if such·a creature were 
possible. A reader- of Minogue's book might,then, be 
forgiven for thinking that if Minogue is writing about 
anyone at all then he is writing about Liberals. Perhaps 
it is possible to write an account of "liberalism" as an 
abstraction. To write an account of a tradition like that 
of Liberalism one must write its history. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that "liberals" seem to Minogue 
to have ceased to have "fixed identities", or that 
"liberalism" seems to be the creed of all but " a few 
palpable eccentri'cs". He cannot identify his "liberals" 
because he has misidentified what gives a tradition its 
identity. 
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